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OF THE

ORDER OF PREACHERS

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THE THOMIST has not often intruded editorially upon its readers. Although its original plan proposed a regular department of editorials, the actual development of the character of the review seemed to preclude frequent editorializing. For THE THOMIST is a speculative review, and as speculative has concerned itself with the world of ideas rather than the world of personalities. Accordingly, while writers and reviewers have assumed responsibility for their ideas and criticisms, the editors themselves have chosen to remain anonymous and have applied themselves to the judgment of ideas and criticisms insofar as they were well thought and well expressed, without editorial statement of agreement or disagreement.

Thus in fifteen years of publication THE THOMIST has spoken as a corporate entity once with a word of introduction to its objectives, several times with words of appraisal about the attainment of those objectives. There have been as few departures in the matter of personality. Only twice has THE THOMIST offered personal tribute, once to Jacques Maritain as an outstanding Thomistic philosopher, once to the memory of Father Walter Farrell as an outstanding Thomistic theologian and one of its original editors.

Now, however, since the editors are not altogether anonymous, but as proclaimed in each issue, Dominican Fathers of the Province of Saint Joseph, they deem it only fitting and proper that they should pay personal and filial tribute to the memory of their Father General recently dead. While it is true that Father Emmanuel Suarez will not be remembered primarily as an author of speculative theology and philosophy, as were several former Masters General like Cardinal Cajetan and Sylvester of Ferrara, his attainments in related fields, his brilliant work of administration and his direct encouragement and assistance to those engaged in speculation richly deserve commemoration and honor.

Emmanuel Suarez was born November fifth, 1895, at Herias in the Asturias of Spain. He entered the Dominican Order as a young man of eighteen and was ordained to the priesthood in 1920. Except for a brief period of teaching philosophy, his entire career, which was to last almost thirty-five years, was devoted to legal study, teaching and administration. Having obtained his Lectorate in Theology at Salamanca, he received two doctorates in law, one in Roman Law at the Apollinaris, the other in Canon Law at the Angelico. His professorial career in law likewise began in Rome at the Angelico, and in due time his care to show the theological principles of the law won for him the Order's highest intellectual distinction, the Masterate in Sacred Theology. A year later he became Dean of the Canon Law faculty at the Angelicum, then later its Rector Magnificus, in which capacity he served until his election as General in 1946. During this period of teaching and academic administra-

tion, Father Suarez wrote many articles of scholarly interest and published his treatise *De Remotione Parochorum*. The Spanish Government honored him for his intellectual attainments with membership in the Superior Council of Scientific Investigations, and awarded him the Grand Cross of Isabel the Catholic.

Even before he was make General, he had served the Holy See with devotion and fidelity in many of the Sacred Congregations, Commissions and Tribunals of Rome. His work was so highly esteemed that he was persuaded to continue even after he was charged with the heavy burden of the care of his own Order. His magnificant work as a churchman and as an agent of the Holy See, like Saint Dominic himself, ceased only with his death. This labor for the Church was not confined to any limited sphere of activity; not only was he, in virtue of his office as General of the Dominicans, Consultor to the Supreme Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office, but also Consultor of the Sacred Congregations of the Council, for the Oriental Church, of the Discipline of the Sacraments and of Religious; a member of the Commission of Judgment of Matrimonial Cases and of the Commission of Vigilance of the Ecclesiastical Tribunals for the Congregation of the Sacraments; a consultor of the Commission for the Authentic Interpretation of the Canons of the Code; an advocate of the Sacred Roman Rota; a Pro-Synodal Judge of the Tribunal of the Vicariate of Rome; and a Pro-Defender of the Bond at the Sacred Roman Rota.

When Father Suarez was elected eightieth General of the Order of Preachers, the Order like the Church herself was passing through a most critical period. A great world war was hardly over; its aftermath was all too evident not only in the physical ruins which scarred the face of the earth in Europe and in Asia but also in the spiritual wreckage of the souls of men, a wreckage which sometimes manifested itself in an uneasy restiveness and an impatient contempt for all which was traditional. In another sense, the war was still not over, for half the world groaned under the tyrannical domination of a God-hating power. Father Suarez had himself encountered

anti-religious persecution in his native Spain during its civil war and had narrowly escaped. Now through the Iron Curtain trickled word of entire provinces hampered in their apostolic work and persecuted in their property and persons. But the work of zeal went forward as new provinces were erected and their apostolic labors begun, old provinces congratulated yet exhorted to expand themselves and their apostolate.

In all his administrative work, the seventy-ninth vicar of Saint Dominic never forgot the profound doctrinal implications in his unique title as *Master* General and Professor of Sacred Theology. In this, his vicar especially resembled Saint Dominic himself, for although no theological writing of that holy Patriarch has been preserved for us, history assures us that he was an excellent theologian, *Doctor Veritatis*. What has indeed been preserved is that admirable plan of practical genius, the Constitutions of the Friars Preachers. Thus, while Saint Dominic has been overshadowed at times in the eyes of the intellectual world by some of his illustrious sons like Saint Thomas, those who know the Constitutions know that it was Saint Dominic who was the wise architect who laid the foundation, that Saint Dominic was the creator of the doctrinal milieu which gave Saint Thomas and other doctors their opportunity. Saint Thomas himself in speaking of the office of the wise man (*I Cont. Gent.*, c. 1) says that men are called wise who direct things and govern them well.

For these last eight years Emmanuel Suarez, following in the footsteps of Saint Dominic, has been the wise governor and director of the Dominican apostolate. As a director and governor his contribution to that doctrinal apostolate has not been simply that of negative toleration or permission but that of a very positive inspiration and encouragement. On his first visit to the College of the Immaculate Conception which houses the editorial offices of THE THOMIST, he spoke with inspiring audacity of fields white for harvest, of the needed growth of the Dominicans and their apostolate. The scene could only recall the first dispersal of the astonished brethren when Saint Dominic announced: "We must sow the seed, not hoard it."

The efforts of Father Suarez went far beyond inspiring exhortation. At the Angelicum in Rome he fostered Institutes of Spirituality and Social Studies even as he extended the material facilities of that international college. The Dominican Faculty at Salamanca, which had been the scene of such fruitful scholasticism in the past, was now raised to the status of a Pontifical Faculty of Theology. At Fatima a new house of studies was erected. The Order no sooner received the care of the Basilica of Saint Nicholas at Bari than another house of studies was founded there. In Protestant Finland, the *Studium Catholicum,* a cultural center was opened. The work of the Leonine Commission for the critical edition of all the works of Saint Thomas was reactivated, and its fruit has been evident in the volumes currently appearing. And throughout the Order, the General encouraged the continuation and amplification of the intellectual life even as more material resources were provided for that life. Maintaining careful vigilance for Catholic tradition and the teaching of Saint Thomas, the General did not hesitate to encourage movements to bring Theology to everyman—Theology for the Laity, Institutes of Spirituality and Theology for Religious and Theology for Colleges. " We must sow the seed, not hoard it."

Very particularly, THE THOMIST owes a special debt of gratitude to the memory of Emmanuel Suarez. In letters to our review, which was but seven years old when he assumed office, the former Master General wrote: " The continued success of your worthy review is a constant source of satisfaction to me, and I encourage you to continue your loyal and self-sacrificing labors in this great undertaking." In this same letter he invoked God's abundant blessing and the special protection of the Angelic Doctor. In another autographed letter, he wrote of " this important apostolate, the noble work of diffusing for the good of souls the doctrine of Saint Thomas, that doctrine which the Holy Father is pleased to speak of as 'efficacissima' (*Humani Generis, AAS,* XXXXII, 1950, p. 573)."

Any success THE THOMIST may have enjoyed for half its existence is in no small measure attributable to the patronage

and direction of Father Suarez. For just as no Christian may take full credit for his good works, realizing that he is an unprofitable servant depending on the grace of God both to will and to accomplish, somewhat analogously, no production of a religious or group of religious may be said to be exclusively their work, since as men subject to obedience, their will and accomplishment is the will and accomplishment of their superiors.

Thus, in recognition of the personal qualities of that noble and generous soul and in gratitude for his paternal solicitude, THE THOMIST honors the memory of Father Emmanuel Suarez and prays for his eternal rest. *Requiescat in pace.*

* * * *

In the interim until the election of another Master General, the Most Reverend T. S. McDermott, O.P., S.T.M. is the supreme head of the Order as its Vicar General. As Provincial of the Province of Saint Joseph, Father McDermott has had direct and immediate care of THE THOMIST from its very inception. Not only was this review founded at his personal direction and command but has been constantly sustained by his vigilant interest. He has supplied members of the Staff and has encouraged the other members of his province to assist THE THOMIST by the contribution of articles and reviews.

On a wider stage, Father McDermott has had long and valuable experience in the direction of a multitude of works in one of the largest provinces of the Order. In the years of his Provincialate, the eastern part of the United States has witnessed a wonderful growth of the Dominicans both in men and in the expansion of the apostolate. Parishes have increased and multiplied, the work of preaching and giving retreats has gone steadily forward.

On the educational scene especially, Father McDermott has made some profound contributions, the full fruits of which will not mature for years to come. However, even now the College at Providence has had a phenomenal growth with nearly eighty on the Dominican faculty and some seventeen hundred students. The educational efforts of Father McDermott's

province, nevertheless, have by no means been confined to Dominican institutions but have branched out into other Catholic and even some non-Catholic colleges and universities. Of the greatest assistance in the preparation of these professors, who are for the most part philosophers and theologians, was the elevation under Father McDermott's care of the faculty of the Washington House of Studies to a Pontifical Faculty of Theology, with the right to grant, over and above the degrees of the Order, papal degrees including the doctorate. Since the inception of this Faculty over two hundred degrees in Theology have been given. The graduates have gone out not only to teach in colleges for men and women, but to give series of Thomistic lectures to adults, especially professional groups, in the major cities. Every summer over twenty institutions staffed by these Dominican professors open their doors to Religious Sisters pursuing a three to six-year course in the *Summa* of Saint Thomas and allied subjects.

With such rich experience in his own Province, Father McDermott comes well qualified to direct the work of the entire Order. THE THOMIST offers the Most Reverend Vicar General of the Order best wishes and prayers for abundant success in his new work.

MARY IMMACULATE, PATRONESS OF THE UNITED STATES

THE liturgy of the Church, as well as popular devotion, perpetuates the venerable tradition by which special patrons are invoked as special intercessors with God and celestial advocates, so to speak, for particular localities, groups or works within that Universal Church for which Christ Himself makes constant intercession before the Throne of the Father.

Such patrons probably began to be chosen as an outgrowth from the early Church custom of honoring certain martyrs as the "titulars" of churches and places. During the first three centuries the faithful assembled for worship in private homes, in the places where their beloved dead were buried or in other secluded areas where neither the persecution nor the contamination of the paganism about them could invade the peace and quiet of the Christian devotion. As occasion permitted, buildings were erected or adapted for Christian cult. These buildings were not "dedicated" to saints originally, as churches and institutions now are, but were set apart and cherished as "houses of God" or "houses of prayer." Their Greek and Latin names indicate this primary dedication of them: *kyriaca, dominica, oratoria.*

It was only after Constantine accorded to Christians peaceful freedom in the practice of their religion and in the construction of churches that these began to be dedicated to saints. The origin of the custom of so dedicating the gathering places of the faithful seems natural enough. The sites chosen for the construction of churches were usually places already beloved by the Christian community because of their association with the martyrs, greatest of the heroes among the Christians. The association might have been because they were the scenes of the triumphs of martyrs, of their glorious deaths, or because

they were made holy in some other way by the lives and the memories of those who bore ultimate and most valiant witness to their faith by the testimony of martyrdom.

And so it came to pass that early in the history of the Church in Rome and elsewhere the buildings erected for Christian worship took their titles from "titulars" among the martyrs or other saints whose pious memories were associated with the places on which the churches were built or with the communities by whom these buildings were erected, supported or frequented. It was inevitable, both as a matter of logic and as a matter of piety, that those who gave their names to churches and to institutions as their "titulars" should eventually be thought of as the special protectors and "patrons" of the places and peoples dedicated to them.

* * *

In general terms it may be said that down to the 17th century it was largely popular devotion, though under the guidance of ecclesiastical authority, which chose celestial patrons from among the holy men and women renowned in life for their miracles and for their special ties of piety to the communities or institutions of which they became the protectors. In 1638, however, Pope Urban VIII set down certain rules by which the faithful of the Church itself should be guided in the selections henceforth of patrons for churches, cities or even countries. Pope Urban was careful in thus codifying future procedure to leave unchanged the long established customs by which traditional patrons were already venerated so long as these customs were consistent with sound piety and theological principles.

The norms promulgated by Pope Urban systematized and clarified many of the considerations by which particular patrons had been chosen popularly in previous generations. Often a saint was chosen as the patron of a region or of a community because his body or some one of his major relics was in the possession of those who chose him as their patron. Frequently, a saint was chosen as patron of a place where he had preached the Gospel or had performed the labors of his dedicated life or had died in the odor of sanctity. Sometimes the selection of

patrons reflects the popular devotions preached at the time when the choice was made.

The underlying doctrine sustaining and inspiring the custom of choosing celestial patrons is, of course, the dogma of the Communion of Saints. This dogma proclaims the spiritual bond which exists among all those who love God and are thus united to Him, whether by vision in Heaven or by faith on earth and in Purgatory. The solidarity which unites those who love God, whether they be in the Church Militant here below or in the Church Suffering and the Church Triumphant in Purgatory and in Heaven hereafter, causes one and all to be interested in the fate of each. Those who are still on earth, and therefore still able to merit by their prayers and their sacrifices, are the advocates of the holy souls detained in the prison of love that is Purgatory. Those who now stand unspotted before God's merciful face serve as advocates for their brethren both in Purgatory and on earth. Even their heavenly advocacy or patronage, a Christian instinct assures us, will inevitably be colored and intensified as a result of the ties between them and the places or persons on earth that perpetuate their names as " titulars " and patrons.

* * *

Against the background of this summary history and even more sketchily summarized doctrine it is interesting to recall how the Blessed Mother, under her title of the Immaculate Conception, came to be chosen as the celestial patroness of the United States. A preliminary observation is important and interesting. On November 8, 1760 Our Lady, under her same title of the Immaculate Conception, had been proclaimed principal patroness of all possessions of the Spanish Crown, including those in the Americas.

At the sixth Provincial Council of Baltimore, May 10, 1846 (with 23 Bishops and the representatives of four religious orders present), the Blessed Virgin Mary " conceived without original sin " was chosen as the Patroness of the Province. On February 7, 1847 this selection of the Blessed Virgin Mary, under the title of her Immaculate Conception, was extended so as to

make her a principal patroness of the whole United States of America. The first Plenary Council of Baltimore, May 9-20, 1852, confirmed all the enactments of the seven Provincial Councils.

This choice of Our Lady under the title of the Immaculate Conception to be patroness of the United States is considered thus meditatively by Daniel Sargent in his book, *Our Land and our Lady*:

> In 1846, not long after the native American riots, there met in Baltimore the sixth provincial council. While it was meeting, the armies of the United States were entering New Mexico and California. We were taking over more lands which the Spaniards had dedicated to the Immaculate Conception. Those in the council were not thinking of the invading armies. They had no way of knowing even whether they were conquering or being conquered. Yet they seemed unconsciously in one act of theirs to be preparing our land to take over Spain's old responsibilities. Twenty years of the Deluge had tightened the bond between the Church in our country and the Mother of God. It was a spontaneous act, therefor, when in this council permission was sought from Rome that we be allowed to elect as our patroness, her, who to the immigrants was not only their life, their sweetness and their hope, but also their only true equality, only true liberty, only true fraternity, the "Blessed Virgin Conceived Without Sin" (*op. cit.*, p. 187).

The fact that this petition for the designation of the Immaculate Conception as the patroness of the United States was made eight years before the solemn definition of the dogma in her regard has always been a further joy to Catholic Americans. One cannot doubt that it has also been a source of special graces to the United States and, one ventures to say, to the hierarchy which officially took the action by which this happy choice was made in 1846. It is surely not too much to suggest that the Blessed Mother must have exercised a providential patronage over the proceedings of the Plenary Council itself and, as a result, over the myriad aspects of Catholic American life subsequently influenced by it.

The theological premises of the invocation of patrons which we have recalled remind us of the inward spiritual union of

the faithful, as members of Christ's Mystical Body, with all other members of this Body, including the elect and the confirmed in justice whose participation in the Kingdom of God is absolutely certain and through whose intercession help may be given to the faithful still wayfaring on earth.

The intercessory power of the servants of Christ who have triumphed through His grace is great before the throne of God. How much greater is the power of her who is not only a servant of God but the Mother of His Incarnate Son? Christ gave His Mother to all Christians on Calvary. The universal Catholic people have taken Mary to themselves by their creed and their cult, but Catholic Americans have made her their especial patroness by the deliberate and formal action of the special representatives of her Son in His Church in the United States.

The ties that bind us to the Immaculate Mother are therefore many and strong. The needs of the Church and of the members of Christ's Mystical Body in the United States are many and urgent. There is no one who can intercede for us with Christ more effectively than His Mother. The consequences of her patronage for us cannot be exaggerated and should not be minimized. Catholic Americans are Mary's devotees by the added title of her election as our principal patroness.

What the spiritual princes of an older day and world, supported by the piety of the subjects of their kings, did for Mary in France and Spain, the bishops of America, seconded by the believing citizens of our democracy, have in our days done for her here. Sound reason and simple faith agree in suggesting that Mary, as patroness of our land, will benignly insure among us victories for faith and freedom comparable to those which once she accomplished there.

✠ JOHN WRIGHT
Bishop of Worcester

MARY IMMACULATE IN THE WRITINGS OF ST. THOMAS

IN this year dedicated to Our Lady Thomists have reason to rejoice in St. Thomas' reverent and profound tribute to the God-bearer; reason to rejoice in his many and masterful contributions to Christian understanding of the mystery that is Mary.

But there is also the kindly suspicion that in this centenary of the definition of the Virgin's Immaculate Conception the followers of Thomas have not too much to rejoice in; for it seems that in this very question of the Immaculate Conception is St. Thomas' greatest—if not unique—theological failure. Certainly the opinion that St. Thomas denied the Immaculate Conception is both widespread and readily defended.

Perhaps nowhere more fittingly than in the pages of *The Thomist* could there appear at this time of intense cultivation of Mariology a re-examination of the text, context, and general background of St. Thomas' teaching on Our Lady's primitive sanctification. The study has but one purpose: to reproduce, in its entirety, Aquinas' view of this mystery. Our procedure, therefore, must be very simple: we shall examine first the texts of St. Thomas which seem, either explicitly or implicitly, to favor the Immaculate Conception; secondly we shall indicate the three classes of texts which seem opposed to the dogma; thirdly we shall examine closely the wording, context, and background of the principal texts.

That we approach this re-examination without pre-convictions is suggested first by reverence for so great a Doctor of the Church as Thomas; for, as Pope Pius XI reminded us all, in honoring Thomas we honor the authority of the teaching Church.[1] It is suggested secondly by intellectual honesty: to

[1] Pius XI Ency. *Studiorum Ducem*, 29 June 1923.

which may be appended, by way of public confession, the admission that this study was undertaken in the firm pre-conviction that St. Thomas had unquestionably denied the Immaculate Conception of our Lady!

I.

1. The texts of St. Thomas which must or can be interpreted in favor of our Lady's Immaculate Conception are not confined to any one period of his life.

At the beginning of his first theological work—his *Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*—Thomas gives us our initial revelation of his thought on Mary's original freedom from sin. We read: "The increase of purity (from sin) is in accordance with the recession from its contrary; and because in the Blessed Virgin this was a purifying from *all* sin, therefore she attained the summit of purity; but beneath God, in Whom there is not even capability of deficiency, such as is to be found in every creature whatsoever." [2] And a bit later in the same *Book of Sentences* St. Thomas amplifies that statement, spells out its meaning. "Purity is intensified by recession from its contrary; therefore there can be some created reality than which nothing in creation can be more pure, if (that reality) is stained by no taint of sin; and such was the purity of the Blessed Virgin who was *immune from original and actual sin*; yet (she was) beneath God, inasmuch as there was in her capability of sinning." [3]

These closely-related texts need little comment. These points alone need be urged with respect to them. First there is no doubt whatever of their authenticity, no doubt whatever that here St. Thomas expressly affirms Mary's immunity from original sin, and from all sin. Secondly, the first of the two texts, considered even apart from the second, is sufficient to indicate St. Thomas' mind on the matter. Many early Fathers of the Church and ecclesiastical authors whose words are cited in favor of Mary's Immaculate Conception expressed them-

[2] *I Sent.*, d. 17, q. 2, a. 4. [3] *Ibid.*, d. 44, q. 1, a. 3, ad 3.

selves only in such general terms as did St. Thomas in this first place. Thirdly, however, too much importance should not be attached to these texts for the reason that in the places cited the Immaculate Conception is not being treated *ex professo* but only incidentally.

2. In Book Three, of St. Thomas' same *Commentary* on Peter Lombard, occur other striking statements of St. Thomas' view of our Lady's primitive sanctification. We read that it was due to the Man-God alone that He should be bound by no slavery of sin, since He alone redeems all from sin; therefore "His Virgin mother ought to have not that purity but the greatest after it."[4] Thomas immediately adds that she was "more pure from sin than all other Saints"; that the privilege of purification in the womb given to some—to John the Baptist and Jeremias, for example—was beyond doubt "given much more excellently to the Mother of God."[5] The meaning of the above passage seems clarified in the very next point: "Of wisdom it is said 'For wisdom will not enter into a malicious soul nor dwell in a body subject to sins.' But the wisdom of God not only entered into the soul of the Virgin . . . He dwelt in her body, assuming flesh of her. *Therefore in her there was no sin*: which can be gathered from what is said in the Canticle, 'Thou art all fair, O my love, and *there is not a spot in Thee*'!"[6]

Now granted that these words occur in a section of St. Thomas' writings which is usually considered one of his strongest statements *against* the Immaculate Conception, they still have considerable force. Their progression is clear. We have *first*, that Christ alone is in no way affected by sin, so that Mary's freedom from sin is, after Her Son's, the maximum; *second*, that her freedom from sin is greater than that of all other saints without any exception, greater than the purity of that John of whom Divine Truth said that no greater than he

[4] *III Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, a. 1, qcla. 2, ad 3.
[5] *Ibid.*, qcla. 3.
[6] *Ibid.*, a. 2, qcla. 2, argu. Praeterea (sed contra 2ª).

was born of woman; *third*, that Mary's initial deliverance from sin was much more excellent than that of others who were purified before birth: what more excellent sanctification is there than that of a John, sanctified before his birth? The answer is, *fourth*, that Mary's sanctification left her without spot, without stain of sin, so that to her St. Thomas applies the words of one *Canticle:* "*macula non est in te.*" In that is the great excellence of her sanctification.

3. More than fifteen years after writing the above St. Thomas in his *Summa Theologiae* returned to the question of Mary's primitive sanctification. Is there now any trace of the opinion he had expressed in the *Sentences*? We find, for example: "The Mother of God should have been adorned with the very greatest purity." [7] Again, "reasonably we believe that she who bore 'the Only-Begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth' received g ater privileges of grace than *all* others." [8] And immediately after: "Under Christ who as universal Savior did not need to be saved, the Blessed Virgin's was the greatest purity. For Christ in no way contracted original sin . . . the Blessed Virgin was cleansed from it . . . In her coming forth she was immune from original sin." [9] In the same question St. Thomas makes his own Augustine's words (words so often cited as indicating that the great Bishop and Doctor of Hippo taught Mary's Immaculate Conception): "Concerning the Virgin Mary I will allow no question when treating of sins . . . we know that greater grace was bestowed on her to overcome sin under every aspect." [10] Again there is a certain progression. Mary had under Christ the highest sanctity, higher than that of *all others*, save Christ alone. Therefore she was in some special way freed from original sin though not as Christ was, since in Him was no reference to that or to any sin. Nevertheless, such was her special purity that according to Augustine and Thomas she can truly be said to have overcome absolutely

[7] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 81, a. 5, ad 3.
[8] *Ibid.*, III, q. 27, a. 1.
[9] *Ibid.*, a. 2, ad 2.
[10] *Ibid.*, a. 4, *Sed Contra.*

all sin with the consequence that *no* question of sin in her is to be tolerated.

4. Dating roughly from the same period as St. Thomas' *Summa Theologiae* his *Commentaries on the Psalms* and on certain Christian prayers also reveal his outlook at this time on Mary's primitive sanctification. He writes, for example: "In Christ and in the Virgin Mary there was *absolutely no stain*," [11] and a bit later the words of Psalm 18—"He hath set his tabernacle in the sun"—he explains to mean: "That is, Christ set His body in the sum, i. e., in the Blessed Virgin who has *no* darkness of sin." And again he refers to Mary the words of the *Canticle*: "*macula non est in te*." [12]

In St. Thomas' explanation of the *Pater Noster* he speaks of "the Blessed Virgin who was full of grace, in *whom there was no sin*, as Augustine says." And last of all his exposition of the *Ave Maria* probably includes these words so reminiscent of the first opinion he has long before penned about Mary. "As to purity she exceeded the Angels, because the Blessed Virgin is not alone pure in herself but she also procured purity for others. With regard to fault (*quantum ad culpam*) she was most pure, because the Virgin incurred neither original nor venial, nor mortal sin." [13] Beyond any doubt St. Thomas in his magnificent commentary on the *Ave Maria* did write: "The Blessed Virgin surpassed the angels . . . in fulness of grace which is greater in the Blessed Virgin than in any angel."

It is the asserted parallelism between Christ and Mary (an admittedly imperfect parallel) which is most characteristic of these passages and most remarkable in them. In Christ and Mary there is absolutely no stain; as Christ has grace without limitation, Mary has such fulness of holiness as to make sin in

[11] *In Psalm.* 14.

[12] Cf. *in Psalm.* 18.

[13] This text is included here merely for the sake of completeness; from it we shall not attempt to draw any conclusion, nor shall further reference be made to it. The reason is that the phrase *nec originale* may be an interpellation; it seems better to concern ourselves wholly with texts that are indisputably authentic than to engage in a discussion of one which is only probably authentic.

her unthinkable; she is even holier than the Angels who were, according to St. Thomas, created in grace! The sinlessness of the Savior and His mother is unique, so that the latter's freedom from sin is comparable only to Christ's own spotlessness: if in her there is no stain or any question of sin at all, then surely her Immaculate Conception seems implied in her original holiness.

II

The texts of St. Thomas which seem to deny Our Lady's Immaculate Conception are so numerous and found in so many of his works that their compilation alone is a task—a task perhaps more arduous than fruitful since many of the texts are repetitive. For the sake of completeness, however, it is well to point out where many of those texts occur.

In general they seem to fall under three headings: (1) those which merely state that the Blessed Virgin was conceived in sin, but offer no reason for that statement; (2) more general texts which state and prove that all men save Christ *alone* are conceived in original sin. Such texts refer only by implication to Our Lady, yet they are highly important in that they manifest some general principles which St. Thomas brought to bear on the problem of Mary's freedom from original sin; (3) texts concerned with proving that Our Lady in particular was conceived in original sin.

1. We find fairly frequently in St. Thomas' works mere statements without any proof that the Blessed Virgin was conceived in original sin. For example, the *Summa Theologiae* has these statements: " The flesh of the Virgin was conceived in original sin "; [14] " the body of the Blessed Virgin was wholly conceived in original sin "; [15] " the Blessed Virgin was conceived in original sin." [16] The *Commentary on the Ave Maria* is quite as clear. " Christ surpassed the Blessed Virgin in this that He was conceived and born without any original sin. The Blessed

[14] *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 14, a. 3, ad 1.
[15] *Ibid.*, q. 31, a. 7.
[16] *Ibid.*, q. 31, a. 8, ad 2.

Virgin was conceived but not born in original (sin)." In the *Quaestiones Quodlibetales* we find: "This privilege is said to be Christ's alone that He was conceived without original sin. Therefore it does not befit the Blessed Virgin." [17] The *Commentary on Psalm 45* reads: "The Holy Ghost sanctified her (Mary) in her mother's womb after her body was formed and her soul created."

It is as well to point out immediately that these texts really prove nothing with regard to St. Thomas' apparent denial of the Immaculate Conception. Leaving aside for the moment the very last text (from the *Commentary on Psalm 45*), all the others state substantially this: Mary was conceived in original sin. But as St. Thomas understood and meant that proposition, it is in no way opposed to the truth defined by Pius IX. In St. Thomas' view, as in that of his contemporaries generally (following the ancient naturalists), *conception* preceded the infusion of a human soul by a very considerable time. During all that time there was as yet no apt subject for divine grace, for the fetus, prior to its animation by a human soul, was considered to be of infra-intellectual nature, consequently incapable of grace. As we shall see, this is an argument used by St. Thomas to show that Our Lady could not possibly have been sanctified before the infusion of her soul; and it is a valid argument if the supposition be granted that the fetus is for some time infra-human.

This explains why we find in St. Thomas' works such propositions as: "The flesh of Mary was conceived in original sin," "the body of the Blessed Virgin was conceived in original sin," and "the Blessed Virgin was conceived in original sin." They are all equivalent because in St. Thomas' judgment conception is conception of the body only, not of the person (though it is attributed to the person); and any flesh or body conceived by human intercourse must inevitably be sin-infested in the sense that it is the instrument which as it were carries original sin.

[17] *Quaes. Quod.* q. 6, a. 7. *Sed Contra.* The same judgment is expressed in the *Commentary on Psalm 50* n. 3: "*Omnes praeter Christum concipiuntur in originali.*"

Sin is in it not formally (for only a *person* can be a sinner) but virtually, or instrumentally. And all these passages in St. Thomas' understanding and intention convey no more than that.

So long as it is a question of *conception*, then St. Thomas is saying merely that the fetus as infra-human is incapable of sanctification or grace; but, given Adam's sin, it is an instrument for the transmission of sin to the person when the person shall be constituted. Therefore the fetus in the womb of St. Anne was capable of transmitting sin, like any other fetus so begotten. This is *not* an assertion that the person who is Mary was stained by original sin *once that human person was constituted* by the union of her human soul to her body. To read into it any such assertion is quite literally to do violence to the thought of Thomas, to refuse to read his words as he penned them. For him conception did not mark the beginning of life as human, but was antecedent to one's personal history. Incidentally, this explains, too, why St. Thomas says more than once that "Christ alone was conceived without original sin." In Christ uniquely, accordingly to St. Thomas, the instant of conception was identical with that of animation by His human soul. But this was miraculous and predicable of no other than Him, for it was divinely accomplished out of regard for the exigencies of the Hypostatic Union.

In brief, the passages we have seen are not concerned with the conception of Mary inasmuch as the dogma of the Immaculate Conception refers to her conception. The dogma asserts that Mary was preserved free from all stain of original sin in the first instant of her conception, i. e., in the first instant that the person who is Mary was constituted. What St. Thomas denied is that there was holiness there *before* that person was constituted. The latter is not a denial of the former.

The last of the quoted passages refers to Mary's sanctification "after her body was formed and her soul created." But again this is not probative. Does *after* (*postquam*) refer necessarily to posteriority of time? Nothing in the text or

context so limits or determines its meaning. As the passage stands its determinate significance simply is not clear and to insist that it is clear would be to substitute arbitrariness for sound exegesis. Can the sense of this passage be fixed by reference to other and fuller passages in St. Thomas? We must attempt to ascertain this.

2. The texts we shall now treat are general in character but have immediate reference to our problem insofar as they show why St. Thomas held that all men save Christ *must* be conceived in original sin. They give the background against which he reached the particular conclusions about Our Lady.

In the *Second Sentences* we read:

> He who is not subject to sin does not need redemption. If therefore there were anyone, besides Christ, who was not born in original sin there would be . . . someone who would not need the redemption accomplished by Christ, and so Christ would not be the head of all men: which is not in accordance with faith. Neither therefore (is it in accordance with faith) to say that anyone could be born without original sin.[18]

Later in the *Sentences* much the same reason is repeated but amplified.

> It is erroneous to say that anyone except Christ is conceived without original sin; for he who would be conceived without original sin would not need the redemption wrought by Christ; and thus Christ would not be the redeemer of all men. Nor can it be said that they did not need this redemption since this favor was bestowed upon them that they be conceived without sin; insofar as grace was given to their parents so that the defect of nature should be healed in them . . . or (the grace was given) to nature itself which was healed. For it must be held that each man needs Christ's redemption *personally* and not only by reason of his nature. But only one who has incurred a debt or fallen into evil can be freed from the evil or absolved from the debt . . . so the forgiving of the debt and the freeing from evil cannot (so) be understood that one be born without debt or immune from evil; but (must be understood in the sense) that, born with the debt, he is afterward freed by the grace of Christ.[19]

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[18] *II Sent.*, d. 31, q. 1, a. 2.

[19] *IV Sent.*, d. 43, q. 1, a. 4, qcla. 1, ad 3.

The *De Malo* yields no different line of argument:

> It is erroneous to say that some are seminally derived from Adam without original sin: for thus there would be some men who would not need the redemption achieved by Christ. So it must be conceded that all who are seminally begotten from Adam contract original sin in their very animation,[20] (i. e., in the uniting of human soul to body).

The same question, of course, is considered in the *Summa Theologiae.*

> According to Catholic faith it must firmly be held that, Christ alone excepted, all men sprung from Adam contract original sin from him; otherwise not all men would need the redemption which is through Christ: and this (proposition) is erroneous.[21]

These passages are uniformly remarkable for two things. First, the argument in each case is the same, viz., that to exempt anyone from original sin would imply a denial of the universality of redemption by Christ; secondly, a theological note of some kind is found in each of the ways wherein St. Thomas records that one argument. In every instance without exception we find "*secundum fidem catholicam*" or its equivalent; or, (qualifying a contradictory proposition) "*erroneum est dicere*" or its equivalent. In St. Thomas this is putting the matter with marked force.

It will be easiest to turn now to what St. Thomas has to say in his *ex professo* arguments about Mary's sanctification in particular. The special significance of the general passages just cited can be pointed out in relationship to the more properly Marian texts to follow.

3. Of the several places in which St. Thomas argues about the Blessed Virgin's primitive sanctity two are of outstanding importance, and these we shall first indicate. In the *Third Sentences* St. Thomas asks whether the Blessed Virgin was sanctified before her animation, i. e., before a human soul was

[20] *De Malo*, q. 4, a. 6.
[21] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 81, a. 3.

united to her body? The objections urge that she was; but, says St. Thomas,

On the contrary, such is the order between the parts of man that the soul is closer to God than is the body. But the power of an agent reaches first to those things that are closer to it, and through them to more distant things. Therefore the grace of sanctification comes from God through the soul to the body. Therefore before the body is animated it could not be sanctified. Again, contraries are concerned with the same thing. But the grace of sanctification is contrary to original sin. Since, therefore, before animation there cannot be original sin in the offspring since the rational soul is the proper subject of guilt; it seems that the Blessed Virgin was not sanctified before animation.

Then in the body of the *quaestiunculum* we read:

To this . . . question it must be said that the Blessed Virgin's sanctification could not fittingly have been before the infusion of her soul, because she was not yet capable of grace; but neither (could it have been) in the very instant of infusion so that, namely, by grace then infused into her soul, it should be preserved from incurring original sin. For Christ alone among human kind has this (dignity) that He does not need redemption, since He is our head; to all others it belongs to be redeemed by Him. But this would not be if there should be discovered another soul which was never infected by original sin. Therefore this is to be conceded neither to the Blessed Virgin nor to anyone else save Christ.[22]

Many years later in the *Summa Theologiae* St. Thomas again asked whether the most Blessed Virgin Mother of God was sanctified before animation? The objections urge that she was: but the Universal Doctor writes:

On the contrary, those things which were in the Old Testament are figures of the New according to I Corinthians, ' all things happened to them in figure.' But it seems that through the sanctification of the tabernacle, concerning which it is said in Psalm 45, ' The Most High hath sanctified His own tabernacle,' there is signified the sanctification of God's Mother who is called a tabernacle of God. According to Psalm 18, ' He hath set His tabernacle in the sun.' Of the tabernacle however it is said in Exodus, ' after all things

[22] *III Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, qcla. 2.

were perfected the cloud covered the tabernacle of the testimony, and the glory of the Lord filled it.' Therefore the Blessed Virgin too was sanctified only after all her (constituent parts) were perfected, that is, soul and body.

I answer that the sanctification of the Blessed Virgin cannot be understood before her animation for two reasons: first, because the sanctification of which we are speaking is a cleansing from original sin, since sanctity means perfect cleanness, as Dionysius says. But sin can be cleansed only through grace, the subject of which is the rational creature alone. Therefore the Blessed Virgin, before the infusion of her rational soul, was not sanctified.

Secondly, since only the rational creature is capable of sin, the offspring is not subject to sin before the infusion of a rational soul. If in any way whatever the Blessed Virgin were sanctified before animation she would never have incurred the stain of original sin and so would not have needed the redemption and salvation which is through Christ, of Whom it is said in Matthew ' He shall save his people from their sins.' But it is unfitting that Christ be not the Savior of all men, as He is called in I Timothy. Hence it remains that the sanctification of the Blessed Virgin was after her animation.[23]

These two texts are of the highest importance for in each we find a denial that Mary was purified and sanctified prior to the infusion of her soul. In addition the first contains a denial that she was purified and sanctified in the moment of the infusion of her soul; the second expressly states that Our Lady was made holy only after the infusion of her soul. On the basis of these two texts many theologians have concluded that we *must* hold that St. Thomas denied the dogma of the Immaculate Conception. Their conclusion is certainly not difficult to understand.

For the sake of completeness it is well to note here the existence of two other, and similar, texts of St. Thomas also of importance in this matter. In the *Quaestiones Quodlibetales* occurs a familiar argument:

Each man contracts original sin by this that he was in Adam *secundum seminalem rationem* (i. e., insofar as he is begotten of his line by natural generation). In this way the Blessed Virgin

[23] *Summa Theol.*, III q. 27, a. 2.

came from Adam because she like others was born through sexual intercourse, and therefore she was conceived in original sin and is included in the totality of those concerning whom the Apostle in the Epistle to the Romans says, ' in whom all have sinned '; from which totality Christ alone is excepted, He who was not in Adam *secundum seminalem rationem*; otherwise, should this be true of another than Christ, that other would not need the redemption of Christ. We cannot attribute so much to the mother as to subtract anything from the honor of the Son, Who is the Savior of all men as the Apostle says (I Epistle to Timothy).

Aquinas goes on to explain the custom of some churches of celebrating a feast of Mary's Conception:

The Roman Church and many others, considering that the Virgin's conception was in original sin, do not celebrate the feast of her Conception. But some, considering Mary's sanctification in the womb, the time of which is unknown, do celebrate her Conception; for it is believed that she was sanctified quickly after her conception and the infusion of her soul. So the feast refers to her Conception not by reason of the conception, but rather of her sanctification.[24]

Lastly the *Compendium Theologiae* offers this wording of the arguments:

She (Our Lady) should have been conceived with original sin because she was conceived through sexual intercourse. (And then the second argument:) If she were not conceived with original sin she would not need to be redeemed through Christ and so Christ would not be the universal Savior of men; this would diminish Christ's dignity. It must therefore be held that she was conceived with original sin but purified from it in a special way . . . But such sanctification did not precede the infusion of her soul. (If it had) she would never have been subject to original sin and would not have needed redemption. For the subject of sin can only be the rational creature. Again sanctifying grace is *per prius* in the soul, and comes to the body only through the soul, therefore she must be believed to have been sanctified after the infusion of her soul.[25]

A fair summary of St. Thomas' position in these places would

[24] *Quaes. Quod.*, q. 6, a. 7. [25] *Comp. Theol.*, c. 224.

seem to be the following. 1) In the question of the universality of original sin he at all times reasons from the revealed truth of the universality of Christ's redemptive activity to the universality of the need of redemption, i. e., to the universality of sin in mankind. This teaching he always qualifies by a theological note. 2) In the special question of Our Lady's primitive sanctification he in various places advances only three arguments directed against her being sanctified before the infusion of her soul. They are: a) before the soul is infused there is given no apt subject of grace; b) all humans including Mary begotten by carnal intercourse *must* inherit original sin; c) had Mary been sanctified before her soul was united to her body her grace would have been independent of Christ, i. e., Christ would not be her Redeemer.

It is noteworthy that in every instance St. Thomas refrains from using any theological note or censure whatever in discussing the case of Our Lady. This might incline us *a priori* to suspect that while he was very certain of the universality of original sin as a general law for men he found no such certainty *pro* or *con* in the special question about Mary.

III

We are now faced with the heart of our problem, namely, what is the proper meaning and interpretation of those passages in which at first reading St. Thomas certainly seems to deny the Immaculate Conception of Our Lady?

In trying to answer that question I shall consider first the places in which the Angelic Doctor argues that Mary's sanctification occurred *after* the infusion of her soul; [26] then that place in which he reasons that her sanctification was not in the instant of the infusion of her soul.[27] The reason for this procedure is that St. Thomas' phrase "*post animationem*" extends in his use of it to the temporal instant of the infusion of Mary's soul. It follows that the passages in which he teaches Mary's sancti-

[26] *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 27, a. 2; *Comp. Theol.*, c. 224; *Quaes. Quod.*, q. 6, a. 7.
[27] *III Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, a. 1, qcla. 2.

fication *post animationem* in and of themselves contain neither an assertion nor a denial of her original sinlessness. There remains then the crucial question: does the argument denying her sanctification *in* the instant of her animation definitively deny Mary's Immaculate Conception?

1. Of the three places which teach the sanctification of our Blessed Mother *post animationem* the most important and the most frequently cited is that found in the *Summa Theologiae*. With it we shall therefore be principally, but not exclusively, concerned.

The very text of the article in question indicates that in its conclusion (viz., " therefore it remains that the sanctification of the Blessed Virgin was after her animation "), the preposition *after* (*post*) signifies nothing other than not-before; therefore it can include the temporal instant of Mary's animation. I say this for the three following reasons. First the title of the article is, " whether the Blessed Virgin was sanctified before animation? " The four objections are worded so as to conclude to this one proposition (which St. Thomas intends, of course, to refute) that Our Lady was sanctified before the infusion of her soul. In the entire article and in the question as a whole there is absolutely no mention of Mary's sanctification in the instant of her conception: St. Thomas' one concern here is to exclude any grace in Our Lady *prior* to the creation and infusion of her human soul. He neither overlooked nor was ignorant of the possibility of a sanctification in the instant of animation: in the *Sentences* he expressly adverted to that possibility. It would seem intentional, therefore, that in the *Summa* he sedulously avoids any express consideration of Mary's sanctification in the instant of the infusion of her soul.

The question of sanctification *before* animation St. Thomas answers negatively. Then, though there has been neither explicit nor implicit consideration of the very instant of animation, St. Thomas concludes that Our Lady was sanctified *after* the infusion of her soul. But the preposition *after* (*post*) must be merely equivalent to *not-before*. For either the Angelic Doctor

was stupid in not seeing the possibility of sanctification *in* the temporal instant of animation (a possibility he did see); or else the *after* is merely a negative of *before* which would include the temporal instant of animation. Again, even in one temporal instant St. Thomas distinguished aspects of priority and posteriority, so that of two things that are temporally simultaneous one can be said to be after another in the order of nature.[28] So the phrase *after her animation* means *not prior in time to her animation, but posterior in nature.* This explanation alone is coherent with St. Thomas' general doctrine, as we shall see.

Secondly, if he meant *post* positively to exclude the instant of conception, then St. Thomas' reasoning in the body of the article is faulty and his conclusion opposed to his own teaching elsewhere. In this place he urges against Mary's sanctification before animation two arguments, namely, 1) that before animation there is no apt recipient of sanctification, and 2) that if Mary were sanctified before animation, then she would never have incurred any sin and so would not need to be redeemed by Christ. The result would be that Christ would not be the Savior of all men as Sacred Scripture says that He is.

From the first reason—that only a rational subject is capable of receiving divine grace—can we conclude that sanctification *must* come as temporally subsequent to the soul's infusion? St. Thomas did not think so. He expressly taught that God not only could give grace *in the first instant* to a rational creature but that God had done so and would have done so for every man had man remained faithful to God. According to St. Thomas' express teaching, in that same instant in which there is an angelic or human creature there is an apt recipient of grace. The *post animationem*, therefore, to which St. Thomas concludes from his first argument either extends to the instant of animation, or if it does not, his conclusion does not follow from his premises and is directly opposed to his general teaching.

The second argument—that if Mary were sanctified before

[28] St. Thomas' familiarity with this distinction will be demonstrated later.

the infusion of her soul she would not need redemption through Christ—again does not exclude the possibility of sanctification *in* the instant of animation. For the point of the argument (as St. Thomas makes clear in a passage in the *Fourth Sentences*, a passage we shall soon consider) [29] is that sanctification prior to animation would be a sanctification either of nature, or of the principles of nature; a sanctification therefore which would be prior to the person as person. Hence the person so sanctified would be as a person in every way outside the order of those who need redemption. Such sanctity as that would indeed militate against man's universal dependence on Christ as Redeemer.

But that argument would by no means hold for a sanctification achieved in the temporal instant of animation; St. Thomas taught that the person is naturally prior to grace; so there could be in one instant of time 1) the infusion of the soul into the fetus, which would constitute the person; 2) some order to sin in the person so constituted (because the soul would be united to a flesh which *ought* to beget sin in the person), and 3) grace excluding sin from the person.

Again we must conclude that the premises of St. Thomas' second argument in the article under discussion do *not* contain the conclusion that Our Lady was actually in sin in the moment of her animation. They contain only the conclusion that she was not sanctified before that moment. We have already seen that that is the only question St. Thomas set out to answer, so it is not remarkable that it is the only question he does answer. If we interpret *post animationem* to exclude sanctification *in* the moment of animation, we must say that St. Thomas either stupidly or dishonestly pretended to solve a question by an argument that was irrelevant. Therefore, either the whole article hangs together and the conclusion answers the question through pertinent arguments, or else St. Thomas was trying to answer a question he had not asked by arguments which would not lead to that answer. The latter alternative is not impossible; but it is neither necessary nor likely.

[29] *IV Sent.*, d. 43, q. 1, a. 4, qcla. 1, ad 3.

Lastly with respect to the text of this article the second objection demands scrutiny. The objection proceeds from St. Anselm's famous dictum, " it was fitting that this Virgin should shine with such purity that under God none greater can be imagined." [30] But St. Thomas adds: " The purity of the Blessed Virgin would have been greater had she never been stained by the contagion of original sin. Therefore it was given to her to be sanctified before her flesh was animated."

The point here is the conclusion of the objection. What follows from the premises is this: *therefore it was given to her never to be stained by original sin*; but St. Thomas concludes: *she was sanctified before her animation.* What is the difference? Such preservation from sin as really follows from St. Thomas' objection might have been either before animation or in the instant of animation. Yet he concludes *only* to sanctification before animation. *But Thomas knew that the former is the correct conclusion.* From the very same premises he concludes in the *Sentences*: " Either therefore her flesh was sanctified before animation, or, at least in the very instant of infusion her soul received grace." [31] Why then in the *Summa* did he express as a conclusion to be rejected only a part of what followed from his premises? The answer seems clear: he had in writing the *Summa* no desire to reject the possibility of Mary's sanctification in the instant of the infusion of her soul. That was a possibility he would neither reject, nor discuss; so he sacrificed laws of logical deductions in order to avoid any express consideration of the matter. Once in his youth he discussed in the *Sentences* the instant of the infusion of Mary's soul; but from that day until his death he never again returned to that discusion even though it was to the forefront in the schools of his own day, and a question that almost demanded treatment in his own writings. But this man of genius who so boldly, though reverently, rewrote much theology, and who, when he was certain of his position, humbly dared stand against

[30] St. Anselm, *de Conceptu Virginali;* c. 18; *M. L.*, 158 : 451.
[31] *III Sent.*, d. 31, q. 1, a. 1, qcla. 2.

his masters and predecessors and contemporaries: he in *all* his works refused ever to ask " whether Mary was sanctified in the instant of her animation? " He does ask: " Was she sanctified before animation? "; " Was she sanctified after it? "; but he pointedly avoided any *ex professo* article on the very instant of animation; he scrupulously avoided any exclusion of Mary's sanctification in the first instant of her life. If one would maintain that St. Thomas here in the *Summa* did exclude such sanctification, one must be willing to admit that Thomas was too dull to see and to treat the problem as a distinct question; for *nowhere* does he raise it as a distinct question.

In the *Summa* St. Thomas uses the phrase " *after animation* " in an indetermined sense, as equivalent to *not-before animation.* Does *after* imply posteriority of time or merely of nature? St. Thomas left that question open. He would seem, therefore, to have considered it possible that Our Lady was sanctified only at some time after her animation, but, he also considered it possible that she was sanctified in the instant of animation. Neither the title of the article, nor the sense of the objections, nor the force of his two arguments in the article implies or contains a denial of the latter possibility; and in the one objection which almost demanded that he take a stand on the matter he refused to do so. That is not the procedure of a man who has a definite opinion on a question, especially when that man is accustomed to think and to express himself with supreme clarity and precision.

Against all this stands a very obvious objection. Even granted that in the *Summa* the preposition *after* need not be taken as signifying temporal succession, in another of St. Thomas' works it is used determinately to signify temporal posteriority. In the *Quaestiones Quodlibetales* St. Thomas wrote of Our Lady: " she was sanctified quickly after her conception and the infusion of her soul (*cito post conceptionem et animae infusionem*)." [32] Since in this context St. Thomas uses *after* to signify in a temporal sense we can conclude, it

[32] *Quaes. Quod.*, q. 6, a. 7.

is argued, that he so uses it in the *Summa* and in the *Compendium Theologiae.*

But an examination of the context with *Quaestiones Quodlibetales* reveals that the words cited are not an expression of St. Thomas' own opinion! The paragraph reads:

> Although the Blessed Virgin was conceived in original sin (and conceived is used in the limited sense as designating the production of the fetus prior to its animation by a human soul as is evident from St. Thomas' distinguishing in the same paragraph between conception and animation), she is believed to have been sanctified in the womb prior to her birth. Therefore there have grown up diverse customs of (different) churches with regard to the celebration of her Conception. The Roman Church, and many others, considering that the Virgin was conceived in sin do not celebrate a feast of her Conception. But other (churches) considering her sanctification in the womb, the time of which (sanctification) is unknown, do celebrate her Conception; for it is believed that she was sanctified quickly after her conception and the infusion of her soul. . . .

St. Thomas is not saying: "Our Lady was sanctified quickly after the infusion on her soul"; nor is he saying: "I hold that Our Lady was sanctified quickly after the infusion of her soul"; he says simply: "This is believed" (*creditur*). Believed by whom? Believed certainly by those who at that time celebrated the feast of Mary's Conception, for St. Thomas gives this belief as the basis of their practice. Believed also by St. Thomas? Of this there is no evidence. In the context St. Thomas makes in his own name only one statement about the time of Mary's sanctification, viz., "*it is unknown*" (*ignoratur*). It is a very different thing to say: "It is unknown when a particular event occurred," than to say: "I believe that the event occurred soon after that other event." The latter statement denies temporal simultaneity of the two events; the former neither affirms nor denies such simultaneity, but leaves it an open question.

In fact nothing in the text of St. Thomas indicates that he intended the preposition *after* to be used determinately to signify posteriority of time or of nature; everything about the careful wording of the text seems to indicate that he intended

to avoid fixing the meaning of his own phrase. "*Tempus ignoratur*" sums up his attitude: and that judgment is not a denial of the Immaculate Conception nor an affirmation of it.

Clearly then the texts in which St. Thomas states that our Lady was sanctified after the infusion of her soul ought not to be interpreted in a determinately temporal sense. Is there justification in St. Thomas' teaching as a whole for maintaining that by *post animationem* he himself could have understood posteriority of nature? Did he have any awareness of posteriority of nature in simultaneity of time? If he was familiar with both sorts of posteriority then we can say that he meant either indeterminately in those places where he used the preposition indeterminately. If, on the other hand, he knew only posteriority of time—as some have maintained,—then he must have meant temporal posteriority in every instance in which he used the preposition *post*.

In fact, the Angelic Doctor was very familiar with posteriority of nature and moreover, he specifically taught posteriority of nature in this matter of the sanctification of creatures.

Treating of God's creation of the angels St. Thomas defends the position that God created the angels in the state of sanctifying grace. To his own position he objects that Augustine had written that "the angelic nature was first created in an unformed way . . . and afterwards was formed"; and by this "formation" is to be understood grace.

The answer to the objection reads: "That lack of formation . . . can be understood either by comparison with the formation which is glory, and in that sense lack of formation came *before* formation *in time*; or by comparison with the formation that is grace and so (lack of formation) came *before* (formation) *not in the order of time but in the order of nature*." [33] The text speaks for itself.

Later in discussing the justification of an adult human being St. Thomas distinguishes four parts or aspects of the process. He adds: "These four . . . are *simultaneous in time* . . . but *in*

[33] *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 62, a. 3, ad 1.

the order of nature one is before the other; among them, in the natural order first is the infusion of grace, second the motion of the free will toward God," and so forth.[34] Again the text could not be clearer.

Thirdly, speaking of the sacred humanity of Christ, the Angelic Doctor wrote: "Although the human nature did not in the order of time exist before its union (to the Word), yet we must consider it in itself before (considering it) as united; . . . even according as it is considered united, it is still distant from the divine nature according to the condition of its nature . . . and so there can be through invisible grace . . . a mission to the human nature although the nature does not precede grace in time." [35]

All three texts show St. Thomas using, as a familiar tool, the distinction between priority of nature and of time; but they seem to show more than that. The first and third of these texts distinctly imply that it is a general rule among creatures that nature precedes grace *in ordine naturae*; as indeed a subject must always precede an informing form, a substance precede its accidents. St. Thomas expressly teaches that grace comes after nature "*secundum ordinem naturae et* NON *secundum successionem temporis.*" [36] When therefore he states that Our Lady's sanctification was *after* the infusion of her soul, i. e., after the constitution of her nature, must we conclude that he means *after* in a temporal sense? It would seem highly arbitrary so to conclude in light of the fact that he teaches with respect to a) all rational creatures in general, b) all the angels, and c) the man-Christ in particular, that their sanctification was after the constitution of their natures, but expressly denies posteriority of time in that succession. If in so many instances *after* means only successiveness in the order of nature, is it not at least possible that St. Thomas included this possible signification in this instance?

A second argument from the general teaching of St. Thomas

[34] *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 113, a. 8.
[35] *I Sent.*, d. 15, q. 5, a. 1, qcla. 3, ad. 1.
[36] *II Sent.*, d. 29, a. 2, ad 1.

has already been suggested. Briefly it is this. Aquinas sought only to deny of Our Lady any sanctification which would make her holy by reason of generation (for holiness such as that would make her independent of Christ). But, as St. Thomas knew, the exclusion of such sanctity does not demand that her sanctification be temporally subsequent to the infusion of her soul. Therefore by *after animation* he does not exclusively designate temporal posteriority.

The major, I think, has been established already. With remarkable caution Thomas side-stepped the question of Our Lady's sanctification in the instant of her conception, never once penning an article under that title, always avoiding reference to the problem. Yet with all assurance he could write: "If, in *any way whatever* the Blessed Virgin had been sanctified before the infusion of her soul . . . she would not have needed the redemption and salvation which is from Christ."[37] Any sanctification that precedes animation is rejected; sanctification with animation is carefully not discussed. The former he sought to exclude, but only it.

As to the minor. In the *Fourth Sentences* we read:

> Anyone who would be conceived (i. e., prior to animation) without original sin would not need redemption . . . and so Christ would not be the Redeemer of all men. Nor can it be said that they did not need this redemption because it was granted to them to be conceived without sin, inasmuch as that grace was given to their parents in order that the sin of nature be healed in them . . . or (grace was given) to the nature itself which is healed. For it must be held that each needs Christ's redemption personally, and not alone by reason of his nature. But only he can be freed from evil, or absolved from debt who has incurred the debt or fallen into the evil.[38]

That is the point. Redemption must have a starting point; Mary was redeemed; therefore there must have been in her personally a *terminus a quo* of redemption. Any sanctification prior to the constitution of her person (*ante animationem*)

[37] *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 27, a. 2.
[38] *IV Sent.*, d. 43, q. 1, a. 4, qcla. 1, ad 3.

would mean that in the person who is Mary there never was anything bespeaking order to redemption; therefore St. Thomas vigorously rejects every sort of sanctification prior to animation, whether of Mary in her parents, or of her flesh alone, or of her soul alone. Any of these would imply a sanctity prior to the person who is Mary; therefore prior to any relationship (of dependence on Christ) modifying that person. This is what he vehemently rejected.

But the exclusion of such sanctification need not involve that Mary's sanctification be temporally subsequent to her animation. For it is conceivable that the person be constituted in a normal way and, therefore, relative to her human progenitors, have some order to sin; yet in that same instant of animation be so graced by God as to have no infection of sin. We would then have in one instant of time a) the person b) with a debt of sin c) but, by grace, delivered from the actual infection of sin. Hence the fact of personal need of redemption does not necessarily demand that one have actually been for a time in the guilt of sin.

But did St. Thomas know of any such possibility? That he did is shown perhaps most easily by considering as a whole his teaching on Our Lady's sanctification. We have in that teaching three major points: a) Our Lady was *not* sanctified before her person was constituted, i. e., before the infusion of her soul because, b) every human person has personal need of redemption, i. e., some modifications of the person such as bespeaks relationship to sin in some way (else Christ would not be the Redeemer of that person as such), c) yet Our Lady "was immune from original and actual sin." [39] Hence St. Thomas' teaching taken as a whole does clearly imply in one instant a) the constitution of the person who is Mary b) with some order to sin c) yet by grace delivered from any actual stain of sin.

This argument is probative, however, only for those who agree that in the question of the Immaculate Conception St. Thomas did not contradict himself or change his opinion. It

[39] *I Sent.*, d. 44, q. 1, a. 3, ad. 3.

rests on the supposition, unacceptable to many, that Aquinas' various dicta on Mary's primitive sanctification form parts of one integrated body of doctrine.

Can we show to the satisfaction of those who deny intellectual consistency to the Angelic Doctor that his doctrine admits at least the possibility of a) a person b) having some true order to original sin c) yet in one same instant preserved by grace from actually incurring sin? That can be shown by the following argument. *Original sin insofar as it pertains to the person as such is a penalty rather than a sin.* This is Thomas' own teaching. " The lack of original justice (and original sin is the habitual privation of original justice) is in nature; . . . *if it is referred to this man insofar as he is a certain person . . . it is a penalty*; if however it is referred to the principle in whom all have sinned it has the aspect of guilt." [40]

But by God's grace persons who have actual order to penalty for sin can be delivered from that penalty in the very instant in which the debt of punishment obliges. " The penalty is removed by God who can . . . condone penalties." [41] And speaking of death as a penalty for sin he says that though we are all sinners yet not all need undergo death, " for this is achieved from a special divine dispensation, that, out of liberality, God remits this penalty; for the will of God, and His power, is not bound by the order of fault to penalty . . . *Such men* (as may escape death) *have in their nature the necessity of dying*; but, given that, *they are freed by a special grace from this necessity. . . .*" [42]

We have these truths. Original sin, as it regards the *person*, has the aspect of penalty. But God's grace can remit a penalty; that is, while the order to the penalty (*necessitas*, St. Thomas calls this order) is retained, God delivers the person from actually suffering the penalty. Hence in one instant there is a) the person b) with order to sin (or penalty) but c) without actually having the sin (undergoing the penalty).

The application to Our Lady is transparently evident. If

[40] *De Malo*, q. 4, a. 2.
[41] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 81, a. 3.
[42] *II Sent.*, d. 31, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2.

according to St. Thomas God can deliver from penalties due to sin, and in fact does deliver some men from actually falling under the penalty due to them (death) at the time that obligation urges, then God could have (according to St. Thomas' doctrine) delivered Mary from that penalty which is original sin as it affects the person; and this at the very moment when that obligation urged (namely the moment of the constitution of that person). I emphasize that the point here is not that St. Thomas taught this as a fact (he did not); but that he did teach in general terms the *possibility*; so that his doctrine does not exclude the possibility of Mary's having in one and the same instant a debt of sin in her personally and divine grace actually preserving her from all sin. This is quite in accord with the defined dogma of Mary's Immaculate Conception.

It is important to point out that the above interpretation of St. Thomas and its application to the Immaculate Conception of Mary is neither new nor extraordinary. The master of all commentators, Cajetan, was proposing it as Thomism nearly four and a half centuries ago. He expressly teaches that the necessity of having original sin without the stain of original sin itself, is sufficient to constitute need of redemption; and this teaching he bases on St. Thomas.[43]

It is apparent then that St. Thomas knew that sanctity which depends on Christ need not imply actual contamination by sin at any time; he knew that a debt of sin or penalty was sufficient to make one dependent on Christ. Hence in the passages we have seen he was in no instance concerned to deny of Our Lady a sanctification which would be given in the temporal instant of the infusion of her soul; for such sanctification implying a personal debt of sin is, according to Thomas' own general doctrine, reconcilable with dependence on Christ.

2. There remains to be considered only one further point, namely, the one place in which St. Thomas states that the sanctification of Our Lady could not properly have been "in the very instant of the infusion of her soul."

[43] Cf. Cajetan, in I-II, q. 81, a. 3; *Opusc. de Conceptione B.M.V.*, c. 3.

We have seen so far Thomas' teaching that a) Our Lady was without original sin b) yet conceived in sin so that c) she was sanctified after the infusion of her soul. We have seen that the latter two judgments can be reconciled with the first. For in saying that Mary was conceived in sin St. Thomas understands conception to *precede* in time the infusion of the human soul; so his meaning is merely that our Blessed Mother was not made holy before she was made human, and capable of holiness. In saying that she was sanctified after the infusion of her soul he does not mean that sanctity was necessarily subsequent in time to her animation by a human soul; he means merely that there had to be in her personally some order to sin, some real *terminus a quo* of redemption. This we have tried to show both from the text of St. Thomas and from the context of his general teaching on human sanctification especially after original sin.

Nevertheless the Angelic Doctor did write that Our Lady was not sanctified in the very instant of the infusion of her soul. Must we concede that at least in that place he denied the doctrine of Mary's Immaculate Conception? Again we can arrive at a balanced judgment only by careful examination first of the text in question, and then of the general context of St. Thomas' doctrine.

The text in which the passage under discussion occurs is very revealing.[44] *It contains no denial, actual or implicit, of the sanctification of the person who is Mary, in the first instant of her life,* i. e., it contains no denial of Mary's Immaculate Conception.

First, the title of the *quaestiunculum* reads: " Whether the Blessed Virgin was sanctified before the infusion of her soul (*ante animationem*) ? " Since everything else in this *quaestiunculum* is directed to answering *that* question, there is a presumption that whatever we shall find written herein refers to the possible sanctification of the holy Virgin *before* her soul was infused into her body.

The first two objections concluding to the sanctification of

[44] Cf. *III Sent.*, d. 3, q. 1, a. 1, qcla. 2.

Our Lady at some time prior to the infusion of her soul need no special comment. The third objection is really the same as the one already discussed in connection with the article in the *Summa*. The objection is that, according to St. Anselm, the Mother of God should have such sinlessness that no greater under God is conceivable. "But," adds St. Thomas, "there would be a greater purity if her soul had never had the infection of original sin than if for some time it had had (that infection) and afterwards been cleansed. Therefore, either her flesh was sanctified before its animation, or at least in the instant of infusion her soul received grace through which it was immune from original sin."

Note that the objection is concerned with establishing Mary's sanctification *before* the infusion of her soul. Thus in the conclusion alternate possibilities are proposed: either the prior sanctification occurred in her flesh ("*aut igitur caro sanctificata fuit ante animationem*") or in her soul ("*vel saltem . . . anima gratiam suscepit*"). But neither alternative supposes as accomplished the union of body and soul which constituted the person who is Mary; that is why no mention of Mary, the person, is made in the conclusion but only "either her *flesh* . . . or at least. . . her *soul* received grace through which *it* was immune. . . ." That conclusion, of course, St. Thomas was to reject; and because he intended to reject it he formed it m[illegible]efully. What he intends to reject is not "either the [illegible]n of Mary was sanctified before its animation or at least in the moment of the infusion of her soul *she* received grace"; no, what he wrote for rejection was "her *soul* received grace in the first instant, etc." And this latter is a quite different proposition, for it envisions a sanctification of her soul which would be in the order of nature prior to its union with her body. There is the point. The sanctification *ante animationem* might have occurred in the soul prior (in nature) to its infusion into the body. That would mean that the person then to be constituted would not be dependent on Christ for sanctity.

Unless this be the sense of the objection then: a) there is no accounting for St. Thomas' discussing in an article about sancti-

fication *before* animation what took place *in* the instant of sanctification; b) there would be no reason for the rather strained wording of the second alternative, viz., "the soul received grace through which it (the soul) was immune. . . ." A much more normal manner of speaking would be "the Blessed Virgin received grace through which she was immune. . . ." The latter is not said for the excellent reason that it is not meant, and therefore not meant to be positively rejected.

Immediately after the objection come the two arguments *Sed contra* quoted earlier; then the body of the solution, also previously quoted. In the body occur the famous words: "the sanctification of the Blessed Virgin could not fittingly have been . . . in the very instant of the infusion (of her soul)." The *whole* statement must be read: "The sanctification of the Blessed Virgin could not fitly have been . . . in the very instant of the infusion of her soul so that, namely, by grace then infused into the soul it would be preserved from incurring the stain of original sin. For Christ alone among human kind . . . does not need redemption, because He is our Head; to all others it belongs to be redeemed by Him. But this would not be if among these were found any other soul which had never been infected by the original fault."

What these words deny is not any and every conceivable sanctification in the instant of the infusion of Mary's soul, but a very determined mode of sanctification, that, namely, which would have for its subject not the person of Our Lady but her soul so that the soul, considered prior to the person (for in the order of nature the creation of the soul is prior to its infusion into the body, and *a fortiori* prior to its function in constituting the person) would already be sanctified. This sort of sanctity must be denied; for it would imply, as Aquinas immediately adds, holiness prior to the person so that the person as to holiness would not be dependent on Christ. Thus St. Thomas is in agreement with St. Bonaventure: "The natural is prior to the spiritual. First therefore the soul is conceived to be united with the body, and then grace to be infused by God." [45]

[45] *III Sent.*, d. 3, par. 1, a. 1, q. 2.

This interpretation, viz., that St. Thomas in this passage rejects only a sanctification which in the order of nature would precede the person is borne out a) by the reason he alleges: for a sanctification in the first instant of time but subsequent in the order of nature to the person would not make the person's sanctity independent of Christ; b) by the words of St. Thomas; for he speaks of grace being given in the first instant not to Our Lady, but to her soul; he speaks of the preservation not of Our Lady but of her soul; considering the grace and preservation not as privileges of the person of Mary but as a gift that would come to the person through the soul and would be, by priority of nature, in the soul first; c) lastly, this interpretation is sustained by the fact that the words occur, as we have noted, in a passage devoted to the problem of a sanctification *ante animationem*. What is discussed in them is a sanctification which would be (in the order of nature) *before* animation although temporally *in* the very instant of animation.

In this interpretation alone St. Thomas' reasoning, his choice of words, and the order of the passage become intelligible. That interpretation which can explain St. Thomas' leaving intact his order, language, and logic seems preferable to that which can justify none of these three.

Secondly, this interpretation—that in the disputed passage Aquinas is excluding from the first instant of Our Lady's human life only sanctification which would precede (in the order of nature) her person—is completely in accordance with Aquinas' general teaching.

As we have seen Aquinas teaches clearly that in each human as a person and not merely by reason of his nature, there must be need of redemption. The inevitability of this St. Thomas had previously pointed out, " From the act of nature which is the propagation of the body there is left in the nature of the one generated a certain disposition, called concupiscence . . . inclining to evil. From the very fact that that corruption . . . which contains in itself the virtuality of sin which caused it, touches the person, it renders that person unworthy of God's grace;

thence there is in the soul a stain and lack of grace" (*macula et defectus gratiae*).[46]

Within our very nature rebellion has been introduced by the principle of that nature, Adam. That rebellion is a real modification within us, handed on together with our nature; for it is a real disposition in the flesh which virtually transmits our nature. Even before there is a human soul there is already (at least by a priority of nature) the *fomes peccati* in the embryo; at the instant that the human soul is joined to that flesh the soul is already unworthy of God's grace by the fact of union with the body virtually carrying original sin. Hence the *person* who is constituted by and in that union of soul and body, by the very fact of such constitution is unworthy of God's grace. That real unworthiness, called the debt of original sin (*debitum peccati originalis*), is inseparable from human generation after the sin of Adam and therefore transmitted in every natural generation.

If somehow prior to the constitution of the person sanctity were to come to the nature in its principles (material, formal or efficient), then the person as person would bespeak no order whatever to sin and so would not look to Christ who gives grace only as redeeming grace. That is why St. Thomas wrote: "He alone can be delivered from evil or forgiven a debt (i. e., redeemed) who has incurred the debt or fallen into the evil."[47] All redemption presupposes the person (or persons) to be redeemed, and presupposes him (or them) somehow contained within the order of those needing redemption. Therefore any sanctification of Mary or of anyone else which would precede the person in time or in nature would imply independence of Christ and be, for that reason, unthinkable. That is what St. Thomas teaches.

The Church teaches this same doctrine. The Collect for the feast of the Immaculate Conception reads in part: "O God . . . we beseech Thee that Thou who *by the foreseen death of*

[46] *II Sent.*, d. 32, q. 1, a. 1.
[47] *IV Sent.*, d. 43, q. 1, a. 4, qcla. 1, ad. 3.

the . . . Son of God didst preserve her from all stain. . . ." Thus by Christ's *redeeming death* Mary was preserved; she was not independent of His satisfactory sacrifice. Pope Alexander VII expressly taught Mary's preservation from sin through the merits of Christ, *Redeemer of the human race.*[48] It is most surely true that none can be redeemed except those who are in need of redemption: hence in Mary *as a person* we must suppose a debt of sin. In light of this St. Thomas did require in Our Lady a debt of sin prior (at least by priority of nature) to her grace; for otherwise grace in her would not be Christian grace.

This *debt* of sin, as distinct from the actual infection of sin is, however, all that is requisite according to St. Thomas' general doctrine. The reason for this we have already seen; original sin, as it regards the person, is a penalty rather than a guilt, and one falls within the order of those subject to the penalty by having a debt, even though the penalty itself is never actually incurred. " The lack of original justice . . . if it referred to this man insofar as he is a person . . . is a penalty." [49] " This is achieved by a special divine dispensation that out of liberality God remits this penalty . . . (such persons as are so graced) have in their nature the necessity " of undergoing the penalty, " but . . . they are freed by a special grace from the necessity " of *actually* incurring the penalty.[50]

Even Cajetan does not understand St. Thomas' saying that Our Lady is not sanctified in the instant of the infusion of her soul to mean more than that she had a debt of sin. " It pertains to Catholic faith," he writes, " that all men, save Christ alone, contract original sin." He adds that this is to be understood in the same way that we understood the proposition that all men incur the penalty of death " so that as all incur death, i. e., the necessity of dying, so all incur original sin, i. e., the necessity of incurring original sin . . . If anyone should not incur original sin EITHER *actually* OR *as to its debt,* he would

[48] Bull *Sollicitudo omnium eccles.*, 8 Dec. 1661.
[49] *De Malo*, q. 4, a. 2.
[50] *II Sent.*, d. 31, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2.

not need redemption, which is heretical. But . . . not only does one actually held (by sin) need redemption, but also one *liable to captivity*." [51] And he adds that Thomists must note this well in questions concerning Mary's conception.

In another work he is, if possible, even more to the point. "Not only is he said to be cleansed from original sin who is purified from its actually contracted stain, but also he who is purified from the stain as to its debt. . . . And let no one think I propose this from my own imagination, but let him see St. Thomas." [52]

It seems then from the text of St. Thomas, from the context of his general teaching, and from the understanding of his greatest commentator, that his saying that Our Lady was not sanctified in the very instant of her animation by no means need imply that she contracted the stain of original sin. His statement in itself and in his understanding of it is completely reconcilable with the fact of grace bestowed on Our Lady at the first temporal instant of her human life, provided one also admits in her a *debitum peccati* which in the order of nature preceded her sanctifying grace. And this is not opposed to the defined dogma of Our Blessed Mother's Immaculate Conception.

This explanation suggests why St. Thomas never uses a theological note or censure in discussing Mary's primitive sanctification. The general doctrine of the necessity of incurring original sin he unfailingly qualifies by some note, as we have seen. It is a tenable position that he avoided using censures in this question because he considered the doctrine itself as probable, and so refrained from even the appearance of reflecting on it but qualifying any theory in explanation of it. Quite surely the lack of all theological notes in his discussion argues that in his own mind this matter was not completely certain one way or the other.

[51] In I-II, q. 81, a. 3.
[52] *Opusc. de Conceptione B. M. V.*, c. 3.

CONCLUSION

The foregoing discussion as a whole suggests certain conclusions about St. Thomas' teaching on the Immaculate Conception of Our Lady.

1) St. Thomas did indisputably teach that doctrine at least in his earlier work. We must conclude that he had found some good reason for assenting to it.

2) His later works do not repeat that unequivocal teaching that Mary was free from original sin.

3) Some of the later works contain a denial of the Immaculate Conception which is merely verbal. Mary is said to have been conceived in sin; but the meaning is that, prior to the infusion of her human soul, her body like any other fetus was unsanctified, and was therefore an instrument apt to transmit original sin to her soul when that soul should be infused into her body. This is by no means opposed to the dogma of Mary's Immaculate Conception.

4) Some of St. Thomas' works contain the further statement that Our Lady was sanctified after the infusion of her human soul; one contains the statement that she could not (fittingly) have been sanctified in that instant. However, the wording of these texts, and the context in which they occur, demand on careful analysis that they be interpreted in accordance with St. Thomas' doctrine as a whole, namely, as not excluding the possibility of Mary's sanctification in the first instant of her human life.

5) Therefore, as it would be absurd to maintain that in the later works St. Thomas taught the Immaculate Conception, it is also manifestly contrary to the text and general teaching of St. Thomas to hold that he *in any instance* excluded or denied the sanctification of Mary in the first temporal instant of her human life, that is, that he excluded or denied her Immaculate Conception.

6) St. Thomas' attitude toward the problem seems to be best described as one of caution, reserve. Having at first taught that Mary was without original sin, he thereafter with marked circumspection and at the cost of evident incompleteness in his works refrained from ever again definitely committing himself to an affirmative or a negative position. In every case his words imply the possibility but neither affirm nor deny the fact that Mary was preserved free from original sin.

7) The reason for St. Thomas' later reserve seems very likely to have been the attitude of the Roman Church. His earliest years had been spent in the vicinity of Naples where the feast of Mary's Conception has been celebrated many generations before his day; that fact may help account for his early unequivocal affirmation of Mary's freedom from original sin. But the Church of Rome in St. Thomas' day did not admit any feast in honor of Mary's conception, though, as St. Thomas says, the custom of other Churches of celebrating that feast was not totally reprobated. In addition the greatest theologians of the day were teaching that the object of the feast, where it was celebrated, was not the sinless conception of Our Lady but her sanctification at some undetermined time. St. Thomas would not take the stand that in a question of supernatural fact his private view was to be preferred to the attitude of the Holy See; so, like the Church, he reserved any further explicit expression of judgment.

8) Since St. Thomas never withdrew his early admission of the Immaculate Conception by expressing its contradictory but rather expressly taught, as had the Fathers, that Mary was absolutely free from all stain, it is likely that his personal opinion continued to be that Our Lady had been immaculately begotten. If that were the case, reverence for the highest authority in Christendom demanded that he hold the proposition as no more than probable, until the Roman Church should decide the matter. In any case his position of reserve was, in light of the attitude of Rome, the best possible position in his day. *Three and a half centuries after St. Thomas' death* the

Holy Father was to declare that divine wisdom had not yet made the matter clear to the Church! [53] Surely one whose whole wisdom was derived from the Church could hardly have been certain.

Whatever else is to be found in St. Thomas' discussions of the Immaculate Conception, this much is evident—submissiveness to the Church of Rome. In that there is no failure; in that is, ultimately, only triumph—moral, intellectual and eternal.

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[53] Brief *Catholicae relig.*, 4 June, 1622, Annalibus Minorum XXV, 462.

ORIGINAL SIN, PRIVATION OF ORIGINAL JUSTICE

IT IS a well-known fact among theologians that St. Thomas is claimed as their patron by followers of the most clearly opposed doctrines. The very same texts of the Saint are not infrequently understood in widely different meanings. So much so that one wonders at this irreducible division among Thomists. Is there any possibility at all of getting at the genuine teaching of the Common Doctor?

One of the controverted interpretations regards St. Thomas' texts and his idea of original sin as privation of original justice. The disputed point is well known: does original justice whose privation constitutes original sin comprise in itself sanctifying grace, or is sanctifying grace adequately distinct, though not separable, from original justice? Both answers are given by Thomists and each of them claims faithfully to echo St. Thomas' teaching. Both theories argue from his texts and from intrinsic reasons based on his principles. Each also has an answer ready for the arguments of the opposite opinion. Is there any way out of the deadlock?

Contemporary Controversy: Its History.

Before 1915 modern Thomists commonly taught, as being the faithful interpretation of St. Thomas, that the essential and formal element of original justice is sanctifying grace. The latter, therefore, is but inadequately distinct from the former, as is a part from its whole. No one seemed to have any doubt or difficulty about this. And it was taken for granted, rather than concluded from a study of the original texts, that such was the authentic interpretation of St. Thomas' teaching. Since the concept of original sin as privation of this justice explained perfectly well how the hereditary fault is a sin in the proper sense of the word, that is, death of the soul because of the

absence of sanctifying grace, such as the Tridentine decree on original sin demands it and still more explicitly the projected Canon of the Vatican Council, no one was led to suppose that the Common Doctor could have taught any different doctrine.

It was Fr. R. Martin, O. P., who opened the controversy by calling into question this common interpretation. In an article on the doctrine of original sin in the *Summa contra Gentiles*[1] he showed, from a minute analysis of the three chapters on original sin (Book 4, chapters 50-52) and from the study of the sources, that St. Thomas held, with the Scholastics of the previous and of his own century, that sanctifying grace is not included in original justice, the privation of which constitutes original sin. Original sin is the privation of the preternatural integrity of nature only, and this privation entails the absence of sanctifying grace in the individuals who inherit that nature. Martin's study—because, no doubt, of the unsettled conditions of the First World War—provoked little comment. His thesis was taken up again in 1921 by Canon J. Bittremieux, professor at Louvain University, who extended the field of research to all the works of St. Thomas. He examined the question of the distinction between original justice and sanctifying grace according to St. Thomas,[2] and concluded in favour of Martin's thesis. A year later Fr. J. Kors, O. P., devoted a volume of the *Bibliothèque Thomiste* to the same study.[3] In it he combines both historical research in pre-Thomist teaching on original justice and original sin, and critical study of St. Thomas' own

[1] R. Martin, O. P., "La doctrina sobre el pecado original en la *Summa contra Gentiles*," *Ciencia Tomista*, VI (1915) 1, pp. 389-400; 2, pp. 223-236. He expressed the same opinion about St. Thomas' teaching in *Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques*, V (1911), 825 f., and again *ibid.*, IX (1920), 678. Other historical studies of his on the problem: "La question du péché originel dans Saint Anselme," *ibid.*, V (1911), 735-749; "Les idées de Robert de Melun sur le péché originel," *ibid.*, VII (1913), 700-725; VIII (1914), 439-466; IX (1920), 103-120; XI (1922), 390-415; "Le péché originel d'après Gilbert de la Porrée et son école," *Revue d'Historie Ecclésiastique*, XIII (1912), 674-691.

[2] J. Bittremieux, "La distinction entre la justice originelle et la grâce sanctifiante d'après Saint Thomas d'Aquin," *Revue Thomiste*, XXVI (1921), 121-150.

[3] J. Kors, O. P., *La Justice Primitive et le Péché Originel d'après Saint Thomas. Les Sources. La Doctrine.* Paris, 1922.

texts. His conclusion confirms the re-discovered authentic teaching of St. Thomas: Original sin is the privation of original justice, that is, of the preternatural rectitude of nature; necessarily connected with it, but adequately distinct from it, is the privation of sanctifying grace, which grace is extrinsic to the primitive justice.

It was to be expected that the novel interpretation of St. Thomas' teaching would meet with opposition in the common Thomist school. We need not recall here all the participants in the debate nor their refutation of the arguments brought forward in favor of the innovation.[4] We just note that the defenders of the common, perhaps century-old interpretation of St. Thomas hardly go in for a critical and historical study of his texts, but rather base their proofs on speculative reasons connected with certain principles or phrases of his *donum naturae* and *donum personae, causa efficiens* and *formalis, condito sine qua non* and *dispositio;* or with the teaching of Trent that original sin is a real sin. It is precisely this arguing on both sides from the very same reasons or texts which looks intriguing: How to find an objective approach to the texts? [5]

A partial attempt at bringing together the two positions, or rather perhaps at finding an easy way of maintaining the more common interpretation in face of the novel one, was made by F. L. Teixidor, S. J., in an article on " A lexicographical question.

[4] Cf. C. Vollert, S. J., " Saint Thomas on Sanctifying Grace and Original Justice," *Theological Studies*, II (1941), 369-387, who examines the five main reasons given for the adequate distinction between original justice and sanctifying grace, and gives an answer for each. He also gives the bibliography. Cf. also J. Coppens, " Une controverse récente sur la nature du péché originel," *Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses*, I (1924), 185-191.

[5] As an example, cf. the two articles in *Revue Thomiste*, XXVI (1921): J. Bittremieux, *art. cit.*, and A. Michel, " La grâce sanctifiante et la justice originelle," pp. 424-430. One cannot help noticing, when contrasting these two studies, that Bittremieux' conclusion in favor of an adequate distinction between original justice and sanctifying grace is based on a historical study of the texts, whilst Michel's in favor of an inadequate distinction must be found in (or read into) St. Thomas' texts because Trent and the Vatican Council (projected canon) require it (cf. p. 245). This looks as though the former interpretation were 'historical' and the latter 'doctrinal.'

The use of the phrase 'original justice' in St. Thomas."[6] In it the author defends the thesis that St. Thomas uses the phrase "original justice" in two different meanings: one in which it includes sanctifying grace, another in which it designates only the preternatural justice of nature. When St. Thomas defines original sin as the privation of original justice, the latter is taken in the broader sense, including sanctifying grace as its formal element. Fr. C. Vollert, S. J., who approves of this conclusion, applied it to the study of some fourteenth century Scholastics,[7] Henry of Ghent, Durandus of St. Pourçain, Peter Paludanus, James of Lausanne and Guido Terreni. To his happy surprise he detects in all of them a similar awareness of the twofold meaning of original justice; just as, by a sort of afterthought, he had found it also in Hervaeus Natalis whom he had studied before.[8] Would this not be a way out of the deadlock and an open door to mutual understanding? I am afraid this attempt will convince few readers. It is difficult to escape the impression that their inquiry was greatly inspired by the desire to detect the common Thomist teaching in the texts of St. Thomas and those of his commentators. In point of fact, even if their studies did not pass unnoticed, they seem to have little influenced the followers of the new interpretation.

Historical Approach.

To reach the objective teaching of St. Thomas such as it was understood by his contemporaries, the only suitable approach seems to be the historical one.[9] If we wish to under-

[6] L. Teixidor, S. J., "una Cuestion lexicografica. El uso de la palabre Justicia Original en Santo Tomás de Aquino," *Estudios Eclesiasticos,* VI (1927), 337-376; VIII (1929), 23-41. Cf. an allusion to the same idea in A. Michel, *art. cit.,* p. 427, n. 2.

[7] C. Vollert, S. J., "The Two Senses of Original Justice in Medieval Theology," *Theol. Stud.,* V (1944), 3-23.

[8] C. Vollert, S. J., "Hervaeus Natalis and the Problem of Original Justice," *Theol. Stud.,* III (1942), 231-251. Cf. of the same author, "The Doctrine of Hervaeus Natalis on Primitive Justice and Original Sin," *Analecta Gregoriana,* XLII (Rome: 1947).

[9] Cf. the illuminating remarks of O. Lottin, O. S. B., "Pour un commentaire historique de la Morale de Saint Thomas d'Aquin," *Phychologie et Morale au XII et XIII siècles,* III (Louvain: 1949), 579-601.

stand his (not our) doctrine on original sin and original justice we must replace it in its historical setting, and see what was commonly taught about these points of the faith by his predecessors and contemporaries and by his first commentators. We must set aside the desire to find in his writings (or in those of the other Scholastics) either of the two positions which today divide his followers, avoid even reading his texts in the light of the Tridentine definitions which he himself never knew. It is not surprising, but rather to be expected, that St. Thomas' problematique is not the same as ours. Seven centuries of theological reflection, not uninfluenced by the reflection of the outside world, separate us from him. If we project into his texts our own way of viewing the problem, little wonder that different interpretations, governed by different pre-conceptions, result from their reading.

The approach to the historical teaching of St. Thomas on original justice and original sin has been facilitated by several recent historical studies. Besides the book of Fr. Kors already mentioned, we have the historical article on "Péché Originel" in the *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique* 12 (1933) by A. Gaudel (for the Scholastic period, col. 432-510); the volume of Fr. Martin on "The controversy on original sin in the 14th century" [10] which edits unpublished texts; and especially the series of studies on the doctrinal history of original sin in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries by Dom O. Lottin, O. S. B.,[11]

[10] R. Martin, O. P., *La Controverse sur le Péché Originel au Début du XIV Siècle. Textes Inédits* (Louvain: 1930).

[11] O. Lottin, O. S. B., "Le péché originel au XII siècle," *Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale,* XI (1939), 17-32; XII (1940), 78-103; 236-274 (referred to below as Lottin, XII siècle); "Le traité du péché originel chez les premiers maîtres dominicains à Paris," *Ephem. Theol. Lovan.,* XVIII (1940), 27-57 (ref. Lottin, maîtres dominicains"); "Le traité du péché originel chez les premiers maîtres franciscains à Paris," *Ephem. Theol. Lovan.,* XVIII (1941), 26-64 (ref. Lottin, "maîtres franciscains"); "Le péché originel chez Albert le Grand, Bonaventure et Thomas d'Aquin," *Rech. Théol. Anc. Méd.,* XII (1940), 275-328 (ref. Lottin, "Albert . . ."); "Baptême et péché originel de S. Anselme à S. Thomas d'Aquin," *Ephem. Theol. Lovan.* XIX (1942), 225-245 (ref. Lottin, "Baptême").

We have not been able to make use of the earlier study of J. N. Espengerger, O. S. B., "Die Elemente der Erbsünde nach Augustin und der Frühscholastik,"

based on the study of the manuscript texts of which he edits the most important. Without doing over again their detailed inquiries, it will suffice for our purpose to note their main conclusions and see where St. Thomas' position comes in; designate also in what precise points St. Thomas eventually introduces something new with regard to his predecessors, and where, eventually, modern Thomists have done the same with regard to Thomas' position.

For the reader's convenience, we may briefly state the result of our study at the outset. It comes down to this: St. Thomas' concept of original justice remains the same as that of his contemporaries, for whom original justice is the preternatural rectitude of nature, adequately distinct from sanctifying grace. But he establishes a connection between this justice and grace which makes both dependent on each other for their existence. Later on, when new viewpoints and problems arise, the justice of nature is conceived somewhat differently. Modern Thomists accordingly express the connection which St. Thomas had established by saying that in the whole complex of preter-and supernatural gifts which Adam received, sanctifying grace is the formal element and the preternatural gifts the material element. In their new problematique the manner of expression is different from that of St. Thomas; the objective reality expressed is much the same. The influences that have determined the shifting over to a new way of viewing the problem come mainly from the Tridentine insistence, in opposition to Luther, on the "*vera ratio peccati*" found in original sin which is death of the soul, "*mors animae.*" This led to including in original sin the privation of sanctifying grace.

To lead up to that conclusion we must: 1) briefly state the development of the ideas on original sin as privation of original justice before St. Thomas; 2) recall St. Thomas' concept; 3) indicate some of his immediate commentators; 4) examine as far as possible what influences determined the slow shift to a new problematique; and 5) lastly point out the identity and differences of doctrine in the two theories.

Forschungen zur christlichen Literatur und Dogmengeschichte, I (Mainz: 1905), 79-184.

Original Sin as Privation of Original Justice Before St. Thomas.

In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries up to St. Thomas' entrance into the Scholastic field, the concept of original sin as privation of original justice is not the only, nor even the more commonly accepted, theory. Lottin's studies have traced the curves of three other conceptions. First, the so-called Augustinian theory [12] defines original sin as concupiscence. This is followed in the school of Anselm of Laon († 1117) and of William of Champeaux († 1122),[13] and it flourished throughout the twelfth and in the thirteenth centuries as well.[14] Another theory is that of Peter Abelard († 1142) and Gilbert of la Porrée (1154) who conceived original sin as being nothing else than the necessity of undergoing temporal and eternal punishments.[15] After having known a real success towards the end of the twelfth century, it was, especially on account of Abelard's condemnation at the council of Sens (1141), to disappear for good. A third theory was that of Stephen Langton († 1228) which defines original sin as a stain on the soul,[16] and which had some following in the beginning of the thirteenth century.

[12] For St. Augustine's concept of original sin, cf. A. Gaudel, *art. cit.*, col. 371-381; 392-402; or before him, Kors, *op. cit.*, pp. 3-22. According to the latter, original justice does not, for St. Augustine, include sanctifying grace, though Adam had received grace, and (but this is less clear) was created in sanctifying grace. Cf. however B. C. (appuyns) in a review of A. Slomkowski, "Relatio gratiam sanctificantem inter et iustitiam originalem secundum doctrinam S. Augustini, Collect. Theol.," XVIII (1937), 32-52, *Bulletin de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale*, III (1938), n. 730, who says that Slomkowski is right, against Kors, when showing that St. Augustine identifies justice and sanctifying grace.

[13] Cf. Lottin, "XII siècle," pp. 20-22; authors of this school: Robert Pullen (Lottin, *art. cit.*, pp. 239-40; Hugo of St. Victor (*ibid.*, pp. 241-242); the *Summa Sententiarum* (*ibid.*, pp. 249-251); Peter Lombard (*ibid.*, pp. 246-248); Robert of Melun (*ibid.*, pp. 248-249); *Sententiae Udonis* (*ibid.*, pp. 249-251); Peter of Poitiers (*ibid.*, pp. 258-259); Praepositinus of Cremona (*ibid.*, pp. 259-263); Peter of Capua (*ibid.*, pp. 264-265). Further, William of Auxerre (Lottin, "Maîtres franciscains," pp. 28-38), Hugo of St. Cher (*ibid.*, pp. 38-46).

[14] Cf. Lottin, "XII siècle," pp. 236-265.

[15] Lottin, "XII siècle," p. 103, summary of the evolution of this theory. Authors: Abelard (*ibid.*, pp. 78-79), *Sententiae divinitatis* (*ibid.*, pp. 82-83), *Tractatus Paris Maz. 1708* (*ibid.*, pp. 83-86), Simon of Tournai (*ibid.*, pp. 86-90, *London Brit. Museum Royal 9 XII* (*ibid.*, pp. 90-94), Alanus of Lille (*ibid.*, pp. 94-97), Radulphus the Ardent (*ibid.*, pp. 97-101), Nicholas of Amiens (*ibid.*, pp. 101-102).

The concept of original sin as privation of original justice, which was to become the classic Scholastic theory of the future, was originated, as is well known, by St. Anselm of Canterbury († 1109).[17] Departing largely from the prevalent Augustinian concept he defines original sin as "the bareness of the due justice which was induced by Adam's disobedience, and by which all have become sons of wrath."[18] By justice he means "the rectitude of the will kept for its own sake."[19] Does this primitive justice imply sanctifying grace? It certainly originates from a grace and is more than a natural gift. Whether the grace it involves is sanctifying grace St. Anselm does not say clearly; only by reasoning on his texts can we connect sanctifying grace with justice.[20] But the Scholastics of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries who take over St. Anselm's definition explicitly note that, for St. Anselm, the justice of

[16] Lottin, "XII siècle," pp. 266-272; "Maîtres dominicains," Roland of Cremona, pp. 47-59. No one will wonder at this variety of opinions if he remembers that in the twelfth century, till well in the thirteenth, the very notion of sin, speculatively considered, is still fluctuating. The history of the theology of sin (mortal, habitual, venial sin) in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries is as yet unwritten. Hints at this unsettled state of ideas are found in A. Teetaert, *La Confession aux Laïques dans l'Eglise Latine* (Louvain: 1926) and O. Lottin, *Psychologie et Morale aux XII et XIII Siècles, passim.*

[17] Cf. R. Martin, "La question du péché originel dans Saint Anselme," *Rev. Sc. Théol. Phil.*, V (1911), 735-749; A. Gaudel, *art. cit.*, col. 435-441; Kors, *op. cit.*, pp. 2323-35.

[18] "Factam per inobedientiam Adae iustitiae debitae nuditatem per quam omnes sunt filii irae" (*De conceptu virginali*, c. 27; *ML* 158, 461).

[19] "Iustitia est rectitudo voluntatis propter se servata" (*ibid.*, c., 3; *ML* 158, 436).

[20] Cf. Kors, *op. cit.*, p. 27. The obscurity in St. Anselm's teaching lies in his statement that this justice is both due to the rational creature and given in view of the vision: "Rationalem creaturam a Deo factam esse iustam, ut illo fruendo beata esset, dubitari non debet" (*Cur Deus homo*, lib. 2, c. 1; *ML* 158, 399). Martin, *art. cit.*, p. 739, against J. Toner ("Anselm's definition of original sin," *Irish Theological Quarterly*, III (1908), 427) who wrote: "For our Saint original justice meant nothing more than the natural and connatural rectitude of will due to a rational creature" (p. 428), proves that this natural justice is due to a grace. Cf. Kors, *op. cit.*, p. 27, 29; Michel, "Justice Originelle," *Dict. Théol. Cath.*, VIII (1925), col. 2033. Note also that in the twelfth century the doctrine that sanctifying grace is a *habitus* in hardly formulated as yet.

which original sin is the privation is "natural justice," not "gratuitous justice." [21]

It may seem strange but it is a historical fact that throughout the twelfth century little attention was paid to St. Anselm's innovation. Lottin can point to only three authors who follow him: Honorius of Autun († 1150/60),[22] the author of the *Ysagoge in theologiam*, of Abelard's school,[23] and Achard of St. Victor († 1171).[24] To these may be added an earlier author, Odo of Cambrai († 1113) [25] who was one of the first to write a treatise *De Peccato originali*. Apart from these, the early Scholastics are nearly unaware of the new idea. With the turn of the century this situation would change. The first Dominican and Franciscan Masters of Paris definitely usher in the Anselmian concept of original sin.

Among the Dominicans John of St. Giles († 1258) is the first to follow it: Original sin is "the absence of due justice. And justice is, according to Anselm, the rectitude of the will kept for its own sake." [26]

More resolute to adopt the new idea are the Franciscan

[21] Cf. below, nn. 8, 30.

[22] Lottin, "XII siècle," pp. 236-239; Kors, *op. cit.*, pp. 40-43; Michel, *art. cit.*, col. 2034; Gaudel, *art. cit.*, col. 441-442. Honorius hints at the distinction between original justice and sanctifying grace, "ut voluntate iustitiae corpori subdito imperaret, et voluntate beatitudinis Deo obediret" (*ML* 172, 1212).

[23] Lottin, *art. cit.*, pp. 244-246, "Culpa originalis est concupiscentia mali et duplex debitum, habendi scilicet originalem iustitiam quam semper servare potuit, et satisfaciendi pro inobedientia a qua semper cavere potuit."

[24] Lottin, *art. cit.*, p. 251. Achard is mentioned as a patron of this opinion in the *Allegoriae N. T.* (*ML* 175, 887) which is probably the work of Richard of St. Victor (Lottin, p. 253), and in the commentary on St. Paul's Epistles of the ms *Paris Arsenal 535*, "Originale ergo peccatum est iniustitia originalis, id est privatio sive absentia cuiusdam originalis iustitie que debet esse in prima etate secundum primam institutionem Dei." The same opinion is referred to in *London Lambeth 199*, "Alii dicunt quod peccatum originale est privatio cuiusdam iustitie quam habuisset homo si non preccasset, et quia privatur illa iustitia, privatur et gloria" (Lottin, *art. cit.*, p. 256).

[25] Cf. Gaudel, *art. cit.*, col. 442.

[26] "Peccatum originale est carentia debite iustitie. Iustitia vero secundum Anselmum est rectitudo voluntatis propter seipsam servata"; Lottin, "Maîtres dominicains," pp. 53-54.

Masters of Paris. The anonymous author of *Douai 434*[27] attempts to synthesize the Augustinian and Anselmian ideas, an attempt that will be repeated after him. He defines original sin as "the absence of the due justice and proneness to sin." By justice he means, not the gratuitous justice, but, as Anselm says, the natural justice. Original sin is not properly speaking the absence of grace, but the spoiling of the natural gifts.[28] After him John of la Rochelle († after 1245) [29] lists six opinions on the nature of original sin and hesitatingly chooses the Anselmian doctrine: absence of the due justice, that is, not of the gratuitous but of the natural justice. Another anonymous author, Paris Nat. lat. nouv. acq. 1470, also adopts the Anselmian definition.[30] And so does, even more fully and more explicitly, Alexander of Hales († 1245) according to the Paris Nat. lat. 15 272 and 16 404:[31] original sin is the absence or bareness of the due original justice which was incurred from elsewhere, that is, privation of Adam's natural justice by virtue of which all his descendents would have been just from their birth, had he not sinned.[32] Alexander, too, attempts a synthesis of this idea with the Augustinian concept of concupiscence, by which, he says, Augustine did not express the whole of original sin but only a part of it. Just as in actual sin there is a turning away from the changeless Good and a turning to a perishable good, so also there is in original sin the aforesaid

[27] Lottin, "Maîtres franciscains," pp. 26-34.

[28] "Peccatum (originale) non est proprie privatio gratie, sed corruptio naturalium, que naturalia, si essent in sua rectitudine naturali, disponerent ad gratiam," Lottin, *art. cit.*, p. 2. It is "abenstia debite iustitie et pronitas ad peccandum" (*ibid.*, p. 31). This justice "aut . . . sumitur pro iustitia gratuita, aut pro naturali. Pro gratuita non; quia . . . dicit Anselmus."

[29] Lottin, *art. cit.*, pp. 34-41, "Absentia debite iustitie; . . . iustitia gratuita que solum descendit a pratre luminum, et de hac nihil in presens"; it is the "iustitia naturalis" as defined by Anselm, "rectitudo voluntatis propter se servata" (*ibid.*, p. 37).

[30] Lottin, art. cit., pp. 41-43, "Privatio iustitie debite," that is, of the "iustitia naturalis," which "erat in nobis posse non concupiscere et debere non concupiscere."

[31] Lottin, *art. cit.*, pp. 43-54.

[32] "Carentia vel nuditas originalis iustitie debite aliunde contracta" (Lottin, *art. cit.*, p. 48); that justice was "iustitia naturalis qua omnes procedentes ab ipso (Adamo) essent originaliter iusti, si stetisset" (*ibid.*, p. 45).

absence and the aforesaid concupiscence.[33] We find the latter idea also with Odo Rigaud († 1275).[34] The two elements of original sin are: the absence of the due justice which is by way of aversion, and concupiscibility which is by way of conversion. For all these authors, Lottin remarks,[35] "original justice does not formally designate anything supernatural, and still less does it in any way imply in its definition the habitus of sanctifying grace."

A singular exception to this rule is St. Albert the Great († 1280). He belongs to the Anselmian current of doctrine and defines original sin as privation of original justice. But he departs in this respect, that, against the common opinion, as he explicitly says himself, he includes sanctifying grace in original justice and its privation in original sin.[36] His reason for doing so is twofold: first, he holds, also against the common opinion, and with only one predecessor among Scholastics, Praepositinus of Cremona,[37] that Adam was created in sanctifying grace, *in gratuitis*, and not *in naturalibus*, that is, not with

[33] In actual sin, "aversio a bono incommutabili et conversio ad bonum commutabile"; in original sin, "predicta carentia et predicta concupiscentia" (Lottin, *art. cit.*, p. 48).

[34] Lottin, *art. cit.*, pp. 56-62, "carentia debite iustitie (que) est per modum aversionis, et concupiscibilitas per modum conversionis" (*ibid.*, p. 59).

[35] *Art. cit.*, p. 63.

[36] Lottin, "Albert . . .," pp. 280-282. It is mainly, if not exclusively, according to an unpublished ms. attributed to St. Albert that this novel theory of his is known; cf. Fr. M. Henriquet, "Vingt-deux questions inédites d'Albert le Grand dans un manuscrit à l'usage de St. Thomas d'Aquin," *New Scholasticism*, IX (1935), 313, n. 49; Lottin, *art. cit.*, p. 282. Kors, *op. cit.*, pp. 62-64, who bases his study on the printed works only, leaves this point undecided, or rather inclines to the opposite view. Lottin himself, *art. cit.*, p. 282 n. 14, gives a hint in the same sense. St. Albert's text in the unpublished *quaestio disputata* is as follows: "Secundum veriorem sententiam carentia fuit debite iustitie gratuite; verior enim sententia est quod gratiam habuit in statu innocentie" (Lottin, *loc. cit.*) Even for St. Albert the *iustitia naturalis* (= praeternaturalis) is distinct from *iustitia gratuita*.

[37] Cf. Michel, "Justice Originelle," *Dict. Théol. Cath.*, VIII I (1924), col. 2035, Praepositinus was the first to propose this theory which would become common after St. Thomas. He claims as his authorities St. Anselm and St. Gregory the Great. Note with Michel, *loc. cit.*, that *creatus in naturalibus* means in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries *in praeternaturalibus* (*sine gratia sanctificante*). Only later on it will come to mean *in donis pure naturalibus tantum*.

the preternatural gifts only. Secondly, unless original sin implies the privation of sanctifying grace, he does not see how it can make men sons of wrath.[38] Another point on which St. Albert makes a new start is the application to the doctrine of original sin of the Aristotelian ideas of matter and form: in original sin the proneness to evil is the matter, the absence of due justice is the form.[39]

St. Bonaventure († 1274),[40] contemporary of St. Thomas, also synthesizes St. Augustine and St. Anselm, following at the same time St. Albert's example in applying the Aristotelian matter and form concepts. With a stress on Augustinian concupiscence he defines original sin, formally, as privation of original justice, and materially, as concupiscence. And he understands this in the following manner: original justice is the (preter)-natural rectitude in which Adam was created, that is, without sanctifying grace, as held by the then more common opinion.[41] Concupiscence, or the inclination to evil, following on the loss of original justice, is the material element of original sin; it connotes and includes positively the formal element.[42]

We may sum up these brief notes by saying that, St. Albert the Great excepted, the Scholastics who before St. Thomas defined original sin as the privation of original justice, understand the primitive rectitude in the sense of a natural (= preternatural) rectitude of the will, distinct from the gratuitous justice. And they do so, because such was St. Anselm's idea, and because they commonly teach that Adam was not created *in gratuitis*, but *in naturalibus* (= praeternaturalibus).

As for those who conceived original sin differently, whether as concupiscence, or as *reatus poenae*, or as a stain (*macula*),

[38] Cf. Lottin, *art. cit.*, p. 282, nn. 13 and 14. To an objection, "Originale non est carentia nisi debite iustitie naturalis; defectus autem boni naturalis non contrariatur gratie; ergo per originale non est homo filius ire," St. Albert answers by granting that, "secundum veriorem sententiam (peccatum originale carentie fuit debite iustitie gratuite."

[39] Cf. Lottin, *art. cit.*, pp. 280-281.

[40] *Ibid.*, pp. 287-294.

[41] *Ibid.*, p. 290, n. 35.

[42] *Ibid.*, p. 291. Cf. E. Catazzo, O.F.M., *De Iustitia et Peccato Originali iuxta S. Bonaventuram* (Vicenza: 1942).

their very phrases show that they do not include in original sin the privation of sanctifying grace. When these same theologians happen to speak of the justice in which Adam was created, they mean a (preter)-natural rectitude, without sanctifying grace. This grace Adam either never received before his sin, or if he did receive it before his sin, then at any rate not immediately with his creation.

Accordingly, it is historically certain that in the theology of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries up to St. Thomas the idea of original justice did not include sanctifying grace. In the mind of the theologians who conceived original sin as privation of original justice—unless they explicitly say that they do not follow the common opinion, as St. Albert did—the hereditary fault does not include in its essence the privation of sanctifying grace.

Unless St. Thomas also explicitly says the opposite, the presumption will be that he understood original justice and original sin in the meaning commonly accepted by his contemporaries.

St. Thomas' Concept of Original Sin as Privation of Original Justice.

The facts seem indeed to confirm that presumption. Before even reading St. Thomas' own texts, it is striking how historians who have studied them, after Martin and Bittremieux,[43] are agreed in saying that St. Thomas does not consider sanctifying grace as an intrinsic constituent of original justice, nor its privation as of the essence of original sin. On this point, they affirm, St. Thomas has not abandoned the common doctrine of the time. So do Kors, Gaudel, Lottin, in their respective studies on the question.[44] And for one who reads the texts with

[43] Cf. above, nn. 1 and 2.

[44] In the studies quoted above nn. 3 and 10 and p. 3. Even Michel. in the article on original justice of the *Dict. Théol. Cath.* referred to above, n. 37, does no longer say, as he did when writing an answer to Bittremieux, that the interpretation of St. Thomas' teaching in the sense of an adequate distinction between original justice and sanctifying grace is less in conformity with Trent or the Vatican. Coppens, *art. cit.* above, n. 4, rightly notes that the projected canon of the Vatican Council purposely substituted the term *ratio* for *essentia* (peccati originalis), in order not

a mind free from doctrinal bias, it is hard to evade their conclusion. There is no need to quote and to comment on all these texts in the chronological order in which they should be read.[45] A few remarks will suffice for our present purpose, namely, to show that in fact St. Thomas remains faithful to the common opinion of the time as regards the distinction of original justice and sanctifying grace—though, as will be shown presently, he did change regarding some other aspects of the problem.

The Texts.

In the *Commentary on the Sentences* he states that distinction in the same terms as his contemporaries: he distinguishes in Adam an original justice and a gratuitous justice.[46] These are distinct, yet, according to the opinion which he considers more probable, not separated in time but given simultaneously.[47] Nowhere in the *Commentary* does he designate the complex of all the gifts Adam had received in his very creation with the phrase " original justice." He does not seem, however, to call this justice in opposition to the gratuitous justice, *naturalis,* as many of his predecessors did; he paraphrases the idea: this justice put order in human nature itself at its very

to enter into the controversy, rather dormant at the time, concerning the adequate or inadequate distinction.

[45] The order of the chief texts is the following: 1) *II Sent.,* d. 20, q. 2, a. 3; d. 29, q. 1, a. 2; d. 32, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1; 2) IV *Summa contra Gent.,* c. 52; 3) *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 95, a. 1, c and ad 5; q. 100, a. 1, c and ad 2; 4) *De Malo,* q. 4, a. 2, c and ad 1 and 2 (e tertia serie obi.); q. 5, a. 1; 5) *Summa Theol.,* I-II, q. 82, a. 3; 6) *Expositio in Epist. ad Roman,* c. 5, lect. 3; 7) *Compendium Theologiae,* c. 186, c. 192, and c. 196. For this chronology, cf. M. Grabmann, *Die Werke des hl. Thomas von Aquin,* 3rd edit., 1949.

[46] *II Sent.,* d. 20, q. 2, a. 3, ". . . duplex iustitia primo homini poterat convenire, Una originalis, quae erat secundum debitum ordinem corporis sub anima, et inferiorum virium sub superiori, et superioris sub Deo . . . Alia iustitia gratuita quae actus meritorios elicit."

[47] *II Sent.,* d. 29, q. 1, a. 2, " Hoc tamen probabilius est, ut cum homo creatus fuerit in naturalibus integris, quae otiosa esse non poterant, quod in primo instanti creationis ad Deum conversus, gratiam consecutus sit." Cf. also *Summa Theol.,* I, q. 95, a. 1, ad 5.

beginnings through a divine favor.[48] It is the privation of this justice which constitutes original sin. In it he distinguishes a formal element, the rectitude of the will, and a material element, the order of rectitude in the lower powers.[49] Similarly, in original sin there is a formal element, namely, the privation of the formal element of original justice, that is, of the rectitude of the will; and a material element, the privation of the material element of original justice, that is, of the order in the lower powers.[50] This shows well enough that St. Thomas does not consider sanctifying grace as included in original justice; he finds in original justice a formal element that is distinct from

[48] *II Sent.*, d. 20, q. 2, a. 3, after the triple subordination which St. Thomas includes in original justice, as distinguished from gratuitous justice, namely, "(iustitia) originalis quae erat secundum debitum ordinem corporis sub anima, et inferiorum virium sub superiori, et superioris sub Deo," he adds, "et haec quidem iustitia ipsam naturam ordinabat in sui primordio ex divino munere."

[49] *II Sent.*, d. 32, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1, "in originali iustitia erat aliquid quasi formale, scilicet ipsa rectitudo voluntatis, et secundum hoc sibi opponitur culpae deformitas. Erat in ea etiam aliquid quasi materiale, scilicet ordo rectitudinis impressus in inferioribus viribus: et quantum ad hoc opponitur sibi concupiscentia et fomes."

[50] *II Sent.*, d. 30 q. 1, a. 3, ". . . destitutio ipsius voluntatis ab illa rectitudine ad finem quam habuit in institutione naturae, in peccato originali formale est; et hic est privatio iustitiae originalis [Note: iustitia originalis, is taken here for its formal element, ordo iustitiae in voluntate, which is a submission of the will to God distinct from the iustitia gratuita] . . . subtractio illius vinculi quo (vires appetitus sensibilis) quodammodo sub potestate voluntatis rectae detinebantur materiale in peccato est . . . concupiscentia," Cf. *ibid.*, ad 4, ". . . defectus ordinis in appetitu voluntatis est formale et completivum originalis peccati quod est privatio rectitudinis voluntatis quae inerat secundum originalem iustitiam; defectus autem ordinis in appetitu inferiori est materialiter in peccato se habens: et hoc est concupiscentia, sicut dictum est." In *II Sent.*, d. 30, q. 1, a. 1, the "ordinatio mentis in Deum," which is "aliquid ultra (illud quod ex principiis naturalibus debebatur) per quod facile in finem perveniret," is in the context of St. Thomas' ideas, the preternatural submission of the will to God, not the supernatural submission "ex iustitia gratuita."

What is this natural (preternatural) subjection of reason to God? Nothing else than the natural love of man for God, supreme end and universal Good, according to which he (or an angel) naturally loves God more than himself; cf. *III Sent.*, d. 29, a. 3; *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 60, a. 5. After the Fall, this natural love for God is no longer possible to man because of the disorder of his nature expressed in concupiscence; cf. *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 109, a. 3. Before the Fall, original justice or the primitive rectitude of his nature made that love possible. And so in the complex unity of that original justice, the subjection of reason to God was its formal element, the other subjections, of the senses to reason and of the body to the soul, being its material element.

the gratuitous justice. The same appears in the way in which he explains how baptism remits original sin: baptism does not, by infusing grace, take away the material element of original sin, but it removes its formal element, namely the insubordination of the will. How and why? By remedying what makes the privation of that justice a sin of nature which infects the person: "Baptism gives grace, and in virtue of that grace the infection which the person contracted from nature is removed; hence the guilt and the obligation to undergo a punishment also vanish." [51]

The *Summa contra Gentiles* also distinguishes a double good Adam lost by sin: a personal good, namely, grace and the right order of the soul, and a good that pertains to the common nature. The latter comprises the threefold subjection already found in the *Commentary on the Sentences*: "the inferior powers were perfectly subject to reason, reason to God, and body to the soul." This original justice was no effect of nature but of grace: God supplied by grace what nature could not give. It is the privation of this favor of God bestowed on the whole of human nature which in the descendants of Adam constitutes original sin.[52]

The *Prima Pars* of the *Summa Theologiae* is not less clear about the distinction under investigation. When St. Thomas treats of the threefold subjection which is involved in original justice—of reason to God, of the inferior powers to reason, and

[51] *II Sent.*, d. 32, q. 1, a. 1, "Per baptismum autem gratia confertur, cuius virtute illa infectio ab homine tollitur quae ex natura in personam devolvebatur: et secundum hoc anima purgatur a macula culpae, et per consequens solvitur reatus poenae." (Cf. Lottin, "Baptême," p. 244.

[52] *IV Cont. Gent.*, c. 52, "Primum peccatum primi hominis non solum peccantem destituit proprio et personali bono, scilicet gratia et debito ordine animae, sed etiam bono ad naturam communem pertinente. Ut enim supra dictum est, sic natura humana fuit instituta in sui primordia quod inferiores vires perfecte rationi subicerentur, ratio Deo et animae corpus, Deo per gratiam supplente quod ad hoc deerat per naturam. . . ." Cf. Bittremieux, *art. cit.*, p. 142: Lottin, "Albert . . .," p. 304. As noted by these authors. "per gratiam" does not mean that the subjection of reason to God, which is part of the "bonum ad naturam communem pertinens," is the formal effect of sanctifying grace. From the context it appears that this subjection of reason is not part of the personal grace of Adam, but of the common gift to nature.

of the body to the soul—of which the first is the cause of the other two, he distinguishes a double subjection of reason to God: one which is natural, another which is a supernatural gift of grace.[53] The latter is necessary in the very creation of man as the root cause of the whole of original justice. The rectitude in which man was created was not natural, that is, flowing from the constituents of nature. It required grace as its permanent cause.[54] Because of this intimate connection between original justice and sanctifying grace, St. Thomas may seem partly to neglect in original justice the subjection of reason to God which is natural (= preternatural), because it is, as it were, taken up and raised in the supernatural subjection of reason to God that arises from sanctifying grace. But it subsists there nevertheless.

This is perhaps still more the case in the *De Malo*. It is not as though the adequate distinction between original justice and sanctifying grace were stated less plainly here; rather, the most definite expression of that distinction is found in q. 5, a. 1. Both sanctifying grace and original justice are supernatural gifts of God: the former is necessary for every rational creature that is destined for the vision of God; the latter is necessary for man only because of his composite being, that is, because his nature is composed of spirit and matter.[55] The first, grace, is not a part of the second, original justice. Original sin is the

[53] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 95, a. 1: one submission of reason to God is "secundum naturam," another "secundum supernaturale donum gratiae." The first is the preternatural rectitude of the mind and reason which consists in this, as pointed out above n. 50, that because of the harmony in man's composite nature, reason and will can freely follow their natural inclination to love God above all things.

[54] *Ibid.*, q. 100, a. 1, ad 2. Here again St. Thomas distinguishes "iustitia gratuita" and "iustitia originalis"; but he holds that they in fact exist together, the first being the root cause of the second. And "iustitia gratuita" is "subiectio supernaturalis rationis ad Deum quae est per gratiam gratum facientem."

[55] *De Malo*, q. 5, a. 1, ". . . aliquod divinum auxilium necessarium est communiter omni creaturae rationali, scilicet auxilium gratiae gratum facientis, qua quaelibet creatura rationalis indiget, ut possit pervenire ad beatitudinem perfectam. . . . Sed praeter hoc auxilium necessarium fuit homini aliud supernaturale auxilium, ratione suae compositionis. . . . Hoc autem auxilium fuit originalis iustitia, per quam mens hominis subderetur Deo, ei subderentur totaliter inferiores vires et ipsum corpus, neque ratio impediretur quominus possit in Deum tendere." St. Thomas here clearly

privation of original justice and the subtraction of grace is its punishment.[56] We should not be misled by a text of the previous question which says, "Original justice includes sanctifying grace."[57] The very context shows what this inclusion means: "I do not believe it to be true that man was created with purely natural endowments." Or another text, "The opinion that sanctifying grace is not included in the idea (*ratio*) of original justice I believe to be false."[58] Why? "Because since original justice primarily consists in the subjection of the human mind to God, which subjection cannot be firm except through grace, original justice could not be without grace." In this context, inclusion of sanctifying grace in original justice or in its idea (*ratio*) means nothing else than its necessary connection with original justice. But necessary connection does not mean inclusion as of an intrinsic element.

Is there any change in the I-II of the *Summa* where St. Thomas deals *ex professo* with original sin? It does not seem so. Original sin is an inordinate disposition that flows from the destruction of the harmony in which consisted original justice.[59]

speaks of a twofold subjection of reason to God: one due to sanctifying grace, the other to original justice. The first is distinct from original justice.

This text shows clearly what St. Thomas meant by original justice and original sin. Original justice is the perfect harmony of man's composite nature which makes him fit, in the same way as other rational creatures, for the supernatural life of grace. It is presupposed to sanctifying grace. Original sin is the wilful disharmony of that composite nature, wilful through Adam's sin, on which naturally follows the loss of sanctifying grace. Modern Thomists more generally conceive things in a different way.

[56] *Ibid.*, "Hoc autem auxilium iustitiae originalis subtrahitur per peccatum originale . . . et . . . conveniens poena peccati originalis est subtractio gratiae."

[57] *De Malo*, q. 4, a. 2, ad 1 in serie 3a obi., "Originalis iustitia gratiam gratum facientem: nec credo verum esse, quod homo sit creatus in naturalibus puris."

[58] *Ibid.*, q. 5, a. 1, ad 13, "ratio illa procedit secundum opinionem ponentium quod gratia non includatur in ratione originalis iustitiae: quod tamen credo esse falsum; quia cum originalis iustitia primordialiter consistat in subiectione humanae mentis ad Deum, quae firma esse non potest nisi per gratiam, iustitia originalis sine gratia esse non potest." Cf. Lottin, "Albert . . ." p. 305, n. 72.

[59] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 82, a. 1, "Est enim quaedam inordinata dispositio proveniens ex dissolutione illius harmoniae in qua consistebat ratio originalis iustitiae." Cf. *ibid.*, q. 85, a. 3, "Per iustitiam originalem perfecte continebat ratio inferores animae vires, et ipsa ratio a Deo perficiebatur ei subiecta. Haec autem

By the privation of original justice the submission of man's mind to God was abolished.[60] For the whole order of original justice comes from this, that man's will was subjected to God.[61] And so the formal element of original sin is the privation of that original justice by which the will was subject to God; every other deordination of the powers of the soul is its material element.[62] That means: in the disorder of nature which is original sin,[63] the chief element is the disorder of the will: the other disorder, which may be called concupiscence, is consequent on the former and is secondary to it. No mention is made of sanctifying grace.

The *Expositio in Epistolam ad Romanos*, when commenting on St. Paul's classical text on original sin, has no other concept of the hereditary fault. It is the sin of nature, committed by the will of the first principle of nature.[64] That inordinateness of nature is the privation of original justice which had been given to the first man, not only as to an individual person but as to the principle of human nature, to be transmitted to his posterity together with nature.[65] Now after his fall Adam transmits to us the privation of that justice. Did this justice include sanctifying grace? To the threefold subordination

originalis iustitia substracta est per peccatum primi parentis. . . ." *Ibid.*, ad 5, ". . . per peccatum primi parentis sublata est iustitia originalis. . . ."

[60] *Ibid.*, q. 82, a. 2, ". . . privatio originalis iustitiae per quam sublata est subiectio humanae mentis ad Deum."

[61] *Ibid.*, a. 3, "Tota autem ordinatio originalis iustitiae ex hoc est, quod voluntas hominis erat Deo subiecta." Both preternatural and supernatural submission of the will to God are meant here, the second supposing the first, and vice-versa. Cf. Kors, *op. cit.*, p. 137.

[62] *Ibid.*, "Sic ergo privatio originalis iustitiae, per quam voluntas subdebatur Deo, est formale in peccato originali; omnis autem alia inordinatio virium animae se habet in peccato originali sicut quiddam materiale."

[63] Cf. *ibid.*, a. 4, "defectus originalis iustitiae . . .": ad 1, "soluto vinculo originalis iustitiae, sub quo quodam ordine omnes animae vires animae continebantur. . . ."

[64] *Ad Rom.*, c. 5, lect. 3, "peccatum originale est peccatum naturae, quod per voluntatem principii naturae commissum est."

[65] *Ibid.*, "Est autem hic defectus carentia iustitiae originalis, quae erat primo homini collata, non solum ut erat persona quaedam singularis, sed etiam ut erat principium humanae naturae, ut scilicet eam simul cum natura in posteros traduceret."

which we know already—of the mind to God, of the lower powers to the higher, of the body to the soul—a fourth one is added here: of the exterior things to man, so that they served him and he suffered no harm from them.[66] The first is the reason and cause of the others. It flows from a special gift of God who gave the soul power and strength to keep command over the body in a manner to which its natural weakness was not equal.[67] Is this *virtus* sanctifying grace? No mention is made of it.

Lastly, the *Compendium Theologiae* explains in what the state of original justice consisted. The triple subordination of the body to the soul, of the inferior powers to reason, and of reason to God, belonged to that state. Is this last subordination preternatural or supernatural? It is the cause of the two previous ones. By it man referred all things to God as to his last end.[68] It is not stated that it is sanctifying grace, though we must necessarily conclude that it depended on sanctifying grace. The complex of this manifold order is original justice. It was given to Adam not as to an individual person but as to the first principle of human nature. From him it was to be transmitted to his descendants together with human nature.[69]

[66] *Ibid.*, "Quae quidem iustitia est quaedam recitudo, ut mens hominis esset sub Deo: et inferiores vires essent sub mente, et corpus sub anima, et omnia exteriora sub homine . . . ut scilicet . . . omnia (ei) servirent, et nullum ex eis nocumentum acciperet."

[67] *Ibid.*, ". . . supplevit potentia divina quod deest naturae humanae, dans animae virtutem continendi corpus incorruptibiliter. . . ." Note that the permanent source of this *virtus* is sanctifying grace; the *virtus* itself is the preternatural gift of integrity.

[68] *Compendium Theologiae*, c. 186, "Ex hoc vero quod voluntas hominis erat Deo subdita, homo referebat omnia in Deum sicut in ultimum finem, in quo eius iustitia et innocentia consistebat." Note again, that this reference of all things to the last end is both preternatural and supernatural, cf. above n. 61.

[69] *Ibid.*, "Hic autem hominis tam ordinatus status, originalis iustitia nominatur . . . qui quidem status primo homini fuit concessus non ut cuidam singulari personae, sed ut primo humanae naturae principio ita quod per ipsum simul cum natura humana traduceretur in posteros." Is sanctifying grace the formal element of this original justice? In the *Compendium* no explicit mention is made of sanctifying grace. The subjection of reason to God, as far as this flows from original justice, is the natural love of God above all things made possible by the preternatural gift

Now its privation, following on Adam's sin, constitutes original sin, the sin of nature.[70] Does it include or entail the privation of sanctifying grace? One of the two, yes: it either includes or entails that privation. That this privation is intrinsic to original sin is not stated.

From this rapid glance at St. Thomas' texts it appears that nowhere does he state explicitly that sanctifying grace is the formal element of original justice. Nor does he do so implicitly. In his first works, where he finds in original justice a formal element distinct and different from sanctifying grace, this is clearly excluded. In his later works in which the connection between original justice and sanctifying grace is stressed more and appears to be closer and tighter than before, it is not said to be that of a whole to its part, but of two realities one of which is dependent on the other for its existence and permanence as on its root cause, not however (at any rate, it is not stated, as the material element of one complex is dependent on its formal element. To conceive of the relation between original justice and sanctifying grace in this latter framework seems to add to St. Thomas' texts.[71]

The Teaching: Old and New.

These brief remarks on St. Thomas' succesive treatments of our problem suffice to show that, within some evolution in his ideas from his first to his later works, on this precise point of the adequate distinction between original justice and sanctifying grace he has not departed from the common teaching of the time. Yet he has departed on several other closely connected points. Two of these we must mention here.

First, St. Thomas departs with regard to the more common teaching of his day (as noted above, only very few of his predecessors or contemporaries had proposed the idea) in holding that Adam was created in sanctifying grace. Hesitatingly at

of the right order of reason and will. But this submission cannot be stable unless man has sanctifying grace which is the root cause of original justice.

[70] *Ibid.*, c. 195 and 196.

[71] That such addition goes against the ideological context of St. Thomas' teaching should appear from the following pages.

first in the *Commentary*,[72] later as a firmly established conclusion,[73] he proves that the very state of original justice required sanctifying grace in Adam. Two reasons mainly prove his statement. First, the preternatural gifts of original justice could not remain inactive; man naturally turned to God in the very first instant of his creation and so received sanctifying grace.[74] Secondly, original justice depends on sanctifying grace as on its root cause,[75] from which it draws the firmness of the harmony it establishes in man.[76]

This last reason leads us to the second point that needs stressing, namely, to the interrelation St. Thomas conceives between original justice and sanctifying grace. Here also he departs, with regard to the teaching of his contemporaries, by making this connection between the two so close as to render each of them dependent on the other for its existence. Original justice, in the sense of primitive rather than natural rectitude of nature, cannot exist without sanctifying grace which is its cause and root.[77] Nor can sanctifying grace, in the primitive state of man, exist without the disposition of nature prerequired for it, namely, the integrity of nature.[78] This reciprocal cau-

[72] *II Sent.*, d. 29, q. 1, a. 2, "Hoc tamen probabilius. . . ."

[73] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 95, a. 1; q. 100, a. 1, ad 2; *De Malo*, q. 4, a. 2, ad 1, "nec credo verum esse quod homo sit creatus in naturalibus puris"; cf. *ibid.*, q. 5, a. 1, ad 13.

[74] *II Sent.*, d. 29, q. 1, a. 2, "Hoc tamen probabilius est, ut cum homo creatus fuerit in naturalibus integris quae otiosa esse non poterant, quod in primo instanti creationis ad Deum conversus, gratiam consecutus sit"; cf. *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 95, a. 1, ad 5, "cum motus voluntatis non sit continuus, nihil prohibet etiam in primo instanti suae creationis primum hominem gratiae consensisse." Note that in the *Summa* this reason is secondary.

[75] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 95, a. 1, "Quod fuerit (homo) etiam conditus in gratia, ut alii dicunt, videtur requirere ipsa rectitudo primi status, in quo Deus hominem fecit"; q. 100, a. 1, ad 2, "Cum radix originalis iustitiae in cuius rectitudine factus est homo, consistat in subiectione supernaturali rationis ad Deum quae est per gratiam gratum facientem. . . ." Cf. *II Sent.*, d. 32, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2, ". . . ex qua (gratia) rectitudo voluntatis causatur."

[76] *De Malo*, q. 5, a. 1, ad 13, "Cum originalis iustitia primordialiter consistat in subiectione humanae mentis ad Deum, quae firma esse non potest nisi per gratiam. . . ."

[77] Cf. above, n. 75.

[78] Cf. *De Malo*, q. 5, a. 1, and above n. 74; Bittremieux, *art. cit.*, pp. 136-139.

cality between sanctifying grace and original justice, the first being the cause of the other in the order of efficient causality, and the second the cause of the first in the order of dispositive causality, may well have been unknown before St. Thomas. Does it entail that original justice and sanctifying grace are to each other as matter and form, or disposition of the subject and new perfection infused? Not necessarily. Not in the texts nor in the mind of St. Thomas. In his context the reciprocal causality between original justice and sanctifying grace is demanded and sufficiently explained by the interrelation existing between nature and person. But a later evolution of his doctrine among his followers under the influence of new ideas and a new perspective will come to state that sanctifying grace is the formal element in the sum total of gifts bestowed on Adam (called now original justice) whilst part of these gifts, namely, the preternatural ones (formerly named original justice), is the disposition for sanctifying grace. The evolution did not happen without tacitly modifying St. Thomas' concepts. That evolution was perhaps invited by St. Thomas' texts or ideas; but evolution there is.

Another factor in the later development is St. Thomas' concept of original justice as rectitude of nature, and of original sin as sin of nature. For as will appear later, it seems mainly to have been a change in the idea of nature in this connection that has given rise to the chief difference between the "Thomasic" and the "Thomistic" conceptions of original justice and original sin.

What does St. Thomas mean to say when calling original justice a good or gift of nature, *bonum vel donum naturae*? [79] There are mainly two ideas connected with this phrase. First, though original justice is not a perfection that flows from the constituents of human nature, and in that sense is more than natural and is a divine favor, a gift of God and a grace,[80] yet it

[79] Cf. *IV Cont. Gent.*, c. 52, "bonum naturae quod per gratiam superadditum fuit"; *Ad Rom.*, c. 5, lect. 3; cf. Bittremieux, *art. cit.*, p. 125 f. On "Donum naturae," cf. Kors, *op. cit.*, p. 130 f, and the texts quoted there.

[80] *II Sent.*, d. 20, q. 2, a. 3, above n. 48; *IV Cont. Gent.*, c. 52, above n. 52.

does not add any objective reality to the constituents of nature nor any perfection which would raise man to a higher order, the order of the specifically supernatural or of the divine. It is *bonum naturae*. It perfects nature in its own order by making it whole and sound, by establishing in it, in a firm and permanent manner, the harmony and order that befit its components from their very essence.[81] In this aspect original justice cannot but be adequately distinct from sanctifying grace which raises man to a higher order, a sharing in the divine life.[82] Original justice is only a natural, though preternatural, good; it means nothing more than the intergrity of nature. We find this aspect of original justice throughout St. Thomas' works, stressed more perhaps in his first writings in which he is still less personal. In his later works, in which he insists on the necessity of sanctifying grace as permanent root cause of original justice, the " grace aspect " of this justice naturally stands out more than its " naturalness."

The other aspect of original justice, as a *donum naturae*, a gift made by God to human nature, reveals that this justice was not given to the person of Adam, as his individual good, but to the common nature. As such, it is to be considered as a (preternatural) accident of the specific human nature, *accidens naturae speciei*,[83] a specific property of the nature, to be transmitted through generation together with nature. Sanctifying grace, on the other hand, is of its very essence a gift to a person; it cannot mean or be a gift to nature, because it means adoptive filiation which regards persons only,[84] and it is intended to enable persons for a new life and destiny.[85] It cannot, therefore, be transmitted by generation but must be infused by God directly: He it is who adopts and regenerates His sons. That is another reason for the adequate distinction between original justice and sanctifying grace. St. Thomas'

[81] Cf. above the texts about the triple harmony and subordination in nature, which is the formal effect of original justice, nn. 48, 52, 53, 55, 65, 68.

[82] Cf. Kors, *op. cit.*, p. 125 f, and quotations *ibid.*, nn. 2, 3, 4, 5.

[83] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 95, a. 1.

[84] Cf. Kors, *op. cit.*, p. 126.

[85] Cf. Kors, *loc. cit.*

teaching on the point has not varied, and even after he conceived the connection between the two as a necessary one, this connection did not, in his eyes, diminish their adequate distinction.

It is this aspect of original justice as gift to nature which explains, as Fr. Kors remarks,[86] that St. Thomas knows only two states of nature: the one of sound nature, *natura integra*, that is, endowed with original justice; and that of fallen nature, *natura lapsa*, that is, deprived of the gifts of original justice. In both of these the presence or absence of sanctifying grace, as such, makes no difference for nature as such, because grace regards the person, not nature. Grace, though according to St. Thomas necessarily connected with original justice as its root cause, did not add anything to nature as such.[87] Nor does it, when restored in baptism, repair nature. Nature after baptism remains a fallen nature.[88] The state of repaired nature, *natura reparata*, is still to come: it will obtain only after the resurrection.

Parallel to this concept of original justice as good or gift of nature runs St. Thomas' idea of original sin as sin of nature. Here also we distinguish two aspects. First, inasmuch as it entails the loss and destruction of the harmony of nature, it is a wound of nature,[89] involving the loss of a natural good or a good of the natural order, not of a strictly supernatural perfection. The subtraction of sanctifying grace that follows in its wake, of necessity, because of the mutual interdependence of the two, is a punishment of original sin: [90] it is not original sin itself. This may involve that original sin is a sin in a very analogical meaning of the term. Yet, that is undoubtedly the idea of St. Thomas and of his contemporaries: original sin is the (wilful) disharmony or disorder of nature.

[86] *Op. cit.*, p. 136 f.

[87] Cf. Kors, *op. cit.*, p. 125 f. The state of grace is a state of the person, its presence or absence does not affect (specific) nature as such.

[88] That is why baptized parents transmit original sin which they themselves no longer have. Cf. Kors, *op. cit.*, p. 136.

[89] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 85, a. 3.

[90] Cf. *De Malo*, q. 5, a. 1.

Secondly, it is a sin of nature in the sense that the persons who contracted it did not themselves, through their own will, commit the act on which followed the sinful disorder. This disorder was caused by the will of him who was the principle of human nature.[91] The first man, by his sinful action, threw off from nature the harmony of original justice, just as and because he threw off the personal gift of sanctifying grace. He in a true sense continues to cause this disorder in his posterity in every act of natural generation,[92] which transmits a nature deprived of original justice. By that very fact original sin in Adam's children does not involve on their part a personal refusal of grace, such as there is in personal sins. It means only that their nature is indisposed for sanctifying grace.[93] It is not, therefore, a voluntary privation of sanctifying grace itself, though the loss of grace necessarily follows on it. It is, properly speaking, the voluntary privation of original justice or of the primitive order and wholeness of nature,—voluntary, that is, through Adam's will. In this disorder, if one wishes to distinguish with St. Thomas a formal and material element, the formal part will be the disorder of that power in nature which is meant to direct and rule the others, namely, the will.[94] This is no longer subject to God as it should be. And the material element is the disorder of the lower powers. But the very concept of original sin as sin of nature and not of the person makes it impossible to include in it the privation of sanctifying grace which necessarily affects the person and does not as such designate a disorder of nature.

From the above the conclusion seems inescapable: St. Thomas conceives the distinction between sanctifying grace and original justice in the same way as his contemporaries,

[91] Cf. above, n. 59.

[92] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 81, a. 1: cf. Kors, *op. cit.*, p. 149 ff.—Cf. our study, "Hereditary Guilt"—to be published in *Irish Theological Quarterly*.

[93] Cf. v. g., *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 82, a. 1, "Est enim quaedam inordinata dispositio proveniens ex dissolutione illius harmoniae in qua consistebat ratio originalis iustitiae," Cf. Kors, *op. cit.*, p. 157 f.

[94] Cf. above, n. 62.

namely, as an adequate distinction. His immediate followers, not unnaturally, did not depart from his teaching.

The First Thomists on Original Sin as Privation of Original Justice.

The practical criterion which allows one to decide whether an author is faithful to St. Thomas' teaching about the adequate distinction may be any of these three: when the privation of sanctifying grace is said to be the punishment of original sin, not the sin itself; or when original justice is conceived as separated in time from sanctifying grace; or when original justice is said to be connected with sanctifying grace in such a manner that the latter is cause of the first or the first the disposition of nature for grace.

There is little need to follow up the non-Thomistic theories about original sin in the centuries following St. Thomas. Of the three conceptions accepted before him alongside with that of St. Anselm, the Augustinian current of thought continues on its way in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries with Henry of Ghent († about 1292), Matthew of Aquasparta († 1302), the Franciscans of Oxford, Peter Auriol († 1345), and the Hermits of St. Augustine, Thomas of Strasburg († 1357) and Gregory of Rimini († 1358).[95] Their idea of original sin as concupiscence, and perhaps also St. Thomas' more nuanced concept, are aimed at by the rationalizing criticism of Durand of St. Pourçain († 1334) who reduces original sin to a *reatus poenae*.[96] In both these schools it is clear that privation of

[95] Cf. Gaudel, *art. cit.*, col. 491-496; Martin, "*La controverse* . . . Henry of Ghent," (peccatum originale) dispositio pronitatis ad peccatum, pronitas ad consentiendum carni in peccatum" (*Quodlib.* II, q. 11; Martin, *op. cit.*, p. 10); Matthew of Aquasparta, "(Peccatum originale) est concupiscentia, secundum Augustinum, cum debito non concupiscendi" (Gaudel, *art. cit.*, col. 493); Peter Auriol, "habitualis rebellio appetitus sensitivi universaliter ad rectam rationem, privativa iustitiae et obedientiae eiusdam appetitus a Deo primis parentibus generose collatae, displicens et odibilis divinae maiestati" (Gaudel, *art. cit.*, col. 495); Gregory of Rimini, "vitium concupiscibilitatis per quod homo inclinatur ad actualiter concupiscendum" (Gaudel, *art. cit.*, col. 496).

[96] Durand of St. Pourçain, "Verum est quod non est culpa proprie, vel poena, sed reatus poenae ex culpa proveniens" (Gaudel, *art. cit.*, col. 487; Martin, *op. cit.*, p. 177).

sanctifying grace does not belong to the essence of original sin, even if that privation is necessarily connected with the hereditary fault.

We must investigate the main representatives of the Anselmo-Thomistic school which follows and interprets the doctrine of the Angelic Doctor. There can be little doubt that St. Thomas' concept of the adequate distinction between original justice and sanctifying grace and the corresponding idea of original sin as privation of that justice—not including in its essence, though entailing, privation of sanctifying grace—continues to prevail with them up to the Council of Trent as the more commonly accepted teaching. That is so for the strictly Thomistic school with William Goding († 1336) and its most renowned master Hervaeus Natalis († 1323).[97] A remarkable exception to the rule, one of the rare Thomists who in the fourteenth century part company with St. Thomas in the theory of original sin and define this as privation of sanctifying grace, is Peter of La Palu († 1342).[98]

Not only in the Thomist school but in the new Scotist and Occamist schools as well the traditional idea of original justice and original sin finds admittance. According to Scotus [99] original sin is the "*carentia iustitiae originalis debitae*"; it is not the privation of sanctifying grace which goes with original sin. Original justice, moreover, in Scotus' mind existed without sanctifying grace. Occam did not differ from Scotus in his idea of original sin.[100] Nor would the general theory of the School on the eve of the Reformation abandon that concept. The

[97] Cf. Gaudel, *art. cit.*, col. 499-501. Godin, in Martin, Les questions sur le péché originel dans la 'lectura thomasina' de G. Godin, in *Mélanges Mandonnet* I (Kain 1930), pp. 411-421; ". . . qualiter illa substractio originalis iusticie habet racionem culpe in nobis" (p. 414). Hervaeus Natalis, cf. Martin, "*La controverse . . .*," "peccatum originale formaliter loquendo est carenica iusticie originalis; sed inordinata concupiscencia habitualis sive ipsa inordinacio talis concupiscencie est in ipso peccato originali materiale, et est peccatum originale materialiter" (p. 102).

[98] Peter of la Palu, cf. Martin, "*La controverse . . .*," ". . . videtur quod essecialiter non sit aliud culpa originalis quam privacio gracie gratum facientis in parvulo propter peccatum Ade" (p. 258). Cf. Gaudel, *art. cit.*, col. 502.

[99] Cf. Gaudel, *art. cit.*, col. 504-505.

[100] Occam, "carentia iustitiae originalis cum debito habendi": Gaudel, *art. cit.*, col. 504.

most illustrious representative of nominalist Scholasticism in the fifteenth century, and that nearly means of the whole School at the time, Gabriel Biel († 1492), expressly distinguishes original justice and sanctifying grace: the latter is not the formal element of the former; it is only its crown. Accordingly, original sin is the privation of original justice, not of sanctifying grace.[101]

Such was the nearly common idea in the School at the advent of Protestantism. It is necessary to stress this historical fact: before the rise of Protestantism and the Catholic Reform of Trent another way of interpreting St. Thomas' idea of original justice and original sin was hardly known. Trent itself abstained on purpose from defining the essence of original sin. It did not want to settle Scholastic disputes among Catholic theologians; it only intended to defend the Catholic dogma against the heresies of the innovators. Against these, it stressed the sinful nature of the hereditary fault and the efficacy of baptism in remitting it, thus indirectly setting aside the pseudo-Augustinian idea of original sin as identical with concupiscence. It did not say anything as to whether sanctifying grace and original justice were two distinct divine gifts or only one; nor whether original sin, though a real death of the soul and necessarily entailing privation of grace, was identical with that privation or did at least include it in its essence.

A Novel Interpretation.

The initiator of what was till recently the more common way of understanding St. Thomas' doctrine on the essence of original justice and original sin, but what was and was considered as an innovation in the sixteenth century, was a theologian of the Council of Trent, Dominic Soto († 1560).[102] He knows that

[101] Biel, "carentia iustitiae originalis cum debito habendi": Gaudel, *art. cit.*, col. 506.

[102] About Dominic Soto, cf. Gaudel, *art. cit.*, col. 529-531: "(peccatum originale) mera privatio iustiae quoad formale. Quapropter, cum in remissione originalis restituatur nobis gratia in ordine ad Deum, non tamen vires inferiores in ordine ad rationem, optime ait S. Thomas, quod in baptismo restituitur iustitia originalis quoad formale" (*ibid.*, vol. 530).

the Council did not intend to define the essence of original sin, and he attempts a new explanation which he connects with St. Thomas' teaching. He identifies the formal element of original justice with sanctifying grace and gives to understand that the essence of original sin lies in the privation of that privilege, sanctifying grace. If this is St. Thomas' theory, then it has been modified considerably. Yet, this is the interpretation of the Angelic Doctor's teaching which became, for nearly four centuries, the unquestioned manner of understanding his teaching. Before our own day Bellarmine,[103] Suarez,[104] the Carmelite Thomists of Salamanca,[105] were to follow Soto's explanation. So were Gonet [106] and Billuart.[107] Among contemporary Thomists, except for the few who followed in the reaction originated by Fr. R. Martin,[108] the greater number

[103] For Bellarmine, cf. Gaudel, *art. cit.*, col. 531 and 543. *Controversiae* (*Opera V*), "privatio doni iustitiae originalis peccatum originale dicitur, quatenus idem est cum aversione a Deo habituali" (p. 450); ". . . peccatum habituale est privatio rectitudinis habitualis, quae est habitus gratiae" (p. 451).

[104] Suarez, "Peccatum originale privat iustitia quod idem est caritate et gratia" (*De vitiis et peccatis*, IX, ii, n. 18. Cf. Gaudel, *art. cit.*, col. 531 and 543.

[105] "Dicendum est propriam et formalem rationem constitutivam peccati originalis esse privationem gratiae voluntariam nobis ex vi peccati Adami" (*Cursus Theologicus. De Vitiis et Peccatis*, disp. XVI dub. v, n. 113). Cf. Gaudel, *art. cit.*, col. 555-556.

[106] Gonet, *Clipeus Thomisticus, IV, De Vitiis et Peccatis*, disp. VII, art. v, § iv, n. cix: "ea opinio videtur probabilior, ac menti et doctrinae D. Thomae conformior, quae docet rationem formalem constitutivam peccati originalis esse privationem iustitiae originalis, voluntariam nobis ex vi peccati Adami, non ut tollit omnes eius effectus, sed ut aufert praecipue ipsius effectum primarium, communem tali iustitiae et gratiae sanctificanti, qui est sanctificare et rectificare animam in ordine ad Deum."

[107] Billuart, *Cursus Theologiae, De Peccatis et Legibus*, diss, VI, art. v, "Essentia seu formale contitutivum Peccati Originalis consistit in privatione iustitiae originalis quoad primarium eius effectum, ut voluntarium nobis voluntate capitis." Cf. prob. 3°: "Peccatum habituale consistit in privatione gratiae sanctificantis ut voluntaria voluntate propria personae: Ergo Peccatum Originale consistit in privatione eiusdem gratiae ut voluntaria voluntate capitis."

[108] Cf. above p. 1 f. An example, A. Van Hove, *Tractatus de Deo Creante et Elevante* (Malines: 1944), p. 308, "Peccatum originale est privatio subiectionis praeternaturalis rationis ad Deum simul cum concupiscentia"; cf. p. 258 f: "S. Thomam admisisse distinctionem adaequatam inter iustiam originalem et gratiam sanctificantem, probabilius est. . . ."

accept the substance of Soto's explanation as the authentic interpretation of St. Thomas.[109]

Influences that Determined the Shifting to a New Problematique.

How did the shifting from the ancient to the new interpretation happen? [110]

Historically there seems to be little doubt that the main cause of this change is the combined negative and positive influence of the Protestant idea of original sin and of the Tridentine reaction to it. The first of these inclined to reduce, or actually did reduce, the hereditary fault to the corruption of nature manifested in concupiscence. The original integrity lost with sin, Protestants taught, is nature's ability to abstain from sin. Had not the ancient Scholastic idea of sin of nature, or of its disorder resulting in the loss of nature's harmony, some faraway similarity with the Protestant error? Did it not at any rate weaken the sinfulness of the hereditary fault? But Protestants further taught—in opposition to the Scholastic tradition—that the sinfulness of nature consequent on the Fall persists even after justification. Against the pessimistic concept

[109] Cf. Hugon, *Tractatus dogmatici* II, ed. 5 (1927), *De Peccato Originali*, q. II, a. 1, "Peccatum originale consistit essentialiter in privatione iustitiae originalis; ita quidem ut concupiscentia se habeat ut materiale et privatio gratiae originalis ut formale, et ut illa privatio dicatur et sit nobis voluntaria per connexionem cum voluntate Adami capitis naturae elevatae" (p. 39). R. Garrigou-Lagrange, *De Deo trino et Creatore* (Turin: 1944), "Unde pro multis thomistis elementum formale peccati originalis est privatio ipsius gratiae sanctificantis, quae est radix intrinseca seu cause formalis intrinseca iustitiae originalis. . . . Haec communior sententia est vere conformis cum textibus S. Thomae . . ." (p. 447).

[110] We should note that there two ways of conceiving the idea that original sin consists formally in the privation of sanctifying grace. One says that the privation of sanctifying grace is the whole of original sin, and that the privation of the preternatural gifts does not belong to its essence. The other conceives original sin as the privation of original justice (understood as including sanctifying grace and preternatural gifts) in which the privation of sanctifying grace is the formal element of original sin, and the privation of the preternatural gifts, its material element. The first of these concepts clearly departs from the idea and terminology of St. Thomas who says that original sin is the privation of original justice. The second way of explaining St. Thomas' teaching is the one we consider here in contrast with the old, and now re-discovered, interpretation.

of fallen man, and still more of justified man, Trent defined the nature of original sin as death of the soul, loss of sanctity and justice, a real sinful state. It no less explicitly taught that whatever is actually sinful in the hereditary fault is wiped away in baptism, though concupiscence, it is too evident, is not taken away from the baptized.[111]

From this Tridentine teaching it is evident that original sin is a (habitual) sin in the true meaning of the word; it contains the substance of (habitual) sin, for it entails the privation of sanctifying grace. By the very fact the restitution of sanctifying grace in baptism remits original sin.[112]

With this insistence of Trent on these two points: original sin is a real sin in us, and, it is forgiven in baptism which restores grace, the way lay open to Soto's novel interpretation of St. Thomas' teaching. A real sin entails privation of sanctifying grace; just as, inversely, infusion of sanctifying grace remits sin. Does not then original justice, whose privation, according to St. Thomas, constitutes original sin, imply sanctifying grace? Trent had not said so in so many words. But was there another way of understanding St. Thomas in the light of Trent? If the infusion of sanctifying grace in baptism remits what is formally sinful in original sin, is not the obvious reason that the privation of sanctifying grace is the formal element in original sin—because sanctifying grace itself is the formal element in original justice? [113]

[111] Denzinger 787-792.

[112] On purpose: Theologians had been directed, "sequantur exemplum antiquorum conciliorum quae non per diffinitiones, sed per effectus cuiusmodi sit hoc peccatum declarant" (*Concilium Tridentinum*, V, p. 163). Do the Acts of the Council mention these ideas? The phrases themselves, "iustitia naturae," "peccatum naturae," may not be there; but equivalent considerations occur repeatedly. The traditional definition is there: "Peccatum originale est carentia iustitiae originalis inesse debitae" (*op. cit.*, p. 165, *et passim*). Considerations occur as these, "Gratiae datae Adam non ipsi tantum sed naturae datae fuerunt . . . et amisit pro natura, id est, omni suae posteritate" (*ibid.*, p. 174); or "per peccatum primi hominis corrupta est humana natura; sed natura sic corrupta corrumpit alias personas" (*ibid.*, p. 80).

[113] Does the projected canon of the Vatican Council sanction this conception? Its text is as follows, "Si quis dixerit, privationem gratiae sanctificantis ad rationem peccati originalis non pertinere seu de eius ratione non esse, A. S." This does not

This seems to have been the logic of ideas that led from St. Thomas *via* Trent to Soto and the new interpretation. Its widespread and general acceptance in the School is, no doubt, mainly due to the influence of Bellarmine, Suarez, the Salmanticenses, who patronized the new idea. Perhaps it was mainly the widespread influence of the *Doctor eximius* and his " broad " Thomism throughout the centuries of low-level Scholasticism, together with the loss of contact with St. Thomas' own texts, that were the determining reason for the success of the new interpretation.

The New Ideas.

The shift from the old to the new way of understanding St. Thomas did not come about without a considerable warping of his original ideas. It is imperative to point this out, if we are to get a grasp of the real and apparent differences between the two theories. Both St. Thomas and modern Thomists may use the same terms and the same phrases. Both may say: Original justice is a gift given to nature; Original sin is a sin of nature and not of the person. But these same phrases and statements do not mean the same thing for both. St. Thomas means by a gift bestowed on nature the preternatural rectitude of man's composite nature, that is, perfect harmony in his natural being by which the lower powers were subordinate to the higher and the higher powers to God: a supplementary perfection of nature in its own order of perfection which did not raise man to a share in the divine life (only grace does so). Consequently this rectitude given to man by way of a specific accident or preternatural " *proprium* " of his nature was to be transmitted through generation together with nature. This second characteristic of original justice, namely, its transmissibility through generation, is only a consequence of the first; it is not the primary meaning of the phrase, " gift to nature."

When modern Thomists speak of original justice as a gift to

say that the privation of sanctifying grace is of the essence of original sin. St. Thomas' idea also implies that privation of sanctifying grace is of the " ratio peccati originalis."

nature they consider only this second and secondary characteristic which is, in a way, more apparent; they overlook the first. That is why they can include in original justice, as its formal element, sanctifying grace itself which is supernatural strictly speaking and does not perfect nature on its own level but raises man to a share in the divine nature. Sanctifying grace cannot, by itself, be an "*accidens naturae speciei*"; it cannot, properly speaking, be transmitted by generation; yet it may be said to be so transmitted improperly, in the sense that the disposition of nature which "necessitates" the infusion of sanctifying grace is transmitted by generation. According to His own free disposition God infuses grace when nature is disposed for it by the preternatural rectitude; much the same way as human nature is said to be transmitted by generation even though what is its formal element, namely, the spiritual soul, is not so transmitted but directly created and infused by God.[114]

This idea of original justice as formally including sanctifying grace is only a consequence of, prerequisite to, the Tridentine concept of original sin which is said to be spiritual death of the soul. The sin of nature we inherit by being born from Adam is not only a moral defect but a real sin. What else can such death of the soul be if not privation of the supernatural life of sanctifying grace? Can there be a formal sin, whether of nature or of the person, unless its formal constituent be privation of sanctifying grace? Original sin must therefore include privation of sanctifying grace. It is a sin of nature in the sense that due to natural generation newborn infants are sinners. They receive a sinful nature deprived of original justice; they are born without sanctifying grace. Privation of sanctifying grace is what makes the state of original sin truly sinful, not the privation of the preternatural gifts which are a *gratia gratis data*, not *gratum faciens*. Privation of sanctifying grace is, therefore, the formal element in original sin; the other privation connected

[114] This Thomistic systematisation is not found readymade in St. Thomas. Its patrons grant this; but they maintain that it develops on the lines of St. Thomas' thought. History makes this statement questionable.

with it is only its material element, that is, disposition to the first.[115]

St. Thomas's idea of original sin as sin of nature is different. Nature, stained with original sin or deprived of the preternatural gift of original justice, is truly sinful; but not because it is deprived of sanctifying grace. To say so would be an imperfect and incorrect way of speaking. Nature cannot be deprived of sanctifying grace because it cannot be given sanctifying grace. This is a gift to a person; it does not perfect nature as such but raises the person to a share in the divine nature. Original sin causes nature to be sinful because it, so to speak, makes it impossible for God to infuse grace, by indisposing man for this infusion, that is, by depriving his nature received from Adam of what is, in God's plan, the necessary and sufficient disposition for God to infuse sanctifying grace. The formal element of original sin, therefore, is not privation of sanctifying grace which is extrinsic to the sin of nature, but privation of what is the formal element in the preternatural justice of nature, that is, of the preternatural subjection of the will to God. Its material element is the disharmony of the lower powers no longer subject to the higher ones. Privation of sanctifying grace, accordingly, is necessarily connected with original sin, but it is not its formal element. Consequently, original sin is spiritual death of the soul, not exactly *formaliter*, but rather *causaliter*.

St. Thomas no doubt agrees with Trent that original sin is a true sin, *veram rationem peccati habet*.[116] But perhaps more

[115] It should be noted that this concept turns original sin not only into a sin of nature but also to an extent a sin of the person (who is deprived of sanctifying grace). We may leave out of consideration the question of the voluntariness of original sin, because this is explained the same way in both interpretations we are contrasting.

[116] As noted above, n. 113, St. Thomas agrees that privation of sanctifying grace "pertinet ad rationem peccati originalis." His perspective is different from that of Trent, because he considers original sin first and foremost as sin of nature; and for him this idea settles the question whether privation of sanctifying grace belongs to its essence or not: that privation cannot be of the essence of a sin of nature. Trent considers the reality of the state of original sin in Adam's posterity (without looking for exact definitions), and that state most certainly includes privation of sanctifying grace.

than Trent did he insisted on the analogous character of that sin, of necessity involved in his idea of sin of nature. This idea for him means more than that original sin is contracted by mere natural generation. It also implies what is the presupposition of that mere fact of transmission through generation, namely, that nature is sinful because it is indisposed to grace. This indisposition of nature transmitted from Adam is the proper sinfulness of the sin of nature: it is nature's way of refusing sanctifying grace for the person that inherits sinful nature. And this indisposition evidently can be and is properly transmitted through natural generation. A necessary consequence of this transmission is that persons born with such a sinful nature are deprived of sanctifying grace. Their souls are spiritually dead.

We touch here on the different nuance in the ideas of justice of nature, sin of nature, according to St. Thomas and post-Tridentine Thomists respectively. Nature is taken in two different senses. St. Thomas takes it to mean the specific nature as distinguished from the individualized nature which alone exists as such. Modern Thomists take it in the sense of the concrete existing nature.[117] St. Thomas says that nature is just or sinful according as it is endowed with its own rectitude and harmony (preternatural, of course) or is deprived of it. This nature as such is passed on in natural generation. Modern Thomists say that nature is just or sinful because the concrete persons who are born with it are just or sinful, that is, are born in friendship with God through sanctifying grace, or enmity with God because of privation of sanctifying grace. They are so born by the mere fact of their descent from Adam, no matter whether or not sanctifying grace or its privation, which formally constitutes their justice or sin, be properly transmitted by generation.[118]

[117] Should we refer to a contemporary idea and say that Trent's position is more "existentialist" and that of St. Thomas more "essentialist" (in the concept of original sin)?

[118] Another factor that seems to have contributed towards the shift of perspective is the idea of reciprocal causality between sanctifying grace and preternatural gifts. Reciprocal causality plays between the material and formal constituents of a

Real and Apparent Differences between the two Interpretations.

Do the two interpretations imply only real differences? Granted that the Thomist position initiated by Soto is an interpretation of St. Thomas' teaching which modifies that teaching in the sense and for the reasons pointed out above,[119] do the two positions express objective differences, or do they say the same thing in other words or at any rate, when they use the same words and phrases in different meanings, do these apparently different statements perhaps in fact say the same thing? At the risk of some repetition we must still answer this last question.

The precise difference we are studying is the following: St. Thomas' idea of original justice is that this justice is adequately distinct from, though necessarily connected with, sanctifying grace. Preternatural original justice, with its own formal element,—preternatural subjection of the higher powers to God, and its own material element,—preternatural subjection of the lower powers to the higher, is the disposition of nature for the granting of sanctifying grace to the person who possesses that nature. Sanctifying grace is both root and crown of that justice. And so, whenever original justice is passed on with nature through generation God infuses sanctifying grace in the newly created soul. Post-Tridentine Thomists generally conceive original justice as the whole complex of sanctifying

composite reality. St. Thomas certainly considered the preternatural gifts, which he called original justice, as the disposition of nature for sanctifying grace in the person (when the person receives grace with nature): just as he conceived sanctifying grace as the root cause of original justice. It would suffice to unite the two elements as determining and determined parts of one whole, and then sanctifying grace is called formal element, and the preternatural gifts the material element of that complex reality. St. Thomas was prevented from doing so by his idea of *donum naturae*: sanctifying grace cannot be that: if original justice is a gift to nature, then sanctifying grace is extrinsic to it. As to the reciprocal causality between the two, in St. Thomas' position this obtains fully when one is gift to the person and the other gift to nature: nature and person are interrelated, in the concrete existent men, in that manner.

[119] The historical question of an evolution in the Thomistic tradition, after what we have said, seems to be answered in the affirmative: the post-Soto Thomist position modifies that of St. Thomas.

grace and preternatural gifts bestowed on Adam and to be transmitted to his children; the former is the formal element, though not properly transmitted in generation but only called for by generation; the latter is the material element, ultimate disposition of nature for the infusion of sanctifying grace. Is that anything more than a difference in words? Does it make any real difference to call original justice only the preternatural gifts bestowed on Adam, or so to call these gifts together with sanctifying grace, if in fact the transmission of these gifts is the same in both theories? After all, the name matters little if the reality expressed is the same.

As far as original justice goes and the transmission of the "sanctity and justice" in which Adam was established at the beginning, there seems to be between the two conceptions little more than a difference of names and of viewpoints in the idea of nature. The necessary connection between preternatural gifts and sanctifying grace and the mode of transmission, of the preternatural gifts and of sanctifying grace alike, are the same in both. In both conceptions it is God who directly infuses grace when nature passed on through generation is disposed to it; and grace is given as a gift to the person. To call sanctifying grace the formal element of original justice, or to distinguish it adequately from original justice as its cause or root, makes no real difference with regard to those two points.[120]

But there is a difference in the idea of original sin. The difference may, perhaps, be mainly one of emphasis, yet it is certainly real. In St. Thomas' mind, original sin, privation of original justice in the sense in which he understood the phrase, is a sin of nature and not of the person, in the sense that it is a disorderly indisposition of nature for grace, but it is not, by itself, privation of sanctifying grace which affects the person. That sinful disposition of nature is a sin in the analogous meaning of the term, namely, to the extent that sin, which is properly

[120] Because of the real agreement on these two points between both interpretations, the differences in the ideas about the state of original justice are more nominal than real as far objective realities go. A real difference, however, remains in the concepts of "justice of nature"; and still more in the idea of original sin.

an act and a habitual disposition of a person, can be shared by nature. Its sinfulness entails, no doubt, privation of sanctifying grace and spiritual death of the soul for the one who inherits original sin; but even apart from these, which later on for Trent give to original sin the real *ratio peccati*, the original disorder is already sin in the analogical sense.[121] St. Thomas insisted less on the idea, emphasized by Trent and afterwards, that original sin *veram rationem peccati habet;* he rather stressed, because he conceived it as sin of nature, a notion which Trent left out of its official teaching, its analogous character. Original sin for St. Thomas is a sinful disposition of nature; its necessary consequence for the person who inherits it is privation of sanctifying grace. But in his mind it hardly makes sense to speak of nature as deprived of sanctifying grace; as said already, nature cannot be given sanctifying grace nor be deprived of it; only a person can. It is because St. Thomas conceives the idea of sin of nature in the full meaning of the phrase that he need not and cannot include in the notion of original sin the privation of sanctifying grace.[122]

For Thomists after Soto the idea of original sin is different. They, after Trent, emphasize that original sin is sin in the full sense of the word; that it is spiritual death of the soul. Accordingly they include in the idea of original sin the privation of sanctifying grace. They know, many of them,[123] that sanctifying grace is a gift granted to the person; but because of its inclusion in original justice, which is a gift to nature and whose formal element it is, its privation, implied in the privation of original justice, is a sin of nature because it is necessarily

[121] In this conception, after the remission of original sin by the infusion of sanctifying grace, the original disorder of nature remains as defect, but no longer as sin; because the natural disorder of the will (formal element in it) which as consequent on the loss of the preternatural submission of the will to God, has been remedied by the supernatural orientation of the will to God (sanctifying grace).

[122] But, evidently, as pointed out already, the state of original sin necessarily implies privation of sanctifying grace, not less according St. Thomas than according to modern Thomists.

[123] Only those who identify original sin with privation of sanctifying grace (cf. above n. 110), and not with privation of original justice whose formal element they conceive as sanctifying grace, overlook this personal aspect of sanctifying grace.

incurred by all those who are born from Adam by the mere fact that they receive their nature from him through generation. Hence they weaken both St. Thomas' ideas of sin of nature and of the analogous sense of sin.

The idea of sin of nature is understood as the sinful disposition of a concrete existing nature, a sinfulness which, insofar as it includes privation of sanctifying grace, affects the person as well and not only nature. Correlatively, the idea of sanctifying grace as a personal gift is weakened, since its privation is conceived as affecting nature, at any rate, a concrete nature. The sinfulness of original sin in this conception is a disorderly disposition both of nature as privation of its preternatural harmony, and of the person as privation of sanctifying grace. The latter is the chief or formal element in original sin. The idea of sin of nature is thus reduced to mean above all that men contract original sin by being born from Adam or by receiving their nature from him.[124] The other element involved in the idea of sin of nature, namely, sinful disposition of nature as such, which is a prerequisite to its transmission by generation, has become secondary. It only remains as the material element of original sin.

Hence, secondly, the analogous character of original sin is weakened as well. The analogy will chiefly be looked for in the question of the voluntariness of original sin: its relation to the will of Adam, instead of to the will of the individual original sinner.[125] The disorder which consists in the privation of sanctifying grace is found in original sin in the same way as it is in habitual mortal sin. This allows, no doubt, an easier explanation of Trent's teaching that original sin is a real sin, spiritual death of the soul. But does it not do so at the expense of accurateness and formalness of St. Thomas' ideas?

Need we say that those among today's Thomists who prefer

[124] This is, moreover, one element in the dogmatic meaning of the idea that original sin is sin of nature. We may note in this connection that both systems of interpretation respect the whole dogmatic truth about original sin, and do so equally well.

[125] The current phrase of manuals is well-known: original sin in voluntary "voluntate Adae capitis naturae."

to follow the original position of St. Thomas, and not that of his post-Tridentine interpreters, are as faithful to the complete teaching of Trent as the others? They say with equal truth that the state of original sin entails privation of sanctifying grace [126] and spiritual death of the soul. But they remain more faithful to the formal teaching of St. Thomas. Perhaps the evolution of Thomistic teaching after Trent, commanded in fact by the dogma of the Council, was but natural and to an extent hardly inevitable in the circumstances. But it was an " evolution "—perhaps no progression,—including a partial departure from the position of the Angelic Doctor.

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[126] In that sense, therefore, they also say that privation of sanctifying grace belongs to the "ratio peccati originalis," as the projected canon of the Vatican Council, stated; cf. above, n. 113.

ST. THOMAS AND THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE

I

THE average man is rarely concerned about the problem of knowledge because knowledge as a common and ordinary human experience does not present itself as a problem. Knowing things imperfectly, he meets problems in his knowledge; he solves problems through his knowledge or fails to solve them because of his lack of knowledge, but the knowledge itself he generally takes for granted. Although he makes the ordinary efforts to distinguish between what is true and what is false, it very seldom occurs to him to investigate the validity of knowledge itself or to inquire into the basis of all certitude. For him knowledge is really no problem at all. He lives and works, eats and sleeps, and has no difficulty with his knowledge as such, though he is well aware of frequent mistakes. He knows his wife and family; he knows his friends and associates; he knows his business or profession. Knowledge for him is not a problem to be solved but a fact to be faced. As far as the ordinary person is concerned, Scepticism or Idealism—if he knew or thought about them—would be simply silly. He is a realist because he has to be.

The philosopher, however, is not satisfied with this naive acceptance of knowledge and what it seems to reveal to us. The philosopher, the man of reflective thought, wants to get to the bottom of things, and therefore knowledge itself, on reflection, begins to pose problems that lead him to investigate the validity of knowledge and the basis of certitude. He is faced with many facts that need explaining, for example, that we all make mistakes, that many of us hold contradictory opinions about the same things, that we are constantly changing, revising and correcting ideas, judgments and conclusions

that we once considered adequate and certain. These facts evoke questions that, properly understood, make up the various facets of the problem of knowledge. Is any of our knowledge true? Can we be certain we have the truth about anything? Does my knowledge represent a world of reality, a real world, or are my ideas which seem to represent reality merely private experiences elaborated entirely within my own mind? These and related questions have always troubled philosophers, though with varying intensity at different times; and the crucial nature of the problems involved, concerned as they are with the very foundations of all certitude, has impelled reflective minds to seek a complete and satisfying solution.

For almost three hundred years philosophers have been especially tormented by the problem of knowledge. It has been taken for granted that before anyone can enter into the temple of wisdom he must begin with a critique of knowledge to determine whether or not our ideas correspond with reality. That method was inaugurated by Descartes and Kant, and perfected by their followers. So deeply were all their disciples convinced of its necessity that they tended to make the problem of the critique of knowledge not merely the preliminary question but the entire content of philosophic investigation. As a result, modern thought has been for the most part lost in the maze of epistemology and has begun only lately to escape from it. Philosophers since the time of Descartes and Kant have been swinging on a pendulum of their own making that has touched periodically the two extremes of Idealistic Monism and Materialistic Monism. The history of modern philosophy is largely the account of the series of epistemological reactions that followed the acceptance of Descartes' extreme dualism. Ignorance of man's composite nature leads naturally to oversimplification in explaining his knowledge, and the various theories offered are significant only in pointing up the utterly contradictory positions to which thinkers can be led when they approach the problem of knowledge. Something must be seriously wrong when sincere and capable investigators must do an about-face each generation in their attempts to find the

solution to so fundamental a question as the problem of knowledge.

From the viewpoint of Thomistic philosophy, it is probably true to say that of all the divisions or classifications of philosophical science the newest, the most unsatisfactory and the most unfinished is that branch usually called Epistemology or Criteriology which seeks the solution to the problems surrounding knowledge. It is also the most controversial part of philosophy, giving rise to differences of opinion, among great Scholastics, that have persisted to the present day. There is no unanimity about the name, the proper subject matter or even about the precise problems that the science must solve. Some important thinkers even maintain that it is a wholly synthetic discipline which owes its very existence neither to reality nor to the exigencies of the human mind but only to the need for a reaction against false contemporary epistemologies and theories of knowledge; in short that it has no separate place in Thomistic philosophy which as an integral realism need not and, in fact, cannot be critical.

Yet the fact remains that there is a critical problem and always has been. That it has become especially prominent and articulate only in our time, whereas it was dealt with rather summarily and incidentally by the ancient and medieval thinkers, does not remove it or solve it or lessen the need for attacking it now. There is a critical problem and it must be faced. This does not, however, mean or imply that the solution to the problem of knowledge is to be found in a completely distinct science with its own principles apart from the principles of metaphysics and psychology. In recognizing epistemology for what it really is, and in placing it in its proper relation to the other philosophic discipliness, two dangerous exaggerations must be carefully avoided.

The first exaggeration derives from an over-emphasis of the historical fact that St. Thomas in the construction of his philosophy made no provision for a separate epistemology or critique of knowledge. It is a simple step from the acceptance of this fact to the easy conclusion that Thomistic philosophy is

non-critical, and that because it is an integral realism its approach to the critical problem is entirely naive, resting only on what we might call ordinary common sense. In my opinion this view is highly exaggerated and can lead to serious misconceptions about the whole Thomistic synthesis.

The philosophy of St. Thomas, on the contrary, is not at all naive but deeply critical in its foundations which are firmly anchored in an immediate contact with reality on both the intellectual and the sensory levels. A careful reading of the *De Veritate* will easily dispel any idea that St. Thomas was unaware of the necessity of a critique of knowledge at the very beginning of the elaboration of his metaphysics. In the sixth article of the tenth question he writes: "All our knowledge in its origin consists in the knowledge of the first indemonstrable principles. Our knowledge of these arises from sense experience as is made clear at the end of the *Posterior Analytics*. Our scientific knowledge, therefore, derives from sense experience." In the commentary on the sixth book of the *Metaphysics*, moreover, St. Thomas outlines a complete critical theory of the act of judgment in which alone, he maintains, truth is found. Examples could be multiplied to show that we have here no naive acceptance of knowledge without a critical appraisal and no appeal to ordinary common sense, but a thoroughly scientific criticism of the origins and foundations of knowledge.

The other exaggeration is to conceive the deeply critical element in St. Thomas' philosophy as something completely independent of metaphysics and psychology, and this might well issue into an attempt to construct an epistemology possessing its own principles and conclusions, properly antecedent to metaphysics and of which metaphysics would be merely the corollary. This is the trap into which modern epistemology fell and from which it is beginning, happily, to extricate itself.

Actually, the key to the grasp of what epistemology properly should be and what should be its relations to the other branches of philosophy can be found in St. Thomas' method of approaching the critique of knowledge. He never attempts to treat it as

an isolated problem, but always as a function of metaphysics and psychology. It is not viewed as a type of investigation that is self-contained with principles and evidence of its own, but rather as metaphysics in the precise role of self-examination and self-criticism. The principles of metaphysics are primary and self-evident and regulatory of all other sciences, but this very self-evidence, naive perhaps at the beginning, can and must be subjected to a critical examination. This critical self-examination is properly epistemology, a necessary and early element of metaphysics. We can find its origin precisely where we find the origin of metaphysics itself, that is, in the inborn curiosity of the human mind, the natural thirst of the intellect to grasp the real in all its satisfying fullness. We may well call this beginning a methodic doubt, not in the sense that the mind mistrusts itself or its hold on first principles, but in the sense that the object of knowledge, the ideas, the principles, the acts of knowing and the power of knowing itself must be scrutinized so that the scientific validity of the entire process may be laid bare.

When these two exaggerations are eliminated we move into a position to meet the two demands made upon any follower of St. Thomas who would seek a solution to the problem of knowledge in its present setting. The first and basic demand will be for a competent grasp of the truly critical nature of Thomistic philosophy and an understanding of the place and the relationship of the critique of knowledge in the whole Thomistic scheme. With this assured the contemporary Thomist will then be able to meet the legitimate demands for the solution of contemporary problems in their actual frame of reference, never losing sight either of their immediate urgency or of their proper reference to the entire field of philosophy.

II

For St. Thomas, then, philosophy does not and cannot begin with the problem of knowledge, because a critique of knowledge presupposes both metaphysics and psychology. We do not first know knowledge; we first know things. At the very beginning

knowledge is not a problem but a fact of consciousness to be examined and explained. Philosophy, moreover, has a definite objective in view, true and certain knowledge of things through their causes, and this goal makes it necessary that truth and certitude be possessed initially, from the very beginning of the search, since they cannot be created out of nothingness. If we do not have truth and certitude about something as our point of departure, we shall be without them at the end of our investigation. The attainment of ultimate knowledge has as its condition the possession of primary knowledge; ultimate truth can rest only on primary truth. The alternative is no truth, no certitude and in fact no knowledge. This can only mean that all our philosophical knowledge is ultimately based on the certitudes of immediate evidence. As against all the theories of knowledge that can be traced to Descartes and Kant, Thomism maintains that we can and must begin with the absolute certitudes of immediate evidence. These certitudes are the basis of all knowledge on both the sensory and intellectual levels.

Where can these certitudes be found? Where does all our knowledge begin? Where has everything we know its ultimate origin? To these questions only one answer is possible. All knowledge of every type begins with the immediate evidence of our senses in direct contact with the physical, sensible world. Thomistic philosophy depends completely and entirely for its material on the direct and immediate experience of the sensible universe, and in so depending finds a solid foundation on the primary facts of experience. Our external senses directly experiencing their proper objects in material things are the only sources through which our knowledge can ultimately come. The first object of all knowledge is the material world around us, the material bodies that present themselves to our senses as the subjects of continual changes and movements. The channels through which we are able to possess this primary knowledge are the external senses commonly distinguished as sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch. The value of this knowledge is guaranteed by the immediate contact of our senses with

their proper objects in material things. No bridge from subject to object is necessary nor is any possible; the contact is immediate and direct.

To seek positive proof that such really is the origin of our knowledge is both unnecessary and impossible; unnecessary because immediate experience, direct intuition excludes all need of proof; impossible because proof must proceed from something more fundamental, better known than the thing to be proved and nothing can be more fundamental or better known than the immediate knowledge of the senses. Proof needs a middle term; there is none here. But if this first fact of experience cannot be proved directly because the evidence is immediate, we may give an indirect indication of its validity by observing that the lack of any one of the senses deprives a man of all knowledge that sense might apprehend. A man born blind, for example, knows nothing of color and no amount of teaching will help him. Color for him is unimaginable and unthinkable, a clear indication that the materials of knowledge come only through the experience of the senses. It is, therefore, through the experience of the senses that knowledge originates, and the first object of all knowledge is the sensible, material world.

The validity of this sensory knowledge, moreover, depends not merely on this indirect indication but can be defended positively by an analysis of sensation itself which will show that the facts of external experience are infallibly known by the intuitive knowledge of the external senses. St. Thomas makes such an analysis in the *Summa Theologiae*,[1] where he poses the question: "Whether there is falsity in the senses?" In answer to the first objection he says: "The affection of the sense is its sensation itself. Hence from the fact that sense reports as it is affected, it follows that we are not deceived in the judgment by which we judge that we experience sensation." Aristotle had said the same thing when he noted that "illusion does not occur without our actually seeing or perceiving something. Even to see wrongly or to hear wrongly can happen only to one

[1] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 17, a. 2.

who sees or hears something real, though not exactly what he supposes." [2] And in this case the false supposition is an error of intellectual judgment, not an error of sense.

Sensory knowledge is intuitive in the strictest sense, that is, knowledge which terminates directly and immediately in an object really present by its real physical existence. It does not suffice, here, that there be only that intentional presence which occurs in all knowledge, but it is necessary that the knowledge terminate at the object in its physical existence. Such knowledge must attain its object as it really is, for otherwise it would have to apprehend an object that is not present, which means that it would have nothing as its object—an absurdity. When our senses report contact with anything, we can have infallible assurance that we are in contact with the real, and with that real object as it really is, no matter what its nature may on further analysis turn out to be. The reason for this infallible assurance is that no legitimate distinction between appearance and reality can make what appears to be, unreal. If there is an appearance to the senses, there is a reality appearing; the alternative is to face the contradiction that perception can terminate in nothing, and that nothing can appear. In short, if we sense, we sense something; if we sense something, we sense it as it is. The alternative here is not to sense at all.

III

Closely bound up with and dependent upon this knowledge of the material world is the knowledge of the self, the knowing subject, because coincident with the sense knowledge which put us in immediate contact with the reality of the universe, we have the consciousness of ourselves as knowing subjects. This consciousness of self is not, as Descartes thought, prior to the knowledge of external things, but is rather awakened by this knowledge which is in its origin always sense knowledge. It is true that the consciousness of self is more perfect in intellectual than in sense knowledge, but even in the primary sense

[2] *V Metaphys.*, c. 34.

knowledge gained by contact with material things, consciousness of self is present. Descartes' dictum: "I think, therefore, I exist," which he considered the one unassailable certitude, is acceptable only on the supposition that his thinking have a real object. To think without thinking of something is impossible. We can more correctly say: "I know something, therefore, I exist." With the knowledge of things the consciousness of self is necessarily coincident.

If all knowledge begins with the senses, it does not end there, since we have within us a higher power of knowledge, our intelligence, which uses the material supplied by the senses to elaborate ideas, judgments and reasoning processes. Although the knowledge of the intellect is on a different level than the knowledge of the senses, and although this experienced fact forces us to distinguish these two types of knowing, we must not conceive this power of intelligence as operating alone and in isolation from the senses. Neither our personality nor our knowledge can be so divided because there is absolute unity and continuity. With the knowledge of the senses the knowledge of the intellect goes hand in hand occuring simultaneously and in a collaboration so intimate that in the concrete process of knowing it is impossible to mark off the exact limits of each. Sensible knowledge is concerned only with external and sensible qualities. Intellectual knowledge, on the contrary, penetrates to the essence and intimate nature of a thing; for example, by our eyes we see the color of a plant, but by our intelligence we know what a plant is—matter endowed with vegetative life. The intellect gives us a knowledge of intelligible being; its knowledge differs from the knowledge of the senses in that it penetrates beyond the sensible phenomena to the nature, the being of the object.

We have, therefore, two different kinds, two different levels of knowledge, which operate mutually to complement and complete each other. In spite of these two levels of knowledge, human consciousness is a simple unity, not composed of watertight compartments set side by side but rather forming a cognitional oneness wherein intelligence and sensation act in

such close collaboration that together they grasp the object which is in itself at once sensible and intelligible. Such is the starting point of our intellectual knowledge and such is its critical foundation. It is quite clear that we can have no pure intellectual intuition without sensation, for our mind is so constituted as to find its objects only with the aid of the senses; it is in this way and this way alone that it graps the real. But, on the other hand, the senses do not either penetrate or completely dominate the reality they present to the mind; they reach only to the external appearances. The intimate being of things, their true and deep reality escapes the senses and appears only in the light of intelligence. Yet this light is always present and active; there can be no such thing as a moment of pure sensation in our conscious lives.

This conviction of the collaboration of the senses and intelligence is fundamental in Thomism and it gives to the realism of Aquinas a character that is peculiar and proper to it. If we are in contact with the real only through our sensations, all the valuations of reality that are recognized by philosophy will always have to be tied to experience. St. Thomas does not shirk this consequence, but applies it consistently and with fearless logic throughout his entire synthesis.

The validity of the knowledge given us by our senses is guaranteed by the immediate contact of our senses with objects in the material world. That aspect of the problem of knowledge is solved by our consciousness of direct and immediate experience. But how may we justify the validity of our intellectual knowledge? Here, too, as in the justification of the validity of sense knowledge there is no necessity or possibility of direct proof. We can only analyze reflectively what takes place when we know a thing intellectually. Now the mind has three operations, the conception of ideas, the formation of judgments, the process of reasoning. We know from psychology that any power of knowledge must have, and be distinguished by, its formal and proper object. Taking for granted, again, that the intellect is a different cognitive power from the senses, we seek its formal object. Reflection on what occurs when we

know something assures us that whereas the senses enable us to grasp the phenomena, the appearances of things, we are at the same time grasping intellectually what is within, that is, the intelligible being in its true determining features which we express to ourselves in terms of what the thing is. We do this by grasping the being of the thing with the determinations of the thing that are unfolded in the light of intelligence playing upon it. We see being as exemplified in some determined way in this particular object. In the concrete this means that we know it as a thing, as a substance (or accident), as a body, etc. This intelligible being of the thing is impervious to the senses, but is the formal object of the intellect. Just as what is visible in a body is known only in terms of color and in relation to color, so what is intelligible in a thing is grasped in terms of being and in relation to being.

In every case of intellectual apprehension the intellect shows itself to be a living relation to being, to the real. Being is the center and core of each idea and without it there is no meaning. It is this primary function of the mind grasping being and the basic determinations of being that guarantees the ontological validity of the act of apprehension. What we grasp intellectually is not sensible phenomena but the determinations and differences hidden under the phenomena and characterizing the essential nature of the thing. Again, we repeat, there can be no direct proof of this validity, but the truth of this analysis can be clearly seen if an image of anything be compared with the idea of the same thing. The different levels of determination in each are obvious. Whereas the determining features of the image will always be singular, concrete and material, those that characterize the idea will always be universal, abstract and immaterial. When we, for example, form a visual image of a house, the determinations of that image will be in terms of its color primarily, and then of its shape, size, location, etc., all singular, concrete and material characteristics. When, on the other hand, we know what a house is, we have shifted to the intellectual level; we are asking a question that the intellect alone can ask, and the answer given in terms of our apprehen-

sion can only encompass determinations that are universal, abstract and immaterial. To sum up, we grasp the object in terms of the determinations of being that are visible or more properly intelligible only to intellect.

The reason why the intellect, in its basic function of apprehension, cannot be false has a parallel in the situation found in sensory apprehension, and St. Thomas uses and applies the analogy when he answers the question: "Whether the intelligence can be false." He says: "For, every faculty as such is *per se* directed to its proper object; and things of this kind are always the same. Hence so long as the faculty exists, its judgment concerning its own proper object does not fail . . . hence, as regards simple objects not subject to composite definitions we cannot be deceived unless we understand nothing whatever about them." [3] Being, that is, what the thing is, is not grasped by the senses but only by the intellect, and this immediately and as its proper object, just as color is perceived by sight. The alternative to grasping intellectually what is there is grasping what is not there; this would mean having nothing or emptiness as an object of knowledge, a patent absurdity. The intellect possessing the form of the thing that it knows is put into immediate contact with the reality of the thing. It knows the thing in its being, and as it is. Here, as in the senses, there is required no bridge from mind to thing, since the thing present by its form makes any such bridge unnecessary. Our intellectual knowledge in apprehension is valid because the light of the intellect penetrates to the reality of the object, and cannot avoid doing so.

IV

It is, however, in his analysis of the judgment that the truly critical spirit of St. Thomas shows at its best, since it is in the judgment alone that truth or falsity is properly found. The judgment, moreover, is the intellectual act by which the first indemonstrable principles of knowledge are grasped. In this

[3] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 85, a. 6.

propositional type of knowledge is the real foundation of the truths of all science and all wisdom. This is what St. Thomas is referring to when he says: "In its origin all knowledge consists in becoming aware of the first indemonstrable principles." [4] And he tells us very clearly how these principles are formed: "Among things apprehended there is to be found a certain order. The notion which we grasp before anything else and which is included in every apprehension is being. And on the notion of being and non-being is based the first indemonstrable principle, namely, that the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time. On this principle are based, in turn, all other principles." [5] The need of this supreme principle of being and thought derives from the nature of the first two operations of the mind, apprehension and judgment. We cannot go back indefinitely in tracing our ideas. One must be first. An analysis of our concepts will eventually arrive at the first concept, the concept of being. As St. Thomas says: "The first of all notions reached by the mind is that of simple being, and then non-being, division and oneness follow in logical order; finally the mind acquires the notion of multitude in which is implied that of division." [6] The same is true of a series of judgments. The first, most simple and universal judgment must have being for its subject and that which primarily belongs to being as its predicate. So we see by immediate evidence that a being cannot be and not be itself at the same time, and this is the principle of contradiction, the first stepping stone toward the discovery of truth, which if ignored can produce nothing but error and confusion. This first principle of thought is the foundation of all our intellectual constructions. There is no certitude in the last analysis unless all knowledge be resolved back to the first principles of thought whose own certitude is based on immediate evidence necessitating the mind to assent.

From further material, supplied always by the senses, the intellect perceives other first principles which form the basis

[4] *De Verit.*, q. 10, a. 6.
[5] *Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 94, a. 2.
[6] *IV Metaphys.*, lect. 3.

of each particular field of knowledge. The precise form these primary judgments take is analyzed by St. Thomas at the very beginning of the *De Veritate*.[7] These judgments are simply the primary mental assents at which our mind naturally and necessarily arrives in its inspection of reality, both in terms of the general modes of being common to everything, and in terms of the special modes of being proper to the different kinds of things in our experience. The judgments relating to the general modes of being concern the transcendentals and are the origin of all the principles and conclusions of metaphysics. The judgments relating to the special modes of being concern the categories or various types of reality found concretized in things, and are the origin of all principles and conclusions of the special sciences. In this latter field research properly means the investigation of real things in the light of these principles. The ultimate test of the truth of any judgment, then, can only be the analytic resolution of that judgment back to the first principles, which is the reason why St. Thomas can say: "There is never falsity in the intellect if resolution into the first principles be rightly caried out."[8] The human intellect does not learn these principles nor does it assume them; it arrives at them naturally and necessarily and immediately upon a knowledge of the terms that make them up. The mind thus attains truth and certitude by grasping first principles, and then proceeding from these to conclusions. This does not mean that from these principles all knowledge may be deduced, but only that before anything can be deduced they must be admitted and applied. As regards contingent things, for example, in research in the natural sciences, this will mean that material things will be investigated, weighed and measured in the light and under the guidance of these primary principles involving the first principles of metaphysics and the first principles of the special science in question. The application of these principles to the data of experience will produce the conclusions of that science.

In order to make any of these primary judgments it is

[7] *De Verit.*, q. 1, a. 1.

[8] *Ibid.*, q. 1, a. 12.

necessary to have primary concepts, and for these material images or phantasms are required. These phantasms, derived directly from the objects in contact with the senses, are the psychological connection of the intellect with reality. And it is well to note that a judgment does not take place by comparing mentally two different concepts which are then seen to be compatible or not. A judgment is an assent, a dynamic act of the mind which occurs after a reflection on a composite concept which is the result of a composite phantasm. Unless the two elements are simultaneously known in one composite concept there can be no judgment. This act of composing or dividing occurs as the result of the reflection which sees that the predicate is in the subject, and is properly the affirmation of this connection. This connection or *nexus*, seen as possible in the apprehension, is affirmed in the judgment, which is a dynamic statement of the conformity between mind and reality, that is, the known conformity of the bond between the elements of the composite concept in the mind and the objective make-up of the object in reality.

Here in the analysis of the act of judgment is the heart of St. Thomas' critical theory and the solution to the problem of knowledge. Here is the touchstone of all truth, and the real bridge that closes the gap between our mind and reality. Because of this, our intellect, judging, can penetrate the secrets of the universe and unravel the mysteries of matter. We can detect the order in the world, and put order into our lives and our relations with other men and women. Through the mind, judging, we can regulate our conduct according to the laws of nature and we can know the eternal law of God as the ultimate rule of our actions. The mind in its power of judgment leads us upward to the life of the spirit, and ultimately to God, whence we may understand that it is because of our ability to make judgments that we are said to be "made to the image and likeness of God."

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THE ESSENCE OF THE SACRIFICE OF THE MASS

(An Analysis of Fr. Doronzo's Theory)

I

USING the definition of sacrifice in its broad sense as a point of departure, theologians divide the numerous theories about the essence of the sacrifice of the Mass, proposed since the Council of Trent, into two groups. The first group includes those theories which regard the oblation of Christ's past immolation of the cross as the essence of the Eucharistic sacrifice. The second group includes those theories which require Christ's immolation as well as His oblation.

The second group is further subdivided into several categories, each differing in its concept of immolation. Modern theologians belonging to this group generally agree that Christ's bloody immolation is represented in the twofold distinct consecration performed by the priest. Some, however, restrict the immolation of Christ to the external separation of the species of bread and wine, while others affirm that Christ is internally immolated under the sacramental species.

In the first hypothesis, the separation of species seems to be a mere picture of the sacrifice of the cross (L. Billot). In the second hypothesis, the separation of species refers to the body and blood of Christ; this seems to make the immolation of Christ a new one which supplements the immolation of the cross (A. Michel).

The Benedictine School (Dom Odo Casel, Abbot Ansgar Vonier) proposes a new Mass-theory, which claims that the immolation of the cross is essential to the Mass. According to Fathers Vonier and Casel, the drama of Calvary is made present before us in the Mass; the Eucharistic Rite (in their view) is the sacrament-sacrifice or the sacramental sacrifice. It

effects what it signifies; since it signifies the body and blood of Christ in the state of separation, it makes Christ immolated on Calvary sacramentally present.[1]

The Eucharistic sacrifice, in contrast to natural sacrifice, is not subject to human observation and experience; it is rather a mystical sacrifice. "The sacramental presence and the sacramental offering are not historical events in the career of Christ." The Mass "cannot be a new sacrifice, but it must be the representation, pure and simple, of the historic and natural sacrifice."[2] Both sacrifices, that of the Mass and that of the cross, belong to different modes of being: one to the natural order and the other to the sacramental order. One represents the other: "We are dealing with His representative life, representing the natural life."[3]

Dom Casel accepts this viewpoint and stresses even more the real mystical meaning of the sacramental sign (the dynamic side of the mystery). The sacraments are mystical actions (*Mysterienhandlungen*); through them past soteriological facts are made present and the faithful participate in them "not only by faith or disposition, but also in a physical and a concrete form, in a mystery."[4]

Thus, according to the Benedictine School, the sacrifice of the Mass is real, though sacramental; it is performed in the supernatural "*esse* of the mystery."

Fr. Emmanuel Doronzo, O. M. I., professor of Dogmatic Theology at The Catholic University of America, Washington, D. C., subscribes (at least partly) to the Benedictine theory of the sacrifice of the Mass.[5] He does not accept the theory of

[1] Dom Ansgar Vonier. O. S. B., *A Key to the doctrine of the Eucharist,* (West minister, Md.: The Newman Press, 1948), pp. 60, 80 ff., 97, 138.

[2] *Loc. cit.*, pp. 88 f., 135 f.

[3] *Ibid.*, pp. 91, 94, 118.

[4] Odo Casel, O. S. B., "nicht etwa bloss im Glauben oder in der Gesinnung, sondern in physisch-konkreter Form, im Mysterium." *Das Christliche Kultmysterium* (Regensburg, (1932), p. 41.

[5] Cf. for other viewpoints especially Fr. J. B. Umberg, S. J., *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie* (quoted abbrev. ZKT), v. 52 (1928) and v. (1930) and P. Ruppprecht, O. S. B., "Sacrificium Mediatoris," *Divus Thomas,* 9 (1931)-11 (1933). I repeat here the arguments of these authors in connection with the theory of Fr.

the physical presence of the cross in the Mass proposed by Dom Casel, nor Masure's theory of the efficacious sign of Christ's passion; but with them he holds to the concept of representative immolation, and particularly the notion of the real presence of the sacrifice of the cross in the Mass as proposed by Abbot Vonier.[6]

Fr. Doronzo deserves our thanks for having dealt with this vital question and for having tried to work out the Benedictine theory.[7] But he runs into the same difficulties that have plagued the Benedictine School; in addition, he meets with other difficulties that derive from his own speculations.

Some of these difficulties, proposed by various theologians during the seventh annual convention of the Catholic Theological Society of America at the Universtity of Notre Dame on June 24, 1952, have not been adequately answered by Fr. Doronzo. In the discussion at the time, I spoke against Fr. Doronzo's concept of the immolation of Christ in the Mass and against his positive proofs, i. e., his interpretation of Holy Scripture, the Fathers of the Church, the Council of Trent, the texts of St. Thomas and the " Mediator Dei." Below I should like to explain my position point by point.

The theory of Fr. Doronzo, if I understand it properly, can be summarized in these three affirmations:

1. The sacrifice of the Mass is an essentially relative and representative sacrifice.

Doronzo, as related by Fr. Eugene Florkowski, Nowy pogląd na istatę mszy św. (A new opinion concerning the essence of the sacrifice of the Mass), *Ateneum kapłańskie* (The priestly Ateneum), 34 (1934), 225-251, and art. in *"Kościół"* (The Church), (Lublin: Uniwersytet, 1936), 115-124; cf. J. M. Hanssens, S. J., *Periodica de re morali, canonica, liturgica,* 23 (1934), 112, 132, 160; B. Poschman, art. in *Theologische Quartalschrift,* 116 (1935), 53-116; Eugene Masure, *The Christian Sacrifice* (New York: Kenedy, 1943), pp. 265, 262; cf. pp. 225, 269-280; cf. *ibid.,* Preface; *Le Sacrifice du Corps mystique* (Paris: Desclée, 1950), p. 71, n. 1.

[6] On the essence of the sacrifice of the Mass, *Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Convention* of the Catholic Theological Society of America, Notre Dame, Indiana, June 23-25, 1952, pp. 67, 69, 79, 68.

[7] *Proceedings,* pp. 70-82; Emmanuel Doronzo, O. M. I., *De Eucharistia,* II (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1948) 1016-1026.

2. The immolation and oblation of the Mass is essentially one and the same as the immolation and oblation of the cross.

3. The immolation of the cross is repeated in the Mass " non in esse physico, sed in esse objectivo et intentionali."

II

Tradition concerning the Immolation of Christ in the Mass

The theory of Fr. Doronzo stands or falls by the positive arguments from tradition and Holy Scripture which are adduced in its support.

1. *The interpretation of Holy Scripture.* The sacrificial expressions found in Holy Scripture [8] affirm the *real presence* of the body of Christ under the species of bread and the real presence of the blood of Christ under the species of wine. The words of institution also imply a *relation between the sacrifice of the cross and its mystical representation in the Eucharist.* Theologians deduce from these expressions the truth that the *Eucharist is a true sacrifice,* as Fr. Doronzo himself does.

But, aside from this, theologians cannot decide whether these Scriptural expressions (the participles διδόμενον, ἐκχυννόμενον) refer to the *actual willingness of Christ* to give His body and shed His blood on the cross, the bloody immolation being represented only by the Eucharistic symbols of bread and wine; or whether the Scriptural expressions refer to the *future immolation of Christ on the cross,* the bloody immolation being made present really-sacramentally under the Eucharistic species.

The first supposition is more probable. The body and blood of Christ as He really existed in the cenacle are present under the Eucharistic species which symbolize the immolation of the cross. The second supposition is improbable. The participles διδόμενον, ἐκχυννόμενον, most probably cannot signify the body and blood of Christ in the state of separation on the cross, because the bloody immolation had not yet taken place

[8] " Corpus Christi quod datur, sanguis qui effunditur "; Mt. 26 : 26-28; Mk. 14 : 22-24; Luk. 22 : 19-20; 1 Cor. 11 : 24-25; cf. E. Doronzo, *De Eucharistia,* 873-883.

on Calvary.[9] Hence, these sacrificial words do not prove "Eucharistiam in tantum esse sacrificium in quantum est ipsum sacrificium crucis in ea praesens," as Fr. Doronzo affirms. Neither do these sacrificial words prove that the "tragedy and sacrifice of Calvary really and mystically become present at the altar."[10]

As regards the doctrine of St. Paul, the Apostle speaks of one bloody oblation of Christ on the cross;[11] but he does not exclude an unbloody oblation. Hence, the theory of two, numerically distinct, acts of immolation of Christ is not contrary to the teaching of St. Paul. The suffering Christ offered Himself once on the cross (a bloody immolation); the natural Christ, as He existed on earth, offered Himself at the Last Supper and now the glorified Christ offers Himself a second time under the species of bread and wine (an unbloody immolation). But on the other hand, the renewal of the immolation of the cross in "esse reali" seems to be opposed to St. Paul's teaching. Hence, the numerical oneness of the two sacrifices, that of the cross and that of the Mass, seems not to be contained in Holy Scripture.

2. *The doctrine of the Fathers of the Church.* In his Book "*De Eucharistia,*" Fr. Doronzo quotes many texts of the Fathers of the Church. I limit my criticism to an examination of these texts, in order to show that rightly interpreted, they do not substantiate Fr. Doronzo's theory.

St. Cyprian directs his 63rd Letter against those ("aquarii") who use water only in the celebration of the Mass. Therefore, he teaches that wine mixed with water should be offered, in accordance with the example and institution of Christ. St. Cyprian calls the Eucharist "Dominicae passionis et nostrae redemptionis sacramentum," "passio est enim Domini sacri-

[9] Umberg, *ZKT*, 52 (1928), 362; cf. E. Florkowski, *art. cit.*, p. 242 f.

[10] *De Eucharistia*, 1019, 1018.

[11] *Heb.* 9:12, 25 ff.; 10:12-21; cf. St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, III, q., 83, a. 1, ad 2; Conc. Trid., sess. 22. cap. 1. Henricus Denzinger, *Enchiridion Symbolorum* (quoted abbrev. Denz.), ed. Joannes Bapt. Umberg, S. J., (Friburgi, Br.: 1937), 939.

ficium quod offerimus." [12] In their context, both these texts should be understood in the sense that the Eucharist is " the memory of the passion " of Christ:

1) because (as St. Cyprian points out) the wine is converted into Christ's blood which was shed on the cross. St. Cyprian calls the body and blood of Christ the matter of the sacrifice;

2) because the passion of Christ is mentioned in all sacrifices;

3) because St. Cyprian quotes St. Paul (I Cor. 11:26) saying that we offer the chalice in order to commemorate the Lord and His passion.[13]

A misunderstanding of the words " passio est enim Domini sacrificium quod offerimus " has probably led Fr. Doronzo to the affirmation that, according to St. Cyprian, " in missae sacrificio ipsa passio Christi offertur." [14]

St. Ambrose praises the effects of the death of Christ, which brought life to all. He says that we are sealed with Christ's death, and that we announce the death of Christ in our prayers and our sacrifice.

" Orantes, annuntiamus mortem eius,
offerentes, praedicamus mortem eius." [15]

Textual parallelism calls for this interpretation: Offering, we announce the death of Christ. Fr. Doronzo's interpretation: " Offerentes mortem eius " [16] seems to be contrary to the text of St. Ambrose.

[12] Ep. 63. nn. 14, 17. *Patrologia Latina*, 4, 397, 398 f.; cf. n. 9, col. 392; J. Schwane, *Dogmengeschichte* (Freiburg, Br.: 1892), I, 514 f.

[13] *P. L.*, 4, 399.

[14] *De Eucharistia*, 1020, *the correct sense is this* " *sacrificium quod offerimus est* (vocatur) *passio Domini*," i. e., memoria passionis.

[15] De excessu fratris sui Satyri, 2, 46. *P. L.*, 16, 1385; cf. the parallel text De fide ad Gratianum, IV, c. 10, n. 124. *P. L.*, 16, 647. Another text quoted by Fr. Doronzo " nunc Christus offertur . . . quasi recipiens passionem " (*De officiis*, 1, 238. *P. L.*, 16, 100 f.), when compared with the parallel texts, evidently excludes the real passion of Christ in the Mass: " *as if* receiving the passion."

[16] *De Eucharistia*, 919, 1020.

St. John Chrysostom speaks of the Victim whose death is commemorated in the Mass: [17]

1. Unus ubique Christus,	1. Eius mortem revocamus in memoriam;
2. una hostia,	2. eandem semper offerimus,
3. tunc (olim) futi oblata,	3. quotidie offerimus,
4. semel oblata,	4. multis in locis,
5. unum sacrificium.	5. sacrificii commemoratio.

The texts in question do not state that the death of Christ is really renewed in the Mass, but that it is commemorated (" in memoriam, in recordationem eius quod factum est ").

St. Augustine continued the traditional doctrine concerning the sacrifice of the Mass in his sermons, his homilies on St. John, the *De Civitate Dei,* etc. He followed the teaching of certain Greek Fathers (St. Gregory Naz., St. John Chrysostom) and certain Latin Fathers (St. Ignatius, St. Irenaeus, St. Cyprian, St. Ambrose).

St. Augustine's fundamental idea is his concept of the sacrifice as the visible sign of an invisible sacrifice.[18] This general definition is in agreement with Augustine's explanation of Christ's immolation in the classical passage which distinguishes between bloody and unbloody immolation. According to this and other passages of St. Augustine, Christ: [19]

was once immolated:	*now is immolated:*
1. cruente,	1. incruente,
2. in suo corpore (physico),	2. in sacramento (mysterio),
3. in re,	3. in similitudine,
4. semel.	4. omni die.

The above texts of St. Augustine are very important for the doctrine of the sacrifice of the Mass, because they have influenced many theologians. The Eucharistic elements are symbols of the sacrifice offered on the cross. On the other hand, the elements of bread and wine (composed of grains and

[17] *In Ep. ad Hebr.,* hom. 17, n. 3, *P. G.,* 63, 131.

[18] *De Civ. Dei,* 10, c. 5; c. 20. *P. L.,* 41, 282, 298; *De Trinit.,* 4, c. 4. *P. L.,* 42, 901.

[19] Ep. 98. n. 9 *ad Bonifacium, P. L.,* 33, 363; cf. *Contra Faustum,* 20. c. 21. *P. L.,* 42, 385; cf. Fr. Doronzo, *De Eucharistia,* 908.

grapes) signify the participation of the mystical body in the sacrifice of the Mass.

Summarizing the various elements in the teaching of St. Augustine,[20] we can say that, according to him, the sacrifice of the Mass, is a relative sacrifice: it represents and commemorates the immolation of the cross and applies the fruits of the cross to the faithful.

Faustus Reiensis, following St. Cyprian, St. Ambrose, and St. Augustine, writes about the commemorative character of the Mass and its efficacy. He praises the fruits of the sacrifice of the cross which are applied in the Mass. He holds that both sacrifices are united by the same Victim and the same fruits.[21]

1. Quod semel offerebatur in pretium,	1. ut jugiter coleretur per mysterium;
2. rede . ptio pro hominum salute,	2. perpetua redemptionis oblatio, (quotidiana applicatio),
3. perennis Victima, unica Hostia.	3. ut viveret in memoria, et praesens esset in gratia.

St. Gregory the Great gives expression to the traditional view of the sacrifice of the Mass. He holds to the opinion of St. Augustine in his interpretation of St. Paul (Rom. 6:9) and other scriptural passages, and like St. Augustine, Gregory distinguishes between the sacrifice of the Mass and that of the cross: [22]

1. (Christus passus et mortuus est),	1. Hoc sacrificium (Missae) passionem Unigeniti Filii semper imitatur;
2. Resurgens a mortuis iam non moritur,	2. Iterum in hoc mysterio sacrae oblationis immolatur;
3. Hostia suae passionis.	3. In suo mysterio pro nobis patitur ad absolutionem nostram.

According to St. Gregory, Christ is now glorified in heaven;

[20] Sermo 227. *P.L.*, 38, 1099; *In Joan.*, tract. 26, n. 15, 17. *P.L.*, 35, 1614.

[21] Homilia de corpore et sanguine Christi, inter opera S. Hieronymi, *P.L.*, 30, 272.

[22] Dialog. 4, 58, 59 *P.L.*, 77, 425, 428; Hom. in Evang. 2. hom. 37, 7 *P.L.*, 76, 1279.

His passion is not really repeated in the Mass, but reenacted only " in imitatione, in mysterio "; nevertheless, the fruits of the real passion on the cross are applied to us in the Mass. Hence St. Gregory exhorts the faithful to become victims whenever they celebrate the mystery of the Lord's passion.

The Venerable Bede follows St. Ambrose and St. Augustine. In his homilies he conceives the Mass as the symbolical commemoration of Christ's passion; the memory of Christ's passion (not the immolation of the cross) is renewed on the altar in order to forgive our sins every day.[23]

Venerable Bede (like other Fathers of the Church) uses the word " immolare " in a wide sense, as synonymous with the word " sacrifice," but he also employs it in the strict sense of " mactare." Other Patristic expressions quoted by Fr. Doronzo [24] " quasi recipiens passionem " (St. Ambrose), " eius mortem revocamus in memoriam " (St. John Chrysostom), " in mysterio iterum pati," " passionem semper imitari " (St. Gregory the Great) do not prove that the same passion of Christ is offered in both sacrifices. The Fathers, on the contrary, expressly distinguish between the unbloody and mysterious passion of the Mass and the bloody and real passion of the cross, as is indicated by context and the use of such words as " quasi, imitari, memoria, commemoratio, mysterium."

St. Augustine and other Fathers speak of this immolation in terms which are synonymous: " mactatio vel immolatio incruenta, in sacrificio, in mysterio, in similitudine, in repraesentatione, in symbolo, in sacramento," i. e., in signo sacro. This sacred sign, which designates likeness (not identity) with the signified thing, is a symbol of Christ's passion, not its real repetition. The immolation of Christ in the Mass, according to the Fathers of the Church, is only *figurative*, because Christ is now in a glorified state; this immolation *represents as in a picture and commemorates* the sacrifice of the cross once offered on Calvary. The expressions of the Fathers, however,

[23] " Lavat itaque nos a peccatis nostris quotidie in sanguine suo, cum eiusden beatae passionis ad altare memoria replicatur." Hom. 14 *P. L.*, 94, 75.

[24] *De Eucharistia*, 1020, 891; *Proceedings*, 54.

do not exclude some internal and mysterious immolation, which is in agreement with the glorified state of Christ.

In spite of the representative character of Christ's immolation, the Fathers of the Church speak of a real oblation in the Mass: [25] the same victim is offered on the altar and on the cross. Some Fathers stress the active role of the Church, the mystical body of Christ, in the Eucharistic oblation. The redemption was effected once on the cross; its application is made every day in the Mass; the faithful who participate in the Mass receive the fruits of the cross and are inspired to the imitation of Christ's passion and the practice of virtues.

Hence the theologians, whom Fr. Doronzo unjustly reproaches with levity,[26] rightly affirm that the texts of the Fathers support the representative and commemorative character of the Mass based on the unity of the Priest and Victim. The patristic texts, if correctly explained, say nothing about the same immolation or the numerical oneness of the two sacrifices.

According to Fr. J. B. Umberg, no Father of the Church or theologian affirms that the Eucharistic sacrifice includes the past passion of Christ just as it contains the body and blood of Christ.[27] Hence Fr. Doronzo seems to have no justification for claiming that "the same oneness of the two sacrifices is also directly (formally or equivalently) asserted by Tradition." [28]

3. The doctrine of the Fathers of the Church became the teaching of the *writers of the Middle Ages*. The famous passage of St. Augustine quoted above is found in the works of almost all medieval theologians.[29] They describe the Mass as a symbolic and mystical immolation and oblation of Christ. They say that He is really present in the Eucharist in the manner in

[25] Cf. *Dict. Theol. Cath.*, X, 1, art. "Messe" (A. Gaudel). 991 f.

[26] "Quam leviter plures theologi a vi istorum textuum sese expediant." *De Eucharistia*, 1021.

[27] *ZKT*, 52 (1928), 376-391; cf. E. Florkowski, *art. cit.*, p. 246 f.

[28] *Proceedings*, 71; *De Eucharistia*, 1021.

[29] *DTC, loc. cit.*, col. 970.

which He really exists; that the mortal Christ is present in the sacrifice of the Last Supper; that the glorified Christ is present in the Mass, and that in spite of His glorified state, Christ is immolated in the Eucharist.

In order to explain this seeming contradiction, medieval theologians repeat the expressions of the Fathers of the Church, especially those of St. Augustine in their " Expositiones missae." They speak of immolation " in sacramento, mysterio, similitudine, figura, imitatione, imagine," etc.; this immolation belongs to the essence of the Mass and is reconciled with the glory of Christ existing in heaven, *in contrast to the immolation of the cross.* Let us quote some of the authors with whom Fr. Doronzo himself cites.[30]

Paschasius Radbertus, writing against Ratramnus, insists on the identity of Christ's body in the natural state and in the Eucharist; the same body of Christ, which was once immolated on the cross, is now really present in the Eucharist. In agreement with Sts. Cyprian, Ambrose, Augustine, and Gregory the Great, Paschasius distinguishes in the concept of sacrifice between the external, visible symbol and the invisible reality. The Mass, according to him, is a symbolic action, in which an actual oblation of the Victim of the cross is made under the figure of bread and wine.

Paschasius calls the Eucharist " the mystery of the death of Christ," " the commemoration," which brings to us the fruits of the passion of Christ. Christ, he points out, is said to be immolated in the Mass, because as salutary food He is the Victim for our sins.[31] Although Paschasius uses the word, " immolate " both in the general sense of " sacrifice," and in the strict sense of " mactare," he nevertheless rules out the real presence of Christ's passion in the Mass: " nec illud reiteratur in facto, ut moriatur Christus." He explicitly distinguishes between two immolations:

[30] *De Eucharistia,* 922; *Proceedings,* 55 f., 71.
[31] *Expositio in Matt. II,* c. 26. *P. L.,* 120, 894.

Christus in cruce:	*Christus in celebratione sacramenti*:
1. immolatus est pro salute mundi,	1. immolatur ut hostia pro peccatis nostris,
2. semel,	2. quotidie,
3. in seipso,	3. in mysterio,
4. nec illud reiteratur in facto,	4. sed immolatur pro nobis quotidie,
5. quod pependit in cruce,	5. ut idem percipiamus in pane,
6. quod manavit ex Christi latere.	6. ut (idem) bibamus in calice.[32]

Ratramnus differs from Paschasius Radbertus in describing the manner of Christ's presence in the Mass. According to him, this eucharistic presence differs from Christ's earthly life. Nevertheless, Ratramnus agrees with Paschasius on the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist and the figurative character of the Mass.[33]

Basing himself on the teaching of Isidore of Seville, Ratramnus distinguishes between Christ's passion on the cross and the immolation in the Mass;[34] this distinction appears in his comments on Holy Scripture (Heb. 7:26-27; 1 Peter 2:21):

1. Quod Christus se offerens adimplevit,	1. hoc in eius passionis memoriam geratur,
2. semel fecit,	2. quotidie eadem oblatio (eiusdem Victimae et fructuum),
3. in seipso passus est, nec quotidie in seipso patiatur,	3. neque tamen falso dicitur quod Dominus immoletur vel patiatur,
4. exemplum nobis reliquit, nos passionibus eius sociari debere.	4. per mysteriorum Dominici corporis et sanguinis celebrationem, per imaginem, similitudinem, repraesentationem passionum in mysteriis.

[32] Ep. *De Corp. et Sang. Domini ad Frudegardum*, *P. L.*, 120, 1354 f.

[33] Some theologians interpret in a heterodox sense the text of Ratramnus, i. e., that the Mass is the pure figure of the passion of Christ without His real presence (cf. *DAC*, *loc. cit.*, col. 1013f.). In any case Ratramnus does not admit the real presence in the Mass of the immolation on the cross.

[34] *De Corp. et Sang. Domini.*, cc. 38, 39. *P. L.*, 121, 143 f.

The Eucharistic controversy between Paschasius Radbertus and Ratramnus originated because the terminology used to describe the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist had not yet been clearly determined.

Lanfranc contributed to the clarification of this terminology. He affirms, on the one hand, the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist (against Berengarius). On the other hand, he uses such terms as "species, similitudo, sacramentum (signum), figura, mysterium" (with St. Augustine) to designate the passion of Christ in the Mass; [35] Christ was once immolated on the cross; since His resurrection He is immortal, but His body is immolated in the Eucharist. Although Lanfranc regards communion and not the consecration as the figure of Christ's immolation, he nevertheless does not affirm that the immolation of the cross is really present in the Mass.

Using the same approach and basing themselves on the teaching of St. Augustine, the following two writers have best reconciled the reality of the oblation with the figure of Christ's passion.

Guitmundus Aversanus explains the immolation of Christ as a likeness to a real passion. Commenting on the teaching of St. Augustine, Guitmundus states the relation of the Mass to the sacrifice of the cross in these words:

"Quoties celebratio corporis et sanguinis Domini agitur,
non equidem Christum iterum occidimus,
sed mortem eius . . . *memoramus;* estque ipsa celebratio
passionis Christi quaedam *commemoratio . . . Domini passionis signum . . .*
pro nobis olim mortuus (Christus) *designatur . . .*
non est enim celebratio ipsa dominica passio, sed dominicae
passionis iam peractae significativa commemoratio." [36]

Algerius Leodiensis, important for his comments on St. John Chrysostom, St. Ambrose, St. Augustine and St. Gregory the Great, the champions of traditional teaching, writes that on

[35] "Dominicae passionis designativa nomina" *Decorp. et sang. Domini,* c. 20. *P. L.,* 150, 427.

[36] *De Corp. et Sang. Christi veritate in Euchar.,* 2. *P. L.,* 149, 1455; cf. 1434.

the altar there is the same Victim which was on the cross and that both sacrifices produce the same fruits for our salvation.[37]

The same Victim

on the cross	*on the altar*
1. was offered once,	1. is offered every day,
2. in true passion and death.	2. in figure, similitude, representation of the passion,
3. truly suffered;	3. the memory of His passion is repeated,
4. true immolation,	4. figurative, mystical immolation,
5. in Himself, that is, in human form.	5. in the sacrament, that is, in the form of the bread and wine.

The immolative action (" in cruce vera, in altari figurata ") constitutes the difference between the two sacrifices. In spite of the difference in immolation, the same grace of salvation comes to us because the same true Christ is in both sacrifices. The unity of the sacrifice of the Mass and that of the cross is made effective by the one and the same Victim, and not by one and the same immolation.[38]

Peter Lombard distinguishes in the Eucharist between the real presence of the body and blood of Christ (res et sacramentum) and the representation of the passion of Christ (species of bread and wine, breaking of the host, communion). Like his predecessors, the Master of Sentences accepts the word " immolate " both in the general sense of " sacrificare " and in the strict sense of the figurative immolation of Christ; " Christi passio non rei veritate sed significandi mysterio." [39]

Peter Lombard writes that the Eucharistic sacrifice or the immolation is " the memory and representation of the true sacrifice and the holy immolation which was made on the altar of the cross." [40] Both sacrifices are united by the same Victim and the same fruits. This view appears in his commentary of St. Augustine and St. Ambrose.

[37] *De Sacram. Corp. et Sang. Domini*, 1, 16, *P. L.*, 180, 786, 787, 790.
[38] *Ibid.*, col. 788.
[39] *IV Sent.*, d. 10, n. 3. *P. L.*, 192, 861. [40] *Ibid.*, dist. 12. n. 7. col. 866.

Peter Pictaviensis regards the immolation of Christ in the sacrament as a mere representation of the immolation of the cross.[41] Other twelfth century writers such as Robert Paululus, Peter Blesius, Balduin Cantuariensis, Sicardus Cremonensis, Lothar de Segni (Pope Innocent III) present the doctrine of the Mass in the liturgical aspect and conceive it as a figure of Christ's passion.

The Great Scholastics (Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure, St. Albert the Great, St. Thomas Aquinas) follow the Fathers of the Church, especially St. Augustine, in defining the Mass as a sacred sign of the internal sacrifice whose effects are the sanctification of the faithful. They regard this sign as the oblation of the whole mystical body. Christ is the principal Priest who offers Himself through the visible priest. They make a distinction between the real presence of Christ and the symbolism of Christ's passion in the Eucharist.

In order to shorten this presentation, I shall consider the view of *St. Thomas,* without however attempting to review his whole teaching on the sacrifice of the Mass.[42] According to the prince of theologians, the Mass is the sacrament of Christ's passion, and as such it is a *sign commemorative of the past passion of Christ* (res significata et non contenta), *a sign demonstrative of the present grace of ecclesiastical unity* (communio cum Christo, res contenta) and *the sign foretelling the future glory.*[43]

St. Thomas writes of the relation of the Mass to the sacrifice of the cross in a threefold sense:

a) " as the *representative* image of Christ's passion."
b) " as the *commemoration* of the sacrifice of the cross,"
c) " as the *application* (participation) of the fruits of the passion."[44]

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[41] Sent., 5. c. 13. *P. L.,* 211, 1256.

[42] Cf. *DTC, loc. cit.,* col. 1052 ff.; A. Hoffman, " De sacrificio Missae iuxta S. Thomam," *Angelicum,* 15 (1938), 262-285.

[43] *Summa Theol.,* III, q. 73, a. 4; q. 60, a. 3.

[44] *Summa Theol.* a) III, q. 83, a. 1; Dom Vonier comments on this text: " The sacrifice of Calvary and the sacrifice of the Eucharist are to each other in the relationship of the *exemplum;* one is the replica of the other. One contains what the other contains." (*A Key,* p. 150). My observation on this comment: St. Thomas

The representation of the passion of Christ in the Mass is necessary, because of the application of its fruits.[45] The passion of Christ is represented and commemorated, according to St. Thomas, in the Mass: a) by the ceremonies, especially the *sign of the cross,* b) by the *double consecration,* although both forms (either that of the body or that of the blood) taken separately represent the passion of Christ; nevertheless, the consecration of the blood of Christ represents Christ's passion *more explicitly;* c) by *holy communion* (the effects of Christ's passion).[46]

According to St. Thomas, the Mass is the representative image of Christ's passion, like the altar which represents the cross.[47] This comparison shows that, according to the Angelic Doctor, the word "repraesentare" does not mean "to make really present," but it means "to make present in picture-like manner." As the altar is not identical with the cross, so the celebration of the Mass is not identical with the passion of Christ; it represents the passion as a man's portrait represents his person. The same idea is indicated by St. Thomas' quotation from St. Augustine "sicut imagines" and from St. Ambrose "ad recordationem mortis eius" (Christi); these quotations and examples would be misleading, if they should prove, as Fr. Doronzo would have us believe, "the making present" of the separation of Christ's body and blood.[48]

affirms with St. Ambrose (ad 1) that the same body of Christ is offered in both sacrifices; but he does not affirm that the same immolation is really present in both sacrifices, because, according to him, the Mass represents in a picture-like manner the immolation of the cross. The word "*exemplum*" means the same as "*figura*" (cf. III, q. 83, a. 2, ad 2). In the fifth article of the same question, St. Thomas describes in detail how the passion of Christ is represented by the words and signs of the Mass. b) III, q. 22, a. 3, ad 2; *IV Sent.*, d. 13, q. 1, a. 2, qcla. 6, sol. 3; c) III, q. 79, a. 1; a. 7, ad 2; cf. q. 73, a. 4; a. 5, ad 3; q. 80, a. 4; q. 83, a. 2; cf. Umberg, *ZKT*, 52 (1928), 384 ff.; 54 (1930), 101 ff.

[45] *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 73, a. 5.

[46] *Ibid.*, a) q. 83, a. 5, ad 3; b) q. 76, a. 2, ad 1; cf. ad 2; q. 80, a. 12, ad 3; q. 78, a. 3, ad 7; c) q. 74, a. 1; cf. *IV Sent.*, d., 11, q. 2, a. 1, qcla. 3, sol. 1.

[47] "Sicut celebratio huius sacramenti est imago repraesentativa passionis, ita altare est repraesentativum crucis ipsius." *Ibid.*, q. 83, a. 1, ad 2.

[48] Missae ratio sacrificalis derivatur "ex ipsa praesentia Christi passi" (*De Eucharistia,* 1022).

St. Thomas's words "sacrificium autem quod quotidie in Ecclesia offertur, non est aliud a sacrificio quod ipse obtulit, sed eius commemoratio" should be understood in the light of the passage quoted in the context from St. Augustine,[49] that is: the identity of the two sacrifices is based upon the identity of the same Priest and the same Victim: "Ipse Christus—Sacerdos et Oblatio (Victima)."

Let us add that the word "commemorare" in the above passage is used in relation both to sins and to sacrifice; sins are commemorated in the prayer "forgive us our sins" and the sacrifice of the cross is commemorated in the Mass. Hence, the word "commemoratio" should be taken in the same sense in both phrases, i. e., as a memorial or a representation in a picture. St. Thomas does not speak of any other immolation of Christ in the Mass than that of the representation of the sacrifice of the cross and the application of its fruits.

St. Thomas stresses rather the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist, using such words as "contineri, praesens esse, esse in sacramento."[50] St. Thomas's expression "continens Christum passum" signifies the presence of the glorified Christ who has suffered.[51] This is clear from the comparison of the Old and the New sacrifices. The sacrifice of the New Laws contains "ipsum Christum passum, non solum in significatione vel figura, sed etiam in rei veritate."[52] St. Thomas affirms here the *real presence of the body and blood of Christ, and not the*

[49] *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 22, a. 3, ad 2; *De Civ. Dei*, 10, 20; Fr. Doronzo writes: "Patet mentem S. Thomae esse sacrificium eucharisticum consistere formaliter in ipsa oblatione et immolatione crucis, ut representative reiterata in celebratione missae" (*De Eucharistia*, 1022). He is perfectly right, if he means that the immolation of the cross is represented in the Mass; if, however, he means that the immolation of the cross is made present ("reiterata"), then this sense is not contained in the text of St. Thomas. And Fr. Doronzo uses the term in the second meaning: ratio sacrificalis derivatur "ex tali *specifica repraesentatione* QUAE EXERCETUR IN IPSA REALI PRAESENTIA CHRISTI PASSI" (*Ibid.*; Italics mine.)

[50] *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 73, a. 4, ad 3; cf. q. 79, a. 7; q. 83, a. 2c., ad 1, 2. Cf. Umberg. *ZKT*, 52 (1928), 387 ff. and E. Florkowski, *art. cit.*, p. 247.

[51] *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 73, a. 5, ad 2; cf. A. Vonier, *A Key*, p. 54; E. Doronzo, *De Eucharistia*, 1023.

[52] *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 75, a. 1.

state of Christ's passion. These are my reasons for making this claim. In this article St. Thomas:

1. Contrasts the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist with His figurative presence in the sacrifices of the Old Law.

2. Rejects the error of Berengarius who admitted only the figurative presence of Christ in the Eucharist.

3. Corrects the interpretation of heretics who interpreted certain passages of St. Augustine exclusively in the sense of the mystical and spiritual presence of Christ in the Eucharist (ad 1, 2).

4. Contrasts the visible presence of Christ "per modum corporis" with Christ's invisible presence "virtute spiritus" (ad 3, 4).[53]

According to St. Thomas, "vi sacramenti" the body of Christ is present under the species of bread, and the blood of Christ is present under the species of wine; other parts of the body and the soul of Christ are present under both species "vi concomitantiae."[54] The Eucharist would contain "Christum passum" only if the consecration would take place during the three days between the crucifixion and resurrection of Christ.[55]

After the Great Scholastics, their view of the sacrifice of the Mass was generally accepted and taught in the schools. *Duns Scotus,* the subtle Doctor, and *Gabriel Biel* taught that the Mass is the representation of the sacrifice of the cross; both understood this in St. Augustine's sense. On the whole, how-

[53] Cf. *ibid.,* q. 81, a. 3.

[54] Cf. the opinion of Dom Vonier, *A Key,* p. 126 ("we immolate the Christ, but not . . . the Christ who is in heaven"; p. 208 ff. (a difference in the meaning attached to *vi verborum, vi conversionis, vi sacramenti*); Fr. Doronzo, *De Eucharistia,* 1031 ("solum corpus Christi, sub ipsa oblatione et immolatione crucis est formaliter loquendo hostia . . . status gloriosus, corporis Christi . . . est tantum quid concomitans"). The distinction between sacramental and historical presence involves the difficulty: Christ who once suffered is present in the Eucharist *vi sacramenti* and the glorified Christ is present at the same time *vi concomitantiae.* Christ who is immortal becomes mortal again. Cf. Umberg, *loc. cit.,* Florkowski, *art. cit.,* p. 250, n. 92 f.

[55] *Summa Theol.,* III, q. 76, a. 1, ad 1; a. 2; q. 81, a. 4, ad 2, 3. Hence it seems, that Fr. Doronzo wrongly quotes St. Thomas in favor of his theory.

ever, the theologians of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries dealt rather with the value and fruits of the sacrifice of the Mass than with its essence.

The above short presentation shows that the Scholastic considered the Mass as the representation and the fruitful commemoration of Christ's passion and death on the cross. The same Victim who died on the cross is really present in the Eucharist and is really offered in the Mass; both sacrifices differ only as to immolation: that on the cross was real, while the one in the Mass is figurative, mystical.

The medieval theologians use Patristic terminology in writing about sacrificial immolation; they employed such words as "mysterium, signum, figura, similitudo, etc." Although some medieval writers use the word "immolation" both in the general sense of "sacrificium" and the strict sense of "mactatio," or "repeated immolation," they nevertheless all agree that Christ's immolation, because He cannot die, is only *commemorative*, i. e., the figure of the past immolation; or they say it is mystical ("*in mysterio*") in contrast to the real immolation on the cross.[56] This distinction cannot refer to Fr. Doronzo's distinction between immolation "in esse physico" (on the cross) and "in esse obiectivo et reali" (in the Mass).

III

The Magisterium of the Church concerning the Immolation of Christ in the Mass

The sixteenth century brought a new development in the doctrine of the Mass because of the *errors of the Protestants*. Luther denied that the Mass is a proper sacrifice of the cross and regarded it only as a memory of the unique sacrifice of the cross and the testament or sign of the remission of sins made by God and confirmed by the death of Christ. "The Mass is nothing else than the divine promise or testament of Christ sealed with the sacrament of His body and blood." [57]

[56] Cf. Lepin, *L'idée du sacrifice de la Mass* (Paris, 1926), p. 98.

[57] *Works of Martin Luther*, with Introduction and notes (Philadelphia: A. J. Holman Company and the Castle Press, 1915-1932), vol. 2, p. 207.

Other Protestants denied the expiative character of the Mass. Melanchthon rejected the Eucharistic sacrifice on the ground that it lacked real immolation, the shedding of blood, which he said, is required according to St. Paul (Heb. 9:22) for every propitiatory sacrifice. Zwingli identified sacrifice with immolation and affirmed that Christ suffered only once on the cross, and could not suffer any more; hence sacrifice was impossible.

Catholics who wrote against the Protestants stressed the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist. In conformity with medieval tradition they upheld the concept of sacramental immolation. They stated that there was only one real immolation of Christ on the cross; yet in the sacrifice of the Mass, Christ was immolated " modo quodam incruento, in imitatione, in commemoratione passionis Dominicae, in mysterio, impassibiliter, invisibiliter, modo immolatitio." In other words, along with the medieval interpreters of liturgical texts, Catholic polemicists of the sixteenth century held that the mysterious, figurative, symbolic immolation of Christ belonged to the essence of the Mass.

The modus " immolatitius," of which Cajetan spoke, implied a mystical manner of immolation that commemorated the sacrifice of the cross. This manner of immolation (status or modus immolationis, according to Cajetan, and R. Tapper) signified only the separation of the Eucharistic species. Cajetan in parallel statements differentiated between two manners of offering: " in re mortis " and " in mysterio mortis," but he never upheld the repetition of the passion of Christ, which Fr. Doronzo wrongly ascribes to him.[58]

1. *The doctrine of the Council of Trent* was directed against the Protestants who denied the sacrificial character of the Mass. The Council left undefined the essence of the Mass and the concept of unbloody immolation. Hence no theory can invoke the Council in its support, because the Tridentine Council deals only with the errors of the Protestants. Each theory, however,

[58] *De Eucharistia*, 1019, 1023; cf. *DTC*, X, 1 art. " Messe " (J. Rivière), 1108 f.

must take into account the elements of sacrifice, as defined by the Council of Trent.

During the discussions of the Council of Trent (1551-1552), the Fathers agreed:

1) That the value of the sacrifice of the Last Supper derived from that of the cross;

2) that the sacrifice of the Mass represented the sacrifice of the cross; but they did not deal with the problem of the unity of both sacrifices;

3) that Christ in the Mass was not in the state of passion; the opinion that Christ in the Mass was "in statu passionis et mortis" was eliminated from the initial discussions of the Council. During their discussions the Fathers of the Council stated that the essence of the Mass consisted of three elements:

1) the real presence of Christ,
2) the commemoration of the past bloody immolation of Christ,
3) the actual oblation of the body and blood of Christ.

Some Fathers added a fourth element—our union with God (in the sense explained by St. Augustine).[59]

Christ's immolation at the Last Supper was understood as spiritual and figurative; some Fathers called it real because, they said, the passion of Christ began at the Last Supper.

After the discussions the Council of Trent (sess. 22, September 17, 1562) defined the doctrine of the sacrifice of the Mass. Against the affirmation of the Protestants that the Mass was "an empty commemoration of the sacrifice of the cross," the Council of Trent taught the fundamental dogma that the sacrifice of the Mass was a relative sacrifice in the traditional sense: a) as a *representation* of the sacrifice of the cross; b) as a *perpetuation* (commemoration) of its memory; c) as an *application* of its infinite fruits to souls.[60] The Council used the

[59] Cf. Lepin, *op. cit.*, p. 312.

[60] "Sacrificium quo cruentum illud semel in cruce peragendum repraesentaretur eiusque memoria in finem usque saeculi permaneret atque illius salutaris virtus . . . applicaretur." Sess. 22, cap. 1 *Denz.*, 938; cf. art. "Messe" (J. Rivière), *DTC. loc. cit.*, col. 1130; M. D. Forrest, M. S. C., *The Clean Oblation* (St. Paul: Radio Replies Press, 1945), pp. 64, 72, 162.

word " repraesentare " in the same sense that St. Thomas employed it, that is, to represent in a picture and not to make really present the bloody sacrifice in the Mass. This is clear from the other statements of the Council.[61] The word " repraesentare " used by the Council expressed these two ideas: the *internal identity* of both sacrifices based on the identity of the principal Priest and Victim, and of the satisfaction and merits; and the *external* (symbolic) *representation* of the bloody sacrifice in the Mass.

The proof of this statement follows. First, the Council contrasts the past and unique sacrifice of the cross with the present and repeated sacrifice of the Mass. It contrasts the " mactatio sacramentalis " in the Mass with the " mactatio realis " on the cross.

Secondly, according to the teaching of the sixteenth century and the discussions of the Council, the representation of the sacrifice of the cross consists of the external rite: " Christus mystice immolatur, prout vi verborum consecrationis seorsim ponuntur eius corpus et sanguis, quamvis per concomitantiam sint simul." The view about the presence of Christ in the state of death was removed from the discussions.

The Council spoke of " oblation " and " immolation " in the Mass. According to Batiffol, Kramp, the Fathers of the Council used the words " offerre " and " immolare " in the general sense of " sacrificare " referring to the entire sacrifice. But this opinion, more probably [62] cannot be accepted for the following reasons:

1) The distinction between " cruente " and " incruente " refers to " immolare " rather than to " offerre."

2) The Catechism of the Council of Trent, in accordance with the intent of the Council, distinguishes between oblation and immolation.

3) The theologians of the Council, in agreement with medi-

[61] *Denz.*, 945, 986; cf. Umberg, *ZKT*, 54 (1930), 100 f., E. Florkowski, *art. cit.*, *Ateneum Kapłańskie*, p. 245, n. 76.

[62] Cf. *DTC*, *loc. cit.*, col. 1135; M. D. Forrest, *op. cit.*, pp. 64, 126; E. Doronzo, *De Eucharistia*, 1011.

eval writers, speak of immolation in the strict sense, as equivalent to " mactatio " (incruenta).

The real presence of Christ in the Eucharist is affirmed against Protestants. But the real presence of the Victim once immolated does not explain the terms of the Council, because the Council distinguishes between the real presence (" continetur ") and sacrificial immolation " incruente immolatur ").[63] In agreement with the Fathers of the Church, the Council speaks of two immolations:

The immolation of the cross:	*The immolation of the Mass*:
1. bloody,	1. unbloody,
2. past,	2. actual in every Mass,
3. was made once,	3. is made daily,
4. through Christ Himself,	4. through the visible priest,
5. under His own species.	5. under the species of bread and wine.

The interpretation of the teaching of the Council of Trent on this point can follow either one of two lines of thought:

1) The unbloody immolation is a new and mysterious immolation of Christ, formally *distinct from that of the cross*. The unbloody immolation is a mystery, but it is something real in the supernatural order. It is not merely an image of the past immolation, i. e., it does not consist purely in the separation of the species. The species of bread and wine manifest this mysterious immolation only externally because the Council affirms Christ's immolation *under* the species and not *in* the species.[64]

2) The unbloody immolation is *identified with that of the cross,* which is repeated in the sacrificial mystery. The term " unbloody " means ritual or sacramental, because the unique immolation of the cross is present under the sacramental sign. This second opinion is less probable,[65] as will appear from further considerations.

[63] A. Michel, *DTC,* art. " Messe," X, I, 1267.

[64] " Seipsum ab Ecclesia per sacerdotes *sub signis visibilibus* immolandum in memoriam transitus sui ex hoc mundo ad Patrem quando per sui sanguinis effusionem nos redemit." Sess. 22. cap. 1. *Denz.* 938.

[65] Cf. E. Masure, *The Christian Sacrifice,* p. 265.

The relation of the Mass to the sacrifice of the cross is conceived by the Council in the traditional sense. Both sacrifices —that of the Cross and that of the Mass—are identical because of: 1) the same Victim, 2) the same principal Priest, 3) the same fruits. The only difference stated by the Council appears in the words: " sola offerendi ratione diversa." [66]

This " ratio offerendi diversa " does not refer to the single act of offering which is made on two different levels of being.[67] The " ratio offerendi diversa " does not imply any *difference in the manner of existence;* it suggests rather a *difference in the act of offering* in the Mass and in the act of offering on the cross, because the Council makes a distinction between the bloody immolation on the cross and the unbloody immolation in the Eucharist.

The Council does not affirm that in the Eucharist the real presence of Christ takes place in a double state: Christ in the state of passion (vi verborum) and Christ in the state of glory (per concomitantiam). The Council says that the same Christ exists according to His natural presence in heaven and is present according to His substance in the Eucharist, in many places without a contradiction.[68]

" Vi verborum " the body of the glorified Christ is present under the species of bread and the blood under the species of wine, while other parts of the body and the soul are present " ex vi naturalis connexionis et concomitantiae."

[66] Sess. 22. cap. 2. *Denz.* 940; cf. Josephus Mueller, S. J., *De Missae Sacrificio,* (ed. 3; Oeniponte, 1932), p. 57 " modus offerendi seu modus actionis sacrificalis est physica forma sacrificii; forma autem essentiam vel speciem alicuius rei determinat; ideo sacrificium missae et sacrificium crucis essentialiter differunt " (quia modo offerendi differunt, cruente, incruente). Others conceive this difference as accidental or modal (relating to the manner of offering), but in any case, " the unbloody immolation is numerically distinct from the bloody immolation, though the Victim and the Priest are numerically the same in each sacrifice." M. D. Forrest, M. S. C., Abbot Vonier and " The Clean Oblation," *Emmanuel,* 57 (1951), 297, cf. Umberg, *ZKT,* 52 (1928), 392; the answer of Dom Casel in *Jahrbuch für Liturgiewissenschaft,* 8 (1928), 220 ff. does not convince, as relates E. Florkowski, *art. cit.,* p. 244.

[67] " Penes diversitatem esse physici et esse intentionalis." Fr. Doronzo, *De Eucharistia,* 1018; *Proceedings,* 71.

[68] Sess. XIII, cap. 1. *Denz.* 874; cf. cap. 3. *Denz.* 876.

The glorified Christ really present under the visible signs of bloody death truly offers Himself to God the Father in an unbloody manner (the unbloody immolation); therefore, according to the Council, the Mass is not " an empty commemoration " (" nuda commemoratio ") of the sacrifice of the cross.

Thus, on the one hand, the Council affirms the relation of the Mass to the sacrifice of the cross, while, on the other hand, it proclaims the true sacrificial act of the Mass. According to the Council of Trent, the Mass most probably is both a relative and an absolute sacrifice. The Mass and the cross are probably, according to the Council, specifically identical, because the Priest and the Victim are the same in both sacrifices; but the numerical identity of both sacrifices finds no expression in the teaching of the Council.

Writing against the theory of Fr. De La Taille, Fr. Doronzo says that the De La Taille's view is opposed to the Council of Trent: " identificatio sacrificii crucis et sacrificii coenae . . . non videtur congruere doctrinae Concilii Tridentini, explicite distinguentis inter duo sacrificia et oblationes." [69] On the other hand, from the teaching of the Council concerning the same Victim in both sacrifices, Fr. Doronzo concludes: " It follows that the two sacrifices are one, since the Victim specifies the sacrifices, being the thing offered and immolated." [70] Are not these two affirmations contradictory?

The conclusion of Fr. Doronzo cannot be admitted in the light of the doctrine of the Council of Trent as explained above. Some theologians admit that the presence of a mysterious and internal immolation of Christ under visible signs would be in conformity with the teaching of the Council; but the real presence of the immolation of the cross in the Mass, although not directly contrary to the teaching of the Council, finds no support in the terminology used at the Council. The Council does not use the word " repraesentare " in the sense of " making present."

Likewise, I cannot agree with Fr. Doronzo's interpretation of

[69] Sess. 22, cap. 1; *De Eucharistia,* 1015.
[70] *Proceedings,* 71; *De Eucharistia,* 1020, 1024.

the following passage in the Catechism of the Council of Trent "what is performed in the Mass and what is offered on the cross, is one and the same sacrifice" (Roman Cathechism). Neither do I agree with his interpretation of Pope Leo XIII's statement that the Eucharist "offers not only an empty similitude and commemoration of the reality (of the sacrifice of the cross), but the reality itself, although in a different appearance." [71]

These texts affirm the identity of both sacrifices in the traditional sense, but not their "numerical" identity nor the identity of the "ratio sacrificii. "The Holy Father stresses the fact that the *Victim is really present in the Mass,* hence, *the Mass is not an empty commemoration of the cross,* but he does not say that the "ratio sacrificii crucis" is present in the Mass. On the contrary, his expression "specie dissimili" suggests a difference between the bloody and unbloody immolations asserted by the Council of Trent.

After the Council of Trent, theologians agreed that the Mass and the Cross were one and the same sacrifice; but they did not understand it as being numerically one. In spite of numerous theories, they agreed that the same Victim is in both sacrifices, although they did not agree on the same immolation. The one and the same Victim is not multiplied, if the immolation of the Mass is different from that of the cross, because the Victim can be immolated in a different manner (or as the Council of Trent states "sola offerendi ratione diversa").

We may put aside the theories which admit a real or virtual destruction in the Mass. But let us see next how theologians variously conceived mystical immolation.[72] They wrote of it

1) generally as an unbloody immolation;

2) specifically as the sacramental separation of species (Billot, Tanquerey),

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[71] *Epist. and Episcopos Scotiae, cf. De Eucharistia,* 1020; *Proceedings,* 71. The conclusion of Fr. Doronzo: "Ergo ipsa veritas, seu ratio sacrificii crucis, constituit sacrificium missae" does not flow from the quoted texts.

[72] Cf. Doronzo, *De Eucharistia,* 992 f.

3) as the external state of death and destruction (Billot),
4) as the separation of the body and blood of Christ according to the "esse sacramentale" (Michel, Hervé),
5) as the sacrificial action which produced the separation of the body and blood of Christ (Pasqualigo).

Each of these unbloody immolations essentially represents (but does not include) the bloody immolation of the cross. The sacrifice of the Mass, according to Christ's institution, applies the fruits of the natural sacrifice of the cross.

Some recent theologians state that in the Mass there is the same immolation which took place on the cross. The Mass rite offers the Victim that was once immolated on the cross; in other words, it offers the past immolation of Christ (M. De La Taille, Chr. Pesch, Lepin). The Benedictine School holds to the real presence of the immolation of the cross in the Mass. It teaches that the Mass is the sacramental representation of Christ's passion on the cross.

Aside from this School, theologians agree, in spite of their differences, that the immolation of Christ in the Mass is only figurative and representative; according to others, the immolation is mysterious and internal, but conformed to the glorified state of Christ in heaven. In this way, modern theologians continue the tradition of the Fathers and the medieval theologians. The same tradition is continued in the final document which we shall now consider.

2. *The encyclical on the sacred liturgy "Mediator Dei" of Pope Pius XII.* This encyclical teaches the same doctrine of the Mass as did the Council of Trent to which it refers. This teaching, viewed in the light of the Tridentine Council, may be summed up in several points:

a) *The relation of the Mass to the sacrifice of the cross.* The Holy Father teaches the fundamental dogma that the Mass is a relative sacrifice in the traditional sense, namely:

1) It is the *representation* of the sacrifice of the cross: The

Mass "represents the bloody sacrifice offered once on the cross."

2) It is its *commemoration*: it "perpetuates its memory to the end of time."

3) It is an *application* of its fruits: the "salutary virtue (of the cross) is applied in remitting of . . . sins." [73]

The sacrifices of the Mass and the cross are identified because the same Priest, the same Victim, the same ends and fruits are in both. "The august sacrifice of the altar is . . . a true and proper act of sacrifice, whereby the High Priest by an unbloody immolation offers Himself a most acceptable Victim to the Eternal Father, as He did on the cross." [74]

The Holy Father teaches that the Eucharistic sacrifice *represents* and *renews* the sacrifice of the cross.[75] The word "*repraesentare*" used in the encyclical expresses, in conformity with the Council of Trent, two ideas: the *internal identity* of both sacrifices based on the identity of the same Priest, the same Victim, the same fruits, and the *external* (symbolical) *likeness* of the bloody sacrifice in the Mass, that is, the pictorial representation and not actual reenactment in the sense of "making present." The arguments for this opinion are as follows:

The Holy Father contrasts, as the Council of Trent does, the past and unique sacrifice of the cross with the present and repeated sacrifice of the Mass. He contrasts the bloody death on the cross with the unbloody immolation in the Mass. The first belongs to the past, the second exists every day and is reconciled with the glorious state of Christ.

b) The *differences* between the sacrifice of the Mass and that of the cross: "The manner of offering alone being different." [76] The Holy Father distinguishes between:

[73] *Acta Apostolicae Sedis*, XXXI (1947), 547. Encyclical Letter "Mediator Dei" (quoted Enc.), (ed. the America Press, 1948), n. 67; the Council of Trent is quoted (sess. 22. cap. 1).

[74] *AAS*, 548, *Enc.* n. 68.

[75] *Enc.*, n. 66 f., 164, 205.

[76] *AAS*, 547 f.; *Enc.*, n. 67, 70.

The immolation of the cross and *the immolation of the Mass*

1. The bloody death,	1. The unbloody immolation,
2. Took place on Calvary,	2. Is repeated in every sacrifice,
3. Once on the cross,	3. He daily offers Himself,
4. Christ offered Himself,	4. By the ministry of His priests,
5. In His human nature,	5. Under the external signs, symbols,
6. Separation of His body and blood.	6. The Eucharistic species under which He is present symbolize the bloody separation of His body and blood.

The nature of the unbloody immolation, according to the *Mediator Dei*, may be understood in either one of two senses:

1) Like the Council of Trent, the " Mediator Dei " teaches that the unbloody immolation of Christ is figurative, yet " no mere empty commemoration of the passion and death of Jesus Christ." [77] The immolation does not only consist of the separation of the Eucharistic species; it is real, though mysterious, in the supernatural order, because " the sacrifice of our Redeemer is shown forth by external signs, which are symbols of His death." [78] Christ is the Victim hidden under these symbols: " Christ is symbolically shown by separate symbols to be in a state of victimhood." [79]

The unbloody immolation constitutes the essential nature of the Mass: " the Eucharistic sacrifice in its very nature is the unbloody immolation of the divine Victim, which is made manifest in a mystical manner by the separation of the sacred species and by their oblation to the eternal Father." [80]

2) The unbloody immolation is identified with that of the cross, which is repeated in a mysterious, sacramental manner. Yet the numerical identity of the two sacrifices is not probable, because it lacks support in the expressions of the encyclical. The expressions of the Holy Father show much similarity with those employed in the theory of Pasqualigo and Billot; they

[77] *AAS*, 548, *Enc.*, n. 68.
[78] *AAS*, 548, *Enc.*, n. 70.
[79] *AAS*, 549, *Enc.*, n. 70.
[80] *AAS*, 563, *Enc.*, n. 115.

indicate that the act of sacrificing is performed "*hic et nunc*." [81] The encyclical favors rather the opinion that the unbloody immolation is formally distinct from that of the cross. The "Mediator Dei" teaches rather the specific identity of the Mass and the cross.

The encyclical distinguishes between the *real presence* of the body and blood of Christ and the symbolism of the passion, "by the transubstantiation of bread into the body of Christ and of wine into His blood, His body and blood are both really present; now the Eucharistic species under which He is present *symbolize the actual separation* (cruentam separationem) *of His body and blood*." [82]

But the theory of Fr. Doronzo confuses the real presence with the symbolism of the passion, because it conceives both the body and blood of Christ and His passion as being really present. According to the "Mediator Dei" (in conformity with the Council of Trent) "the unbloody immolation at the words of consecration, when Christ is made present upon the altar in the state of a victim, is performed by the visible priest and by him alone as the representative of Christ." He offers the divine Victim.[83]

According to Dom Casel, the priest consecrating does not primarily offer, but only places the condition necessary for the presence of the act of offering; consecrating, however, the priest unites himself mystically with the present Offerer of Calvary and thus co-offers with Christ. Likewise Fr. Doronzo gives the answer. But if sacramental separation considered formally, as Fr. Doronzo teaches,[84] is only the condition of the

[81] The same interpretation cf. M. D. Forrest, *art cit., Emmanuel,* 57 (1951), 296; E. Masure, *Le sacrifice du corps mystique,* p. 31; B. Kloppenburg, O.F.M., who writes that the Mass is the sacrifice specifically identical with the sacrifice of the cross; but the Mass as the act of the whole Mystical Body is specifically different. The encyclical "Mediator Dei" seems to be opposed to the sacramental theory of Dom Casel. "A controversia sobre a teoria do Misterio," *Revista eccl. Brasileira,* 11 (1951), 241-256, according to a note in *Ephemerides theologicae Lovanienses,* 28 (1952), 146.

[82] *AAS, 548, Enc.,* n. 70; cf. E. Doronzo, *De Eucharistia,* 1017; *Proceedings,* 74.

[83] *AAS, 555, Enc.,* n. 92.

[84] *Proceedings,* 75, 76; *De Eucharistia,* 1031 ff.

Eucharistic sacrifice and does not enter in its essence, then the priest, contrary to the encyclical, performs only the condition of the sacrifice and not the sacrifice itself.

Finally, it may be noted that Pius XII more than the Council of Trent stresses the social character of the sacrifice of the Mass, in which all the faithful cooperate and participate as priests and victims: "Together with Him and through Him let them make their oblation and in union with Him let them offer themselves." This important element will be presented in the future in a separate article.

Conclusion

In opposition to the interpretation of the Benedictine School, such is my understanding of the pertinent documents of the Church; this interpretation is in conformity with the views of other theologians who have criticized this School. Although the Benedictine theory may be defended as not being contrary to the Church documents, it is not traditional. It is contrary to the traditional view which does not affirm the real presence of the death of Christ on the cross in the Eucharist. As Fr. Doronzo himself states, the traditional view speaks of the symbolic representation of the bloody death of Christ and of the real presence of the body and blood of Christ in the Eucharist. The traditional view does not teach the presence of two Christs in the Eucharist, that is, the suffering Christ (vi sacramenti) and the glorified Christ (vi concomitantiae).

Neither the fact of representation of the cross in the Mass, nor the identity of the same Victim and the merits in both sacrifices proves their numerical identity nor the repetition "in esse reali" of the immolation of the cross in the Mass, notwithstanding the opinion of Fr. Doronzo.[85] The sacrifice of the cross does not need to be repeated; only its fruits are applied.

[85] "This is what all Tradition summarized in its constant and emphatic assertion that the Mass is a representation, nay a repetition of the sacrifice of the cross." *Proceedings*, 76.

Fr. Doronzo does not admit the distinction between the immolation of the cross and the immolation of the Mass, except in their manner of existence. According

Although these arguments are not complete and may be developed further, they show that the theory of Fr. Doronzo has no foundation in tradition nor any basis in the "Mediator Dei." Fr. Doronzo's theory is open to grave objections in common with the Benedictine theory; it is liable to even greater difficulties on those points where it departs from the Benedictine theory, even though it uses its terminology.

Fr. Doronzo closes the presentation of his theory with the words: "Our explanation has been, after all, only a theological circumlocution of the essence of the sacrifice of the Mass," [86] because "we can never solve or properly explain the mystery, for the Eucharist is fully a mystery." [87]

I agree with this assertion. I would like, however, to add, that Fr. Doronzo's circumlocution seems at times to be mere tautology and involves a contradiction. The end of theological

to him, the oblation and the immolation of the cross are really (in esse reali) contained in the Mass in the following ways:

1. in a representative way ..... "in esse repraesentativo,"
2. in a relative way ..... "in esse relativo,"
3. in a vicarious way ..... "in esse vicariali,"
4. in an objective way ..... "in esse obiectivo,"
5. in an intentional way ..... "in esse intentionali,"
6. in a cognitive (intelligible) way ..... "in esse cognitivo (intelligibili),"
7. in a terminative order ..... "in esse terminativo,"
8. in the order of finality ..... "in esse finali,"
9. in the order of mediation ..... "in esse mediationis
10. in the order of sacrificial action ..... "in esse activo-sacrificali," or "in esse oblativo et immolativo,"
11. in a sacramental way ..... "in esse sacramentali."

The sacramental separation formally considered "is nothing else than the self-same sacrifice of the cross (the same immolation and the same offering) repeated and re-acted in another way, i. e., "non in esse et modo absoluto," but "in esse et modo relativo, vicario, obiectivo, intentionali." *Proceedings*, 75; other expressions cf. *bid.*, 72, 73, 74, 76, 81; *De Eucharistia*, 1017 1026 f. This collection of expressions of different meaning cannot but create confusion, as Fr. W. Jasiński, professor of SS. Cyril and Methodius Seminary, Orchard Lake, Mich., observed during the discussion at the convention at the University of Notre Dame. Can a theory which creates such confusion be true? Some of these expressions are traditional (esse repraesentativum); others are misleading (esse intentionale, cognitivum) and justly invite criticism; still others require explanation (esse oblativum, immolativum, activo-sacrificale).

[86] *Ibid.* [87] *Ibid.*, 77.

speculation is not to solve a mystery, but to explain what may be explained and to show that we cannot go further in the explanation of a mystery, precisely because what is being considered is a mystery. The theory of Fr. Doronzo does not explain even what can be explained. And therefore, Fr. Doronzo has rightly " stressed the necessity of inquiring how the Mass is an immolation or destruction besides being an oblation," [88] because, as one critic observed, " the theory in its core defies clarification." [89]

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[88] *Ibid.*, 81.
[89] C. De Muth, S. J., *Theological Studies*, 10 (1949), 126.

THE IMPACT OF THEOLOGY

OF all the ecclesiastical disciplines with which students for the priesthood are to be imbued during their course of studies, Sacred Theology holds the first place, both by long-standing custom and by positive law. The other disciplines are ordered to preparation for, completion or application of it; (and in point of fact) it is apportioned many scholastic hours in the program of studies. It is truly the center of ecclesiastical studies in the Catholic Church. For this reason it has been hailed over the past centuries as the Queen of all the sciences, a higher science being inconceivable, since it is the science of God under the "*ratio*" of God. It is a science which is taught by God, teaches God and leads to God, according to the author of the *Summa Theologiae* which is attributed to Alexander of Hales;[1] a science of the Most High and from the highest, as St. Thomas Aquinas remarks.[2]

Now Natural Theology, which is the summit and goal of all the sciences of the natural order, is without doubt about the highest things, since it attains to God, Who is the highest of all things that are and that can be known, Who is, to use the words of the Vatican Council, "ineffably exalted above all things which exist apart from Him and can be conceived."[3] Yet it does not proceed from the highest but from the lowest things, since in this Theology He is known from creatures, as a cause from effects. But on the other hand, Sacred Theology attains to God and to divine things, and according to the proper "*ratio*" of divine things, from the highest and divine things, that is, from God Himself speaking of Himself and revealing Himself to us, Whom we believe, by the gift of this same God,

[1] Ed. Quaracchi, 1924: I, n°. 2, p. 3, *ad objecta.*
[2] *In Boet. de Trin.*, q. 2, a. 2, ad 1.
[3] Denz. no. 1782.

with a divine and supernatural faith. As a result of this, Sacred Theology is of the highest and from the highest things in the full, perfect and absolute sense, and not in a relative sense, as is the case with Natural Theology.

Yet this Queen has at all times suffered critical reproaches corresponding to the culture, difficulties and problems of different ages or different men. But all are reduced to two chief points: its scientific or intellectual value, and its vital or affective value. For, at times it is charged with a lack of scientific vigor and precision, even with being excessive; and at times with a lack of vitality and practicality, often with an excess of the same.

There have been those who considered Mathematics or Formal Logic or Metaphysics to be the ideal of science. Not finding in Sacred Theology the rigor and evidence of the mathematical sciences, nor the classifications, definitions and syllogisms of Formal Logic, nor the demonstrative rigor of Metaphysics working and speculating on necessary matter, they have accused Sacred Theology of a mutilated scientific speculative precision, as if it were too practical, or too vague, or even too positive.

Contrariwise, some who were eminent in historical culture or learning, and who thus conceived the perfect science only as historical or even as related to every type of erudition, have accused Sacred Theology of a deficiency in learning, history and the evaluation of sources, doctrines, systems and arguments, and also of excessive speculation under the form of mathematicism, logicism or metaphysicism. Thus, they say, the scholastic theology of certain periods and of many theologians, rather than being a science of God from God, has turned out to be a logic or a metaphysics, the occasion for this being the supernatural truths revealed by God, and this according to the image of a deductive science which they term Wolffian. And these in turn charge those theologians who give themselves to positive or historical theology with a theology reduced to a pure and unsullied history or criticism, which collects the opinions and

efforts of men about divine things rather than the divine things themselves.

In every country there are always those engaged in the parochial or apostolic ministry, who deal with the concrete and living reality of souls and peoples with all their vicissitudes, difficulties and problems; they try to offer them some direction, some solutions and remedies. But you will look for the answers in vain, they say, in theology and the scholastic philosophy introductory to it, such as they are pursued and learned in the seminaries and ecclesiastical universities. For dogmatic theology, as expounded by scholastic and speculative theologians, is too dry and abstract, uses terminology that today is obsolete and unintelligible, employs a dead language, and, what is more serious, seems to be entirely reducible to quarrels between schools or theologians, raising the same arguments from one century or another either for or against such or such a thesis. And on the other hand, they say, as theology is developed by the positive and historical theologians, it all now seems to be repetitious, wholly occupied in the gathering and exposition of past efforts and solutions of the Fathers or of theologians, which can in no wise serve in the solution of modern problems, of which these present theologians are incapable of even thinking.

Therefore, in place of the traditional theology, it would be better and more useful to undertake kerygmatic, homiletical, catechetical, pastoral and liturgical theology, also calling on scientific apologetics and experimental psychology, which are far more in accord with modern culture and life.

Nor are there lacking those who measure divine matters only with their heart and affections, and vehemently and almost instinctively reject all speculation and all analysis on these points as if they were a profanation. Thus they are contented with a kind of pious simplicity, which, if you would believe them, fosters humility and a mystical elevation above the things of earth through remaining silent and denying one's own knowledge.

And finally some in our own day assert that Sacred Theology,

as it has been handed down in the Church for many centuries, ought to be reformed at its very roots. For according to them it is completely out of touch with and incapable of being in touch with present realities, since the whole science depends on Aristotelian or Scholastic philosophy which has long since been rejected and consigned to oblivion. For example, the notions of relation, person and nature, which are employed to explain the dogmas of the Trinity and the Incarnation, are today wholly to be rejected, for they seem absurd to modern philosophers. This likewise holds for the notions of substance and accident, which are used to explain the dogma of the Eucharist. Nothing is absolutely true, nor is the mind of man able to grasp the essences of things. And Metaphysics, whether it be called Ontology or Theodicy, is wholly inaccessible to us. Accordingly, since Sacred Theology, as it is commonly taught, acknowledges the worth and truth of Metaphysics, there is no one who is blind to the need for a radical change. To be sure, it was strong and flourishing in its own day, namely, in ancient and medieval times, for then notions of this type were admitted; but today it retains only an historical and archaeological value.

Thus it should be adapted to modern ways, not only by assuming current terms or modes of speech so that it might appear to us and be presented to our contemporaries in modern dress, but especially by taking over the sense and mentality of present-day philosophies, for instance, of vitalism or existentialism; yet not in such a way that it will definitively hold on to them always—for nothing is absolutely valid and fixed,—but here and now in this actual moment of human culture, being at the same time disposed and prepared to take on new forms as they appear in the course of time. For life should always be actual and constantly renewed; what has already passed is dead and buried. In like manner, in order that Sacred Theology be living and in touch with current reality, and not dead or wasting away with old age, it should be suited to the actual moment of human culture and be constantly renewed with it.

What then is to be thought of all this? Must it be said of Sacred Theology that it falls short of satisfying the mind and

heart of man, that it is incapable of solving the fundamental problems of human life? And as a consequence of this, is Theology continually to be reformed in accordance with the circumstances of men and times so as to be suited to the life and evolutions of humanity? Finally, has Theology a value and truth which is absolute, fixed and valid for every time and every circumstance of life? Or is it rather to be said that it is accompanied by merely a relative validity and a truth shifting, flexible and variable in relation to the changeableness and perpetual upheaval of life itself?

To be sure, it can hardly be denied that some defects have crept into the study of Theology or that it contains many difficulties. But other sciences experience similar troubles, each in its own sphere. How many difficulties arise from epistomology, history, methodology, the refinement of concepts and the coordination of parts, from hypotheses and theories, and applications! Is it any wonder, then, that they are found in a science so arduous, lofty and universal as Sacred Theology?

But if the matter is closely examined, in Sacred Theology such difficulties are not only held within just bounds, but are easily dissipated. In the first place, faults of this type—if some in fact exist, redound to particular theologians who do not measure up to their office, and not on Theology itself. Secondly, the above-mentioned accusations and charges, or other similar ones, proceed from a somewhat imaginary and false notion of Sacred Theology, and thus should be made their own best refutation.

Sacred Theology is not a science which is univocal with other sciences of the natural order, which are discovered and developed by the light of natural reason alone, but it differs from them entirely, as St. Thomas says,[4] and transcends them in a marvelous way, more than Metaphysics with respect to the other natural sciences; yet it does agree with them analogically. For it does not proceed from experience and abstraction, as do the natural sciences, but from grace and divine revelation; nor

[4] *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2.

are its primary and proper principles detected and formulated by the light of natural reason alone, as happens in the other sciences, but they are received by supernatural faith from God revealing them.

Sacred Theology is divine faith seeking an understanding of those things which are received and held by faith itself; and to this end it summons all the powers of the soul and uses them as means and as instruments.

Thus two things necessarily concur in our Sacred Theology: the light of divine revelation and of faith from on high, and the natural light of natural reason from below; the former as principal cause, the latter as a secondary and instrumental cause; divine faith as the master, natural reason as a servant.

For as grace does not destroy nature but presupposes and uses it for the attainment of the proper end of grace, and not as the mistress but as the handmaid of grace, so also the infused, and especially the theological virtues act with respect to the natural potencies or powers of the soul. Thus charity presupposes the human will in which it is received, and perfects and elevates it and uses its naturally good movements to attain its proper object. The same is true of divine faith with regard to the intellect in which it is received, for it supposes its natural light and elevates, perfects, completes and uses it to attain more fully the proper object of faith.

Accordingly, two lights necessarily come to bear in Sacred Theology, as it is in us: the supernatural light of faith descending from on high, and the natural light of our reason ascending from below. Yet not in an equal degree, but the supernatural is prior and principal, the natural comes after and is instrumental; the former as ruling, the latter as serving; the one showing the way, the other following; as two causes essentially subordinated, and not merely juxtaposed or coordinated.

From this essential subordination there results a light of a unique kind which is called *theological light*, partly supernatural and partly natural: supernatural radically and by origin, natural entitatively and formally, although its natural

aspect is not of the same nature as the naturalness of the light of the natural sciences, but is by far of a greater dignity, being purified and certified by the supernatural light of faith.

Moreover, the chief element for consideration in the nature of this light and habit is that which is from above and comes from above, not that which comes from below and is taken from below; for the former is the more important and predominant and is the formal element, while the latter is secondary, subservient and is the material element. This is not surprising, for in the causal connection of principal and instrumental cause, or of subordinating and subordinated cause, the principal and subordinating causes possess the principal roles, the secondary and subordinated causes the secondary and dependent roles. For the instrumental power reaches down to the instrumental cause from the principal cause which lays hold of, elevates, perfects and applies the instrument to produce, together with itself, the proper effect of the principal cause. And the instrument produces this effect by exercising its proper power, in that it is a definite thing; just as a saw, by cutting a board or plank by its proper power and the sharpness of its teeth, artificially produces the desired cutting under the positive direction, influence and application of the carpenter.

Now that which comes from above is the light of faith, which is a certain formal participation of the divine truth supernaturally revealing itself. Moreover this truth exteriorly revealing itself to us is the same as the very truth of the divine intellect, either divine science or wisdom, which is appropriated to the divine Word and is most fully contained in Him.

But the divine intellect and divine science and divine wisdom and divine truth and the divine Word expressing and speaking it transcend all the differences and all the modes and all the categories—speculative and practical, theoretical and positive, intellectual and vital—of the lower order, and yet contain them all to a very eminent degree. For divine knowledge is neither abstract nor barren, but is most real and comprehensive and necessarily spirates love, just as the divine Word together with the Father necessarily spirates the subsisting and personal Love

Who is the very Person of the Holy Spirit, and Who for this reason is in the fullest sense the Word of life, the most vital and most affective Word.

In a like manner then, the knowledge of faith is at once both eminently speculative and practical, intellectual and vital, being in the category of contemplation and affection, as though naturally demanding love in the will. This is especially apparent in the light of glory, which will supplant faith in heaven, for all at once and in a more eminent way it is more illuminating than faith, and it rectifies and directs the appetite in a more compelling way than prudence does. Thus in its own way, yet truly and most really, conditions of this type are shared by the habit of Sacred Theology, which, to use the words of St. Thomas, " bears, as it were, the stamp of the divine science, which is one and simple, yet extends to everything." [5] Hence that sublime saying of the Angelic Doctor:

> the knowledge of God which is had through the *other* sciences enlightens the intellect *alone*, in showing that God is the First Cause, that He is one, intelligent and so on; but the knowledge of God which is had *through faith*, *both illumines the intellect and delights the affections*, for it does not only tell that God is the First Cause, but that He is our Savior, that He is our Redeemer, that He loves us, that He became incarnate for us, all of which *inflame the affections*.[6]

And again:

> the doctrine of Sacred Scripture has this characteristic, that in it the matter is not proposed merely for speculation, as in Geometry, but also for assent by the will. . . . Thus *in other sciences* it *suffices* that man be perfected with respect to his *intellect*; but *in this* it is *required* that he be perfected with respect to his *intellect* and his *will*. . . . And because what is treated in Sacred Scripture (and in Sacred Theology) pertains to the will and not just to the intellect, man should accordingly be perfect in *both faculties*.[7]

Such perfection and elevation of this divine and principal

[5] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 1, a. 3, ad 2.
[6] *II ad Cor.*, c. 2, lect. 3.
[7] *Ad Hebr.*, c. 1, lect. 2.

theological light require and postulate all the cognoscitive powers of our soul in accordance with all the sciences which have a relation with it, and it supposes these powers as adapted and elevated under the direction of this light. For when we say that in Sacred Theology the natural reason is subservient to faith, natural reason is to be understood according to its full vigor, and as enriched with every type of knowledge; and thus with justice does St. Thomas say that all sciences serve Sacred Theology, and that it partakes something of them all. "Since the end of all philosophy is *beneath* the end of theology and ordered to it, theology should *command* all the other sciences and *use* what is treated in them." [8] It is served by sciences of words, actions and things: "Theology, inasmuch as it is the principal one of all the sciences, *possesses in itself something of all the sciences*; and thus it considers not only *things*, but the meanings of *words*, for the attainment of salvation requires not only faith concerning the truth of *things*, but also a vocal confession by *words*." [9] It is especially Ethics and Theodicy that are closely connected with Theology, as Pius XII teaches in the Encyclical *Humani Generis*.[10]

All these are to be employed as means and as auxiliaries, and not as the end nor as dominating. Yet it remains necessary to uncover the divine truth which is under figures, and to penetrate it as much as is possible for us; this end is forwarded to a great extent through the purifying of words and of concepts according to the method of analogy which is transcendental and even ultra-metaphysical in character. As a result of such procedure, theological speculation is on a far higher level than philosophical, and transcends it more than does metaphysical speculation that of the other sciences, just as the activity demanded by Theology is more sublime and profound than merely ethical or natural activity. For as grace is of immeasurably greater dignity and sublimity than nature, so supernatural

[8] *I Sent.*, Prol., a. 1, c. in fine.
[9] *Ibid.*, d. 22, *expos. textus.*
[10] *Humani Generis*, *AAS*, 42 (1950), 575.

morality and life is of far greater dignity and sublimity than the natural.

And thus it is that Sacred Theology, of all human sciences, is at once the most cognoscitive and the most vital and affective; and not by a separation and multiplication of parts but by its eminent unity, in line with the dictum: unified strength is stronger. For as faith and piety and charity are useful for everything which leads to eternal life, so also is Sacred Theology. But the phrase " for everything pertaining or leading to eternal life " is to be insisted on, for of itself Theology does not care about the other temporal and particular matters of this present life. And neither should Theology be asked for the solutions of all human questions,—questions of economics, of bodily health, or of the construction of a house or machine. For what the man of faith believes and hopes and follows after by love, this alone Theology explains, and, strictly speaking, nothing else. And, properly speaking, he hopes for and seeks from God eternal and not temporal life, not the passing goods of the present life except to the extent that they are of service for gaining eternal and permanent goods, as is stated in the Collect of the Third Sunday after Pentecost: " O God, the protector of all that trust in thee; without whom nothing is strong, nothing holy, increase and multiply upon us thy mercy, that thou being our ruler and guide, we may so pass through things temporal, that we may finally not lose the things eternal."

Therefore Sacred Theology under faith has the same validity as faith itself; and according as it depends on and is derived from faith, to this extent it is as firm and permanent as faith itself. Nor need it be suited to the changing opinions of men and times, but rather the converse, for the truth of faith does not depend on man but on God. And God's knowledge, which faith shares, is not caused by created things, but rather is their cause.

It is also false that the human mind is unequal to the attainment of objective truth or the essences of things, for being is

its proper object, and no faculty can be stripped of its natural power of really and truly attaining its object, without by this very fact ceasing to be such a faculty. Thus being and the attributes identified actually with it, on which are immediately founded the first principles of reason, namely, the principles of contradiction, identity, sufficient reason and causality, are necessarily present to our intellect and are necessarily and truly attained by it.

This is likewise true of the notions of substance and accident, absolute and relative, nature and person, which do not come properly from Aristotle or the Scholastics, but from the native power of the human intellect, which is the root and origin of perennial philosophy.

Accordingly, Sacred Theology does not accept these notions as pertaining to this or that philosophical school, nor as flourishing in a certain specified moment of time, but rather as they are the natural heritage of the human mind, of which it can never be defrauded, since they necessarily accompany it. Therefore they are good for all times and retain their significance even today.

Another and far greater reason, as Pius XII points out, is that notions of this type were not only employed by the Ecumenical Councils, but also sanctioned by them, so that it is wrong to depart from them.

> Hence to neglect, or to reject, or to devalue so many and such great resources which have been conceived, expressed and perfected so often by the age-old work of men endowed with no common talent and holiness, working under the vigilant supervision of the holy magisterium and with the light and leadership of the Holy Ghost in order to state the truths of faith ever more accurately, to do this so that these things may be replaced by conjectural notions and by some formless and unstable tenets of a new philosophy, tenets which, like the flowers of the field, are in existence today and die tomorrow; this is supreme imprudence and something that would make dogma itself a reed shaken by the wind. The contempt for terms and notions habitually used by scholastic theologians leads of itself to the weakening of what they call speculative theology, a discipline which these men

consider devoid of true certitude because it is based on theological reasoning.[12]

This, then, is the supernatural and divine spirit which is always to be retained and insisted on in Sacred Theology. The latter's knowledge is to be resolved to the superior science of God and the blessed, to which it is subordinate, rather than to natural truths or the natural light of reason, which cooperate merely dispositively and instrumentally in approximately the same way as our senses cooperate in intellectual knowledge, yet really and truly in each case. When Theology is correctly developed, it offers the true and real solution for all the difficulties and problems of human life; it is not a solution of itself natural and superficial, as many lacking the sense of Christ are seeking, but supernatural and profound, since it is the solution which God Himself gives in His ineffable and most wise Providence, which is searchable by no man.

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[11] *Humani Generis.*

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Systematic Theology: I. By Paul Tillich. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951. Pp. 300 with index. $5.00.

What Present-Day Theologians are Thinking. By D. D. Williams. New York: Harper, 1952. Pp. 158 with index. $2.00.

The Theology of Paul Tillich has been chosen to inaugurate a series of volumes on outstanding contemporary theologians, similar in purpose and outline to the series on contemporary philosophers: *The Library of Living Philosophers.* The present editors give credit to Professor P. A. Schlipp, who inaugurated the philosophical series. They have the same ideas in mind: "To devote each volume in the series to the thinking of a single living philosopher and to include in each: (1) an intellectual autobiography; (2) essays on different aspects of the man's work, written by various scholars: (3) a "Reply to his critics" by the philosopher himself; and (4) a complete bibliography of his writings to date. . . . Our aim is to do for present-day theology what he has done and is continuing to do so well for present day philosophy" (pp. vii-viii).

Certainly no one will deny that the choice of Paul Tillich was a happy one with which to inaugurate this series on present-day theologians. While Tillich is, perhaps, not as well known as some other contemporary Protestant theologians, his extraordinary exposition of a systematic theology is a vital influence on the contemporary scene. Reviewing the work of Paul Tillich will always be a pleasure, especially to a Thomist, for he explicitly intends to present theology systematically and utilizes in its service the insights of a philosophy and the vast information contained in other human disciplines. Several of the authors in the first volume make mention of the relationship between Thomistic and Tillichian theology: Paul Tillich himself makes occasional reference to St. Thomas. However, as we shall see, the Thomist must also be on his guard against such superficial links.

In his autobiographical reflections Paul Tillich reveals certain influences on his development which should be kept in mind by a reader of his works. He was born in a village in the province of Brandenburg, at the Silesian border. His father was a minister of the Prussian Territorial Church. His early years were dominated by the stringent discipline of such an environment. Nevertheless, he confesses to a "romantic" trend in his feeling and thinking. This romanticism manifests itself in his relationship to nature

and to history. As far as nature is concerned, he points out that: "It is theologically formulated in my doctrine of the participation of nature in the doctrine of fall and salvation." This is one of the most important and valuable aspects of Tillich's thought. His interest in history and his acquaintance with it is, as he admits, the inspiration for his notion of "theonomy": "Without this influence I certainly would not have conceived of the idea of theonomous periods in the past and of a new theonomy in the future." Tillich admits that he had a difficult time breaking through the restrictive pressure of his environment and especially of his father's authority; nevertheless, he found one point at which resistance was possible. He says: "In the tradition of classical orthodoxy my father loved and used philosophy, convinced that there can be no conflict between a true philosophy and revealed truth. The long philosophical developments which ensued belonged to the most happy instances of a positive relation to my father. Nevertheless, in these discussions the breakthrough occurred. From an independent philosophical position a state of independence spread out in all directions, theoretically first, practically, later." (p. 8)

One other point made by Tillich should be of interest to his readers. He points out that in Europe there was a special tension between the humanist and the religious traditions; he himself became keenly conscious of this tension but solved it for himself in a way that becomes a basic outlook in all his writings. "The problem of the humanistic education is in its relation to the religious tradition which, even without a special religious instruction is omnipresent in history, art and literature. Whereas in the United States the basic spiritual conflict is that between religion and scientific naturalism, in Europe the religious and humanistic traditions (of which the scientific world view is only a part) have been ever since the Rennaissance in continuous tension. . . . The result of this tension was either a decision against the one side or the other, or a general scepticism, or a split consciousness which brought one to attempt to overcome the conflict constructively. The latter way, the way of synthesis, was my own way." (p. 10)

Following the "Autobiographical Reflections," come the "Essays of Interpretation and Criticism of the Work of Paul Tillich." There are fourteen of these essays and the editors had no difficulty in choosing as topics for them the outline of Tillich's own *Systematic Theology*. It should be noted that while only the first volume of this systematic presentation of Tillich's doctrine has been published, the writers of the various essays had at their disposal the outlines for the second volume used by Tillich in his classes. From their references to these notes, it is clear that the second volume of *Systematic Theology* will reveal more clearly than the first the definitive thought of Tillich on Christ and His Church.

The first three essays in this section concern themselves with the significance of Tillich in contemporary theology, in his relation to secular culture,

and for the situation in Germany. The following essays treat of the method and structure of Tillich's theology: his doctrine on man, his ontology, and his doctrine on God. Then follow essays on his epistemology, his relation to biblical thought, his Christology and his view of the Church. The final essays are on his interpretation of history and his doctrine of religious socialism.

The final pages of the volume are devoted to Tillich's reply to his critics. He gratefully considers some of the criticisms that have been levelled against his theology by the writers of the essays. An extensive bibliography of Tillich's writings up to 1952 brings the volume to a close.

The systematic character of Tillich's thought can be easily seen from a glance at the Table of Contents in the first volume of his major work. At least half of the volume is devoted to methodological questions. A long Introduction presents a careful discussion of the nature, organization, method and structure of a systematic theology. Part I is devoted to a lengthy discussion on reason and revelation: on "Reason and the Quest for Revelation" and on the "Reality of Revelation." Part II, entitled "Being and God," brings the reader into the heart of Tillich's theology. Even here the systematic intent is quite clear, for the author feels the need of clarifying his ontology before approaching the question of the reality of God. In the final section of this second part, on the "Reality of God," it becomes quite clear that for a final judgment on Tillich's position, especially in regard to the mystery of the Trinity, we must await the Christological doctrine of the second volume.

As an example of Tillich's careful systematic thought we shall follow his presentation of his own concept of the theological task. He says: "Theology, as a function of the Christian Church, must serve the needs of the Church. The theological system is supposed to satisfy two basic needs: the statement of the truth of the Christian message and the interpretation of this truth for every new generation. Theology moves back and forth between two poles, the eternal truth of its foundation and the temporal situation in which the eternal truth must be received." (p. 3) "Message" and "Situation" are the two poles, both of which should be embraced by every vital theology. "Situation," Tillich insists, does not refer merely to the psychological or sociological state in which individuals or groups happen to live: "It refers to the scientific and artistic, the economic, political and ethical forms in which they express their interpretation of existence. (p. 3-4) This broad and valid concept of the "Situation" explains Tillich's preoccupation with the vast field of human culture.

He goes on to point out that theological orthodoxy in Europe and fundamentalism in America failed to make contact with the present "situation" for fear of weakening the revealed message. This is not quite so true of "kerygmatic" theology, which certainly emphasizes the unchangeable truth of the message over against the changing demands of the

situation. Nevertheless in both cases there is this emphasis on the eternal truth and a considerable neglect of the situation. On the other hand, apologetic theology tries to answer the questions implied in the situation in the power of the eternal message and with the means proved by the situation whose questions it answers. Kerygmatic theologians have a profound distrust of apologetic methods, because, as they say, in order to answer a question one must have something in common with the one who asks it. But to embrace a common ground with those outside the theological circle frequently waters down the message, as history testifies. Tillich tries to assume a middle position. "Kerygmatic theology," he insists, "must give up its exclusive transcendence and take seriously the attempt of apologetic theology to answer the questions put before it by the contemporary situation. On the other hand, apologetic theology must heed the warnings implied in the existence and the claim of kerygmatic theology. It loses itself if it is not based on the 'Kerygma' as the substance and the criterion of each of its statements." (p. 7) Tillich characterizes his own theology as a "method of correlation": "The following system is an attempt to use the 'method of correlation' as a way of uniting message and situation. It tries to correlate the questions implied in the situation with the answers implied in the message. It does not derive the answers from the questions, as a self-defying apologetic theology does. Nor does it elaborate answers without relating them to the questions, as a self-defying kerygmatic theology does. It correlates questions and answers, situation and message, human existence and divine manifestations." (p. 8)

It would not be an oversimplification to say that it is reason which asks the questions and revelation that gives the answers. Yet Tillich distinguishes "controlling reason" from "receiving reason." "Controlling reason" is technical reason, which has vast competence in the exact sciences, but has no business in the sphere of ultimate concern. "Receiving reason" alone has competence where it is question of ultimate concern. Even here its competence is stringently limited by Tillich: it is competent to recognize its own inadequacy and to formulate questions that only revelation can answer.

It is not surprising that Tillich's references to St. Thomas should be most frequent when he is discussing the correlation of reason and revelation. In his essay on "Tillich's Doctrine of Man," in *The Theology of Paul Tillich*, David E. Roberts points out the contrast between Tillich and Thomism and, I believe, it is a fair statement of Tillich's mind. "Tillich's rejection of the Thomist solution, which in a sense stands between the two opposed camps just discussed, can be indicated quite briefly. Where he regards the positive link between the divine and the human as furnishing the possibilities for a *correlation between questions and answers*, Thomism tries to regard it as furnishing a basis for *two sets of answers*—natural and revealed theology. Tillich denies (a) that natural theology

can furnish answers, and (b) that the answers of revelation are supernatural truths." (p. 113)

What Tillich seems to overlook in his judgment of St. Thomas (in his *Systematic Theology* he manifests no more profound understanding of Thomism than could be gathered from reading a History of Philosophy), is that St. Thomas carefully delimits the scope of the answers that reason can give to questions raised by man's historical state. A reading of the early chapters of the Second Book of the *Contra Gentiles*, an acquaintance with St. Thomas' handling of the question of the natural desire of man for the vision of God and of what reason can glean from the experience of human life without the revelation of original sin, would convince Tillich that St. Thomas was quite aware of the questions reason may ask, but not answer.

It may come as a surprise that a Christian theologian should repudiate the supernatural character of God's gift of eternal life. Here again the reader is forced to wonder whether his rejection is based on complete understanding. In his essay on "Tillich's View of the Church," in *The Theology of Paul Tillich*, Nels F. S. Ferré criticises this aspect of Tillich's thought: "If Tillich can be counted ontologically as thoroughly within the Christian perspective, he must be ranked as one of our greatest Christian thinkers. Unfortunately, there are grave doubts on this point, which he is now, however, free to clear up in his own reply. Does he actually operate within the transcendental perspective, rather than within the transcendent? His refusal to accept the great, immemorial Christian perspective of supernaturalism at least seems to convince us of this, whatever his use of occasional words may be. Is God, *in fact*, the Creator of process, and *in this sense*, above, before, and behind it? Is He personal Spirit in the sense of a separate consciousness and an eternal being, beyond all created beings . . . Is supernaturalism, *defined in this sense*, to be taken as normative, including secondarily all truth of naturalism, or are both to be transcended in terms of some formal realm of meaning, or in terms of some relation of being and the abyss to which we can refer finally only in terms of myth and symbol?" (pp. 362-363)

In his "Reply," Mr. Tillich reaffirms his anti-supernaturalism. "I still hold emphatically to this position which could be called self-transcending or ecstatic naturalism. Mr. Ferré is afraid that this attitude makes my idea of God transcendental instead of transcendent, that it prevents a genuine doctrine of incarnation, that it implies the negation of personal immortality, that it evaporates the independent character of the Church, that it denies a realistic eschatology. He is right if "transcendent" means the establishment of a "world" behind the world, if "incarnation" means the descent of a divine being from a heavenly place and its metamorphosis into a human being, if "immortality" is understood as the continuation of temporal existence after death, if the latent church within cultures and

religions is denied, if a dramatic end-catastrophe some time in the future is affirmed. All this is a supernaturalism against which my theology stands." (p 341) Who can find the traditional concept of supernaturalism in that jejune presentation of it?

While the Thomist will reject many of Tillich's position in both philosophy and theology, there is still the challenge of his example, his courageous attempt to correlate the "message" of divine revelation with the "situation' in which men find themselves today.

In *What Present-Day Theologians are Thinking* the author attempts to document his conviction that there is a theological rennaissance today. One sign of this, he points out, is "that such Biblical words as Creation, Redemption, Resurrection, and Last Things have come to appear as more indispensable for us than was recognized in the modern period. . . . No other words seem able to bear the weight of meaning which Sin, Reconciliation, and Atonement have. The core of faith seems intimately bound up with the original language which expresses it." (pp. 12-13) If there is a return to original words in Protestant theological teaching today, this book shows that the meaning of these words is still at the mercy of the various theologians.

The vital problems of theology are discussed under four headings: The Bible and Christian Truth: Christian Ethics and Society: Jesus in History and Faith; the Church. The Catholic position on these questions is also presented, but an unfavorable impression is created by pitting the Encyclical *Humani Generis* against hasty opinions expressed in certain "liberal" Catholic periodicals.

On the whole, though, we may be grateful to the author for a clear presentation of the thought of Protestant theologians on these questions.

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Studies in the Philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce. Edited by Philip Wiener and Frederic H. Young. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1952. Pp. 406 with index. $5.00.

Peirce and Pragmatism. By W. B. Gallie. Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1952. Pp. 247. $.65.

In philosophy, as in other pursuits, the man who strikes the spark may be overshadowed by him who fans it into a flame and thus brings it to the notice of the public at large. If W. James tended the fire of pragmatism and placed the brazier in the market-place, it was Peirce who first lit that

fire, as, of course, James explicitly recognised. Not that Peirce was entirely original or unaided in this venture; he himself regarded Nicholas St. John Green as the grandfather of pragmatism, in that he urged the importance of applying Bain's definition of belief as "that upon which a man is prepared to act." But it was Peirce who first made that application, and so gave the first precise and reasoned expression to the idea that was later adopted and developed and made both central and popular by James. If James, by his gifts of extensive application and lucid expression of an idea, quite overshadowed Peirce, he also interpreted and developed that idea away from Peirce's understanding of it. And now that attention to his brand of pragmatism has lessened there has been growing, over the last twenty years, a renewed interest in Peirce the pioneer, who may be said to be at last coming into his own.

This interest is not due primarily to Peirce's connection with pragmatism, though this motive is not absent. More recent trends in logic, semantics, methodology and the philosophy of science find much that is congenial in his work, and stress both his importance and actuality. This interest has found expression in many studies published about him, especially since Hartshorne and Weiss edited his collected papers (1931-35), and has led to the foundation of a Peirce Society, in 1946. It is to the initiative of this society that we owe the present volume of essays by scholars engaged in special studies of Peirce's work. The fact alone that there are twenty-four contributors to the volume indicates how wide spread is the interest now being taken in one who has been as strangely neglected until recently as he was during his life.

Not all the aspects of Peirce's vast output are covered by these essays; notably absent are essays on his foundation of mathematics and logic, while his sign doctrine, so central to his system, is but lightly touched on. The contributors were left free to choose their own subjects, so that there inevitably are some gaps; the essays do not form a systematic whole, and often cover the same ground, though from different angles. The editors have grouped them into three doctrinal groups, and one biographical and historical section, with appendices relating to Peirce and the Johns Hopkins University, and some additions by Max Fisch and Daniel Haskell to Morris Cohen's bibliography of Peirce's published writings.

The first group is of essays dealing with Peirce's pragmaticism, or theory of meaning. A. O. Lovejoy and W. H. Barnes are critical of Peirce's attempt to formulate a theory of meaning; both agree that there is much to clarify in the famous articles "How to make our ideas clear," and "Fixation of belief." The former singles out as the dominant idea of those articles "the assumption that thought exists for the sake of action . . . to generate habits of action," (p. 19) though he does not consider this assumption as either self-evident or unambiguous. In defence of Peirce, J. Buchler accuses Prof. Lovejoy of missing the point; the 1877-78 papers presuppose earlier

ones, and especially Peirce's theory of signs. In the light of that theory one must distinguish, in Peirce, the interpretant and the object or referent of a sign. Peirce is concerned above all with the interpretant, whereas Lovejoy's criticisms envisage mainly the object. D. J. Bronstein points out that Peirce himself was dissatisfied with his earlier attempts, and tried to revise them in 1908 by invoking the correspondence theory of truth, assuming a position of realism, and implying the objectivity of necessity and possibility. This serves to place Peirce's theory of meaning against a wider background. At first Peirce was almost exclusively concerned with analysing meaning in respect to the terminology of physical science; later on he tried to arrive at a more generally valid theory. This however, leads to the disclosure of an ambiguity, of which W. B. Gallie treats in his essay. Pragmatism, in its earlier and narrower form, determined meaning by reference to such criteria as are proper to terms used in the natural sciences; if proposed as applicable to all empirically meaningful expressions it is manifestly inadequate, as appears in the case of proper names or vague predicates. Peirce, realising this, was led to evolve his doctrine of the final logical interpretant, to which G. Gentry devotes his essay. If every thought is a sign, it implies, apart from its referent (or object), an interpreter, one to whom it is a sign. This cannot be merely a thought, for then we set up an infinite process; Peirce rules out expectation, since it is not conditional (a view which Professor Barnes criticises), and decides in favour of habit (which Gentry seems to interpret in purely physical terms).

This interesting discussion undoubtedly throws much light on Peirce's teaching and its development, and stresses some aspects of mental life that may easily be overlooked. That thought and belief influence action and reveal themselves in it, is a truth worthy of emphasis; that meaning relates ultimately to habit is, however, by no means certain or evident. I may refer to what seems to be a strange inconsistency, even in Peirce's developed form of the theory. He insists that what most properly distinguishes a sign (and therefore a thought) is its representative function, its being a sign *to a thought* (5.287; quoted p. 82), in relation, therefore, to "some thought which interprets it" (5.183; *ibid.*). This, as Gentry points out, leads him to the obvious difficulty of an infinite regress, which he avoids by making habit the ultimate logical interpretant. But surely this is a sheer evasion of the difficulty. If habit be regarded as still a thought, the original difficulty remains in all its force. If habit is distinguished from thought, how can it be invoked as the ultimate logical interpretant, when the interpretant must be a thought? Indeed, one may pertinently ask, why should the interpretant be a thought? An interpreter, or interpretant, is surely a person, or at least the mind of a person, and not just a thought. Ideas may denote objects, and they are qualities in their own right; but they are signs only to minds, to thinkers (those who use them, and those to whom they are expressed). It is strange that in all

this discussion one finds no reference to this most obvious requirement of any theory of thought or sign, as though behaviorism, or some form of materialism, were tacitly pre-supposed by all the disputants.

Peirce's own position is ambiguous. He disclaims sensationalism, yet does not seem far removed from it. He insists on the reality of Generals, and calls himself a scholastic realist. For him, " habit " is to be taken as a General, as a way or rule of action with generality of reference to many objects which exhibit common characteristics; and the function of the idea is " simply to evoke or express those habits of thought or action which are the *ultimate* subjects of logical criticism." (Gallie, p. 74) Thought is, or involves, an activity (though a Thomist would here make some careful distinctions), and general ideas may thus be said to express typical ways of thinking, or acting mentally. But beyond the habit, or the act, lies the mind, which alone thinks, and to which alone anything can be a sign, known formally as such. And if habit, in Peirce's sense, is general, if " it moulds our particular actions to conform to certain general features in the bewildering variety of the world," (Gallie, p. 74), it can only be because " our habits are adjusted to certain truly general conditions," (*ibid.*) which implies that " generality is an indispensable ingredient in reality." (5.431) Thought, in order so to rule action, must first apprehend such generality as is exemplified in reality; and surely the primal aim of thought must be to make known such generality to the mind of the thinker, to signify to him what it, through its empirical origin, denotes. Habits of action may undoubtedly be pointers to that signification, and valuable aids in making our ideas clear; they can hardly suffice as ultimate interpretants.

One should not confuse that which enables us to recognize ideas as distinct with that which constitutes their meaning; one is intrinsic, the other may be extrinsic. Peirce was right, in his earlier essays, in looking exclusively to thought to provide the interpretant and the meaning of thought; the difficulty of an infinite process arises only if one neglects the mind, or the thinker who has the thought. If we try to explain or convey to others the significance of our thoughts, we can do this only by other thoughts; and it was to escape this obstacle that Peirce had to go outside the field of thought to that of action. He was concerned, not so much with what constitutes meaning, as with what makes it clear, recognisable as distinct from that of other ideas. If thought is distinct from action, that which constitutes its meaning must be in its own distinctive line—significance to mind—not in that which follows on thought. In order that one may discover the meaning of an idea, that idea must first possess meaning in its own right. Such consequent or extrinsic marks of distinct ideas as determinants of action are, moreover, signs primarily to minds other than that of him who has the idea; and Peirce seems mostly concerned with such criteria as enable us to clarify the ideas of others. The manifestation of significance pre-supposes such significance as already

constituted; and it is by no means certain that he who has an idea apprehends its meaning only or primarily through attention to its dynamic implications. The essential function of the idea is to make present the known to the knower; its meaning must be sought in that order to immanent activity, or intentional relationship between mind and object.

If we regard thoughts as signs to thinkers, rather than to other thoughts, we do not open up an unending series; but if one says that in a purely logical reduction all reference to a subsisting thinker must be eliminated, there is still a very obvious distinction to be made in respect of ideas. Considered as psychical occurrences, as qualities, one may succeed, or lead to another in a series which does not, of itself, postulate a limit; but this consideration is every bit as " real " as that of a thinker. In logic, as in phenomenology, the idea is considered above all from the point of view of its intelligible content; in Peirce's terminology, as a " representamen." From this point of view, a series of linked ideas is based upon inclusion and implication; and here a double process of resolution or reduction is called for. We may call them the ascending and the descending process in the clarification of ideas. One who, like Peirce, is formed as a scientist, or is empirically minded, will naturally try to sharpen the content of his ideas by reference to controlled and exact experience; that is in fact how scientific notions are made clear, and it holds good of all our notions insofar as they are empirical in origin. But the mind, stimulated by reality through experience, makes its intelligible contribution, above all by expressing the ultimate ideas, such as those which metaphysics seeks to penetrate; and present in all and above all is the supreme reality of being. Ideas may also be clarified by reduction to this primordial concept, which every idea implies, and of which it is but a more express determination. They must also be made more explicit by reference to experience, for knowledge is born of the contact of mind with reality; but unless they are seen also in relation to being they can never be ultimately clarified, and the concept of being is the natural limit to any such ascending series of implications. In the orbit of thought there are two foci, the mind and reality as experienced; it is the dynamic interplay of these that cause growth in knowledge and clarity.

In R. M. Chisholm's essay, which heads the next section of essays—Common-sense, Science and Logic—one finds that Peirce, in describing " inquiry," allows for this interplay of mind—to which he grants an instinctive power " to originate ideas that are true " (5. 50; *cit.* p. 97)—and experience; and, in fact, lays more stress on " conjecture " than on experience as a factor of progress in knowledge. Peirce's conception of knowledge, as underlined in this essay, is more intellectual than would appear from the previous essays. His " critical common-sensism," of which A. F. Smullyan treats in the next essay, posits that there are indubitables presupposed by all, or nearly all, inquiry. One is tempted to interpret these

as self-evident first principles, grounded on the idea of being as obtained through abstraction. Peirce's notion of abstraction is considered by T. A. Goudge; it is an interesting contrast to the Aristotelian theory, though not without points of contact. Some implications of a paradoxical nature of Peirce's curious conception of realism and nominalism are pointed out by M. H. Thomson, who seems to confuse idea as thing with idea as sign. The conformity of idea with object, for an Aristotelian at least, regards the idea, not as a quality, but as an intentional representation. Peirce's philosophy of science is dealt with by P. H. Wiener, who stresses Peirce's aim of " welding scientific logic to a cosmic evolutionism which would make room for freedom of the individual will and religious values." (p. 143) He characterizes such philosophy as " an attempt to synthesize by means of an idealistic metaphysic (drawn from Royce) the logic of relations with evolutionism," (p. 150), preferring Lamarck, as favoring the inheritance of acquired habits, to Darwin. G. D. Berry draws attention to Peirce's contributions to the logic of statements and quantifiers; and in the final essay of this section P. Weiss writes on the logic of the creative process in Peirce, seeing the essence of this process in the activity of substitution as based on a habit capable of being expressed in the form of a leading principle.

The third section of essays deals principally with Peirce's metaphysics and phenomenological method. D. Savan treats of his approach to his three categories, as evolving from an earlier one, based on an idealism inspired by Kant, to a later one grounded on empiricism as implied by physical science. These two trends are traced in Peirce's system by Isabel Stearns, who sees his entire philosophy as " a magnificent effort at mediation of the demands of empiricism with those of rationalism," (p. 195) and carefully distinguishes the logical and ontological functions of the categories. This distinction between the formal and ontological aspects is also stressed by H. Schneider, who also indicates how Peirce's system might be completed by a fourth category, that of value. C. Hartshorne develops the theory of firstness in relation to the teaching of both Peirce and Whitehead, while disagreeing with Morris's analysis of the quality-feeling.

The comparison of Peirce with Whitehead is illuminating; they had much in common, however different their terminology may be. Both were logicians and scientists, and sought to raise a metaphysic on empirical foundations. W. Reese draws a parallel between firstness (quality-feeling, possibility), secondness (fact, resistance) thirdness (law, generality) and Whitehead's categories of eternal objects, actual events and progress or creativity. An Aristotelian will see many points of contact here with his own doctrines of potency and act, as revealed through an analysis of becoming or motion. Peirce, indeed, was well acquainted with Greek and mediaeval thought, and called himself a Scotist realist, though it may be doubted whether he fully understood the teaching of the Doctor Subtilis.

There are undoubtedly elements of Scotism in Peirce's thought, as C. McKeon in his essay on this subject points out; but a Thomist, at least, would quarrel with Peirce on his very definition of realism and nominalism. Another link between Peirce and mediaeval thought is his interest in religion, though his views on this important subject have not received the attention they deserve. J. Smith, in the last essay of this section, discusses Peirce's ideas on religion and the grounds of belief in God, while pointing out the defects of his critique of theology.

That Peirce was a difficult character, and his career anything but happy or successful, is clearly brought out by the essays of F. Young, Max Fisch, J. Cope and M. Keeton in the final section of this book. One cannot but agree with Fisch and Cope that it was a tragedy that Peirce was not granted the Carnegie funds to complete the treatise on logic on which he had worked for thirty years, but was unable to finish, though that may have been in part due to Peirce's own unsystematic character. His thought, however, is systematic, and is fruitful in suggestion to those who take pains to follow his ideas. J. Feibleman has tried to reduce these ideas to a more systematic form in his "Introduction to Peirce's philosophy," (1946), and in the last essay of this volume he speaks on the future of some of Peirce's ideas. The vigorous and widespread movement of realism among present-day thinkers owes much to Peirce, and can learn much from him; his message is not primarily that of the logician. He teaches the need and possibility of a metaphysics, realist in inspiration, empirical in origin, systematic, but open and capable of evolution and assimilation of new findings; it is, perhaps, through such a system that the scientist or positivist to-day may, his prejudices once removed, find his way back to the complete metaphysics that is at once traditional and native to the human mind.

In the Johns Hopkins University Peirce saw his ideal of the community of fellow-workers united in the search of truth to some extent realized; this volume of essays is, in a modest way, a realization of the same ideal. Peirce would be very gratified by it, and very grateful for it; it is a worthy tribute to one who must rank among the very greatest of American philosophers, and will surely do much to win for him the recognition and appreciation which he so much deserves.

In *Peirce and Pragmatism* Professor Gallie attempts to give a popular presentation of the teaching of this scientist, logician, mathematician and metaphysician, omitting what is too technical, as for instance his symbolic logic, and concentrating on his pragmatism, in relation both to Peirce's theory of knowledge and to his metaphysics. His aim is to show the organic unity of that system of philosophy, which the fragmentary nature of Peirce's writings tends to obscure, and at the same time to offer some criticisms where they seem called for. Having treated in an introductory chapter of Pragmatism and the Pragmatists, and then of Peirce's life and

writings, he deals at length with Peirce's theory of knowledge (the assault on Cartesianism, critical commonsensism, and the doctrine of Thought-Signs) in three chapters. The originality and value of Peirce's criticisms of Descartes are ascribed to his superior logical equipment, which enabled him to detect the uncriticized presuppositions of that thinker. Peirce's critical commonsensism is shown to imply a rejection of all absolutely first principles, in whose place he puts conjecture as suggested by an experience that is ever subject to change and development. The treatment of the theory of signs is reasonably full, and leads to a discussion of Pragmatism, understood by Peirce rather as a principle of logic than, as in James, as a principle of a metaphysic. Prof. Gallie devotes a chapter to an ambiguity in Peirce's Pragmatism, which claims to provide a general criterion of empirical meaningfulness, whereas it in fact is adapted only to determine the meaning of standard scientific expressions. Peirce's metaphysics is the object of the last two chapters, which consider his categories, and his cosmology; the ontology is considered to be of more importance than the cosmology, whose chief value is placed in its showing up of the defects of classical mechanicism.

Prof. Gallie has succeeded in presenting us with a good, reliable and clear introduction to the philosophy of Peirce in its main outline. We may not agree with his own personal philosophic stand-point, and may feel that we would criticize where he often approves; but he does not unduly intrude his own views upon the reader (which cannot be said for some of the other similar books of this series) and is for the most part content with the humbler task of the objective historian. It is surely such who, in the long run, do the greatest service to those thinkers whom they admire so much.

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Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry. By Jacques Maritain. New York: Pantheon, 1953. Pp. 423 with index. $6.50.

The purpose of this book is twofold: first, to make clear the distinct yet indissoluble relationship between art and poetry, and secondly, to reveal the essential part played by the intellect in both art and poetry, and especially to show that poetry has its source in the preconceptual life of the intellect. Art, in this context, is taken to mean "the creative or producing, work-making activity of the human mind," and poetry is not "the particular art which consists in writing verses but a process both more general and more primary: that intercommunication between the inner being of things and the inner being of the human Self which is a

kind of divination. . . . Poetry, in this sense, is the secret life of all the arts." (p. 3) Many other aims are fulfilled, not least of which is the exhaustive revelation of the author's mind on all related subjects.

The book has, we think, a threefold division. We may divide it: 1) Introduction to Creative Intuition, 2) Creative Intuition in the Artist, and 3) Creative Intuition in the Work. The Introduction comprises two chapters; the first carries out an inductive investigation of the world's art, the second considers art as a practical virtue, and lays some groundwork for the thesis of the work. Creative Intuition in the Artist is then studied through the four causes in the next four chapters. In Chapter Three the author considers the efficient cause; in Chapter Four the material and formal cause; in Chapters Five and Six the final cause. The third main division, Creative Intuition in the Work, considers the meaning of the work in three steps; in Chapter Seven, the essential meaning; in Chapter Eight the transmission of the meaning; and in the final Chapter, the full meaning.

The author shows that all art has its roots in poetic intuition. Oriental art, though intent on things, nevertheless reveals obscurely the Self, or the subjectivity of the artist. Occidental art, though increasingly intent on the Self, nevertheless reveals obscurely the inner side of Things. Two arts, intent on opposite poles of interests, come out with the same answer: a mutual revelation of Self and Things. The burden of the book is to show that this is possible, and how, through poetic intuition.

After he has established some fundamentals on art, the author turns to the field of modern art and sets down his brilliant analysis. The moderns are making an attempt to rid their art of three things: 1) the forms of nature, by carrying to extremes the laws of deformation, 2) rational language, which cannot express the singular, and 3) traditional forms of thought, i. e., logical and conceptual reasoning. While this attempt has gone to extremes, it has nevertheless resulted in a new and valid art form. Scholastics should endeavor to understand it, and not insist that art should proceed in a rational way. Aristotle, Plato, Plutarch, Cicero and others are cited to show that there is an element of madness in art. Plato held that a poet, being friendly with the gods, is bitten by a mania from on high in somewhat the same fashion that Averroes was later to claim that every man did his thinking through the powers of a separate intellect. This Platonic muse, in the Maritain theory, descends into the soul to become creative intuition; Platonic inspiration from above the soul becomes inspiration from above conceptual reasoning, that is, poetic experience.

To establish this thesis the author begins by demonstrating the existence of a spiritual preconscious—distinguished radically from the Freudian animal or automatic unconscious—by developing the doctrine of St. Thomas on the agent intellect. This intellect, always in act, together with the impressed species is solidly established by philosophy. So he argues in

somewhat this fashion: if there is in the intellect a preconscious activity in the abstractive function of intelligence giving birth to ideas, why not the same sort of thing giving birth to poetry?

Chapter Four, " Creative Intuition and Poetic Knowledge," is the heart of the book. M. Maritain points up the Thomistic doctrine concerning the emanation of the powers of the soul, showing how the less perfect emanate from the more perfect. The senses, for example, proceed from the essence of the soul through the intellect. Thus, in each power there is activity, as it were, all the way back to the very essence of the soul, activity which is largely preconscious. The author then makes his leap. The intellect is not entirely engrossed in producing concepts; another phase of its life is free from this work, yet remains cognitive and productive, and is carried along towards the manifestation of the creativity of the spirit. It is here that poetry has its source. It is here that, apart from any process tending to knowledge by means of concepts and abstract ideas, an activity exists which is preconceptual, or nonconceptual, which does not even *tend* to become a concept, but rather tends " to engender in beauty " by a free creativity of the Spirit.

This is somewhat like God's creative activity. For as God knows His own essence and from It creates, a poet knows his own subjectivity and from it creates. A poet, however, is a poor god; he needs things before he can find himself; and thus he knows things first, obscurely, through a knowledge arrived at by affective union with them. This last is a knowledge suggested by St. Thomas but which M. Maritain further describes as non-rational and non-conceptual. It comes about through an intentional, significant, or spiritualized emotion that is tendential to creation, that carries the reality into the depth of the subjectivity, where the intuition is born.

The intuition is both cognitive and creative. It knows concrete existences, not essences, and goes beyond them to the infinite; it also knows the Self. Yet as the author says in a rather typical sentence, being both brilliant and obscure, " in the attainments of poetic intuition what is *most immediate* is the experience of the things of the world, because it is natural to the human soul to know things before knowing itself; but what is *most principal* is the experience of the Self—because it is in the awakening of the subjectivity to itself that emotion received in the translucid night of the free life of the intellect is made intentional and intuitive, or the determining means of a knowledge through congeniality." (p. 128, italics his)

As creative the intuition is not an idea, since it does not represent anything, but is rather a spiritual matrix, or intellectual form, containing *formaliter-eminenter* all that exists in a craftsman's idea—and more besides. Later in the book all of this is summed up. Poetic intuition and poetic knowledge is: ". . . an obscure knowledge through inclination—born in the preconscious of the spirit—in which the world is known *in* and

through the subjectivity, grasped both together and inseparably by means of an emotion become intentional and intuitive. Such knowledge is utterly different from what we ordinarily call knowledge. It is neither conceptual nor conceptualizable: it is ineffable in itself, expressible only in signs and images, and finally only in the work made. But precisely because it is not abstractive or rational, it has no intelligible boundaries and expands, as it were, to the infinite." (p. 184, italics his)

This statement we consider to be the core of the book. It is certainly the clearest expression of the thesis, arrived at through pages of difficult, profound thought, often brilliant, often obscure, but never mediocre. In one place the author submits that his views are tentative and exploratory. May I submit that the following criticism of the Maritain theory is also tentative and exploratory, and is put down with no implication of having a closed mind on a deeply mysterious and fascinating subject. This whole area of art, beauty, poetic intuition, is open ground to the Thomist.

And let us recognize immediately many of the basic truths contained in the Maritain theory. First, there *is* some kind of knowledge by inclination which is opposed to scientific knowledge. A boy in an orchard knows an apple in a much different way than a botanist in a laboratory. St. Thomas points out that a virtuous man can know what a virtue is without scientific knowledge, through this knowledge of inclination. Secondly, poetic knowledge is certainly non-rational or non-logical, at least in the obvious sense that it does not attempt to prove by syllogisms its insight into reality. Poetry, after all, is not science. Thirdly, poetry and poetic knowledge must be born in the preconscious of the spirit, since all knowledge comes through the work of the agent intellect, of which we have no experience. But to the statements that poetic knowledge is " neither conceptual nor conceptualizable," is " ineffable in itself . . . is not abstractive . . . has no intelligible boundaries," we cannot but dissent.

If we are going to talk about poetic knowledge we must, it seems to me, admit that it is knowledge. It may be, and it is, a special kind of knowledge, but if the Angelic Doctor teaches that the ordinary way of knowing extra-mental reality is the only way, so long as man is a union of soul and body, then poetic knowledge with all its special indults, must still conform in its essentials to this way. At least, that would be the opinion of St. Thomas. Asking whether the intellect can understand through its intelligible species without a phantasm (*Summa Theol.*, I, q. 84, a. 7) he quotes Aristotle with complete approval: " the soul understands nothing without a phantasm." This implies, of course, that the soul can understand nothing without an intelligible species, or without a concept. He even says further on (q. 85, a. 2) that " the intelligible species is to the intellect what the sensible image is to sense." And again, when he asks whether the separated soul can understand anything (q. 89, a. 1), he answers that " the difficulty in solving this question arises from the fact

that the soul united to the body can understand only by turning to the phantasm."

We have limited this discussion to knowledge of extra-mental reality since, textually speaking, St. Thomas is abundantly clear on this point; that is, he refuses to admit nonconceptual knowledge to man in this life. This is perhaps why M. Maritain works on the experience of the Self as an essential element of poetic knowledge, for in the Thomist exposition of how the soul knows itself, and especially on how it knows the affections of the soul, there seems to me a legitimate doubt as to the necessity of concepts. St. Thomas himself writes: *Affectus animae non sunt in intellectu neque per similitudinem tantum, sicut corpora; neque per praesentiam in subjecto, sicut artes; sed sicut principiatum in principio, in quo habetur notio principiati.* (I, q. 87, a. 4, ad 3). Just how this "notion" would differ from a concept, if it differs at all, is a question, so far as I know, not yet solved. But in any case, since poetic knowledge certainly involves the knowledge of things, then it surely would involve concepts.

And does not the common consent of mankind give this position strength? It attributes to the poets an ability to see more deeply into reality than others, and to express more sharply what they have seen. And it is precisely the flash into the depths they get, the blinding concept, that calls their emotions so much into play. The thing they see moves them deeply, but it seems to me wrong to take away their sight, or to insist that their knowledge is not knowledge, or that their concepts are not concepts. Their knowledge of things is given a resonance by their knowledge of Self, and it is quite clearly a non-scientific, illogical kind of knowledge, and is certainly born in the preconscious; but when it comes out finally, it comes out in concepts.

Concepts need not be scientific. It is by no means necessary to have a clearcut concept of man (i.e., man is a rational animal) in order to see him. Our concepts may be obscure from the standpoint of logic, lacking genus and species, but still brilliantly accurate in capturing some aspect of man. Someone in musing over the tortures inflicted on him by men of an opposing army, said: "Man is a dirty animal." Logically, that is obscure. Descriptively, it is shattering clear. It is like a gunshot. It is, we submit, the beginning of poetry; a flash into the depths.

Thus, when Jacques Maritain says "nonconceptual" we think he should say "extremely conceptual." This is brought out, perhaps, in his discussion of the illuminating image. When Yeats writes,

> The winds that awakened the stars
> Are blowing through my blood

I do not think he is dealing with nonconceptual knowledge. He begins, I believe, with a keen feeling of his exultation, and here we do see the element of knowledge by inclination, or emotion, but he also has a clear

awareness, and it seems to me a *conceptual* awareness of his exaltation. He *knows* he has it and that it is unlike anything on earth. So he reaches into the heavens for his illuminating image. Eliot, Hopkins, Crane, Lowell, Merton, and all the good modern poets, though they may use obscure and startling imagery, are not proceeding in a nonconceptual way. In his long letters to Robert Bridges, which he called his crib notes, Hopkins explains the concentrated thought and jammed concepts in his poems. A Hopkins poem is a concept seething with meaning; it is not a nonconceptual poem.

For all this, I still believe this book to be the most outstanding achievement on art to come from any scholastic philosopher in this century. Jacques Maritain may be an old man and Thomism an old philosophy, but in this book they are both young again. The aging philosopher is a master in facing up to all the new and pressing problems in the field of art. He shows all the enthusiasm of a boy in bringing round his guns to fight the enemy. Mauriac wrote some five years ago (in *Renascence*, v. 2, no. 1, p. 23), "I wonder if surrealism may not be one of the forces to be blamed for the break in the Christian current. Its adherents hunted in the field of religion. It was about 1920 when the devil turned loose into the vineyards of God such beautiful sleek foes as Aragon, Breton, Eluard, Soupault. . . . It is strange that it should be a Thomist philosopher, Jacques Maritain, who fought them most successfully. But Maritain's little house at Meudon is closed now." Yes, but Maritain's big book is open now. And his flags are still flying; there is still thunder in his guns.

The book is handsomely bound. It contains as well sixty-eight reproductions of famous paintings and some hundred pages of source material called "Texts Without Comment," both of which serve to illustrate the points made in the work. The paintings, though better had they been in color, and better still had they been referred to more explicitly in the text, make the book a portable art gallery. The "Texts," consisting of poetry, reflections of artists, literary men, philosophers and saints, make the book a portable anthology of quotable quotes.

The book cannot be read casually, but thoughtful, reflective study will have its reward. The author has summed up his many, many years of penetrating thought on the problems of art, intuition, beauty, poetry, and has, as we have seen, done some exploring into the twilight realm of the preconscious. Some of what he says has already been put down in the now well established *Art and Scholasticism*, and is as thorough-going and brilliant a treatment of the general problems of art as can be found in any book published today. The Maritain insights into the Thomistic doctrine of art as a practical and intellectual virtue, of the relation between art and morality, have long enriched our scholastic literature and have been received with joy even in fields normally beyond the ken of scholastic philosophy.

It was in recognition of these insights, and of the solid reputation of

the man behind them that the lectureship committee of the National Gallery of Art invited M. Maritain to deliver six lectures in their initial series of the A. W. Mellon Lectures, in the spring of 1952. This was a great honor to Maritain as well as to his philosophy, and anyone then in Washington who attempted to procure tickets for those lectures learned a lesson about the prestige of this bent and benign philosopher. *Creative Intuition* grew out of these lectures.

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Principium Sapientiae. By F. M. Cornford. Edited by W. K. Guthrie. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1952. Pp. 227 with index. $5.00.

This unfinished work of the late Professor Cornford, which was published posthumously by Professor Guthrie, tries to uncover the "pre-philosophical" origins of Greek philosophy. The first ten chapters deal with the rise of Greek "empirical theory of knowledge," that type of knowledge which was in most direct opposition to the prevailing mythological, poetic, or hieratic tradition of early Greek thought. Relying on the findings of W. A. Heidel (*Hippocratic Medicine: Its Spirit and Method*, New York 1946), Cornford ably discusses the attitude of the Hippocratic School towards the importation of philosophical speculation or dogmatism into the art of medicine. Protesting the use of philosophical postulates or hypotheses, which are always at the basis of all that is beyond the reach of sense-observation and sense-verification, Hippocrates and his disciples maintained that medicine is an "art" with a long-established existence and reputation of its own, whose paramount value is acknowledged by all those who call upon its services on the gravest occasions and hold its practitioners in highest esteem. Medicine is, and always has been, a practical "art." Its history stretches back untold centuries before it came to have anything even remotely resembling a "scientific theory." The physician was "a healer" (ἰατρός), "a craftsman in the public service" (δημιοεργός), or "a worker with his hands" (χειρουργός). Whatever his personal ideas might have been as to the "nature" of man or the "nature" of "things," he had always to observe and deal with the symptoms of the individual case to find out what was wrong and what had to be done in the particular instance. His reputation, his survival, and, incidentally, his income, unlike that of the speculative philosopher, depended on how successfully he could cure. Hence his "art" had to be securely based on observation, "scientific research," and the discovery of empirical and empirically verifiable facts. For this reason he had no need of any postulates, maxims, or "metaphysics." The only valid standard of truth he recognized was the way in

which each individual patient responded to the individual cure. Hence the best physician was the one who made the least mistakes; who in this "trial and error balance" was able to tip the scales in favor of concrete success rather than to devise dogmatic theories based on assumptions beyond experimental verification. Impelled by its immediate and rather limited interests, ancient medicine became the only known practical "art" to develop something of a truly "empirical method." This attitude of the Hippocratic School, to some extent is also reflected by the practical Xenophon when he ridicules those "philosophers" who concern themselves with what goes on in the skies or beneath the earth (*Memorabilia* 1. 1. 11-16 and 4. 7. 1-10). But it should be borne in mind that Xenophon is here under the "anti-intellectual" influence of Antisthenes who, as may be gathered from the few surviving sources, was wholly averse to any "theoretical speculation" beyond immediate commonsense practicability. (It could also be said that Xenophon, the pious country squire, thunders here against the "modernistic" theories about heaven and earth which replaced the old religious myths.)

From the surviving evidence we may conclude, therefore, that in antiquity the empirical "theory of knowledge" originally was a "medical theory" or "medical method," arising from reflections on the actual procedures of successfully practicing physicians. It came about, Cornford urges, when these physicians, in an act of supreme revolt, tried to disentangle their art from magical antecedents. (It is interesting to note that the earliest Milesian "physicists" likewise attempted to divorce themselves from mythical antecedents.) During the pre-Aristotelean period medicine was the only scientific occupation that could be called "scientific," a fact which Aristotle seems to have acknowledged when he divides the history of early thought into metaphysics (and natural philosophy), mathematics, and medicine. In this sense, Cornford holds, medicine was also a sort of rebellion against the *shamanism* of the past.

Cornford then proceeds to deal with that type of knowledge which is not acquired by the senses, but is *anamnesis*. This "recollection," which in itself connotes something related to the supernatural, is not a personal or individual memory—the waxen tablet of the empiricist—but an impersonal memory, the contents of which are the same with all human beings. Taking the reader through a fine analysis of the Platonic *Meno*, *Phaedo*, *Symposium*, *Republic*, and *Phaedrus*, Cornford expounds the Platonic doctrine that the soul is immortal, and that it had already existed before it became incarnate. This doctrine, which constitutes the cornerstone of Plato's new theory of knowledge, he has heard from "men and women wise in divine matters" as well as from inspired poets such as Pindar. It enables him to develop his earlier theory of Ideas, the objects of knowledge worthy of that name, which are, like the soul, independent of the concrete things that embody them. In sum, the Platonic theory of

knowledge is vitally bound up with the belief in the immortality and pre-existence of the soul. The close interconnection of *anamnesis*, immortality, pre-existence, incarnation of the soul, and mathematics (as pure forms) in Plato definitely points to a Pythagorean or Orphic source. The final result is then that all knowledge is recovered out of the mind itself, a view which was also held by Heracleitus of Ephesus.

Besides the *anamnesis* there exists also a type of knowledge that comes to us by a sort of inspiration, like that of the seer or the poets who, "in their rapt condition say many true things, but do not know what they mean." They have no *νοῦς*, but are "possessed by divine inspiration." This "fringe of mythical belief" is the "inspirational way of knowing," the "visionary insight into things." It constitutes the oldest "theory of knowledge." In Plato most likely it goes back to Pythagorean or Orphic religious traditions. This is "the gift of heaven," the "madness" or "visionary power" which takes hold of the seer, the poet, and the true philosopher (the Platonic Phaedrus enumerates four kinds of divine madness), the three purifiers of human souls who discover in the past those forgotten errors of which present evils are the consequence. Since the seer, the poet, and the philosopher have a divinely inspired passion for the beautiful and love for the good, at least for Plato (*Symposium*) they are really one and the same person. (Orpheus, according to *Phaedrus* 244A, for instance, was the "union" of all forms of "divine madness": the founder of mysteries, the prophet, the poet, and the teacher of Musaeus.) The Platonic-Pythagorean combination of seer, poet, and sage (or philosopher), as well as the implied belief that all exceptional form of wisdom is the prerogative of inspired persons who are in direct touch with gods or spirits, leads Cornford, who in this is under the influence of N. Kershaw Chadwick's *Poetry and Prophecy* (Cambridge, 1942) and *The Growth of Literature* (Cambridge, 1932), to the assumption that we have here before us a common Eurasiatic tradition which links the mantic cults of the Teutonic-Norse and Celtic peoples and the *shamanism* of northern Asia. The *shamans* or *bakshas*, who never degenerate into cheap witch-doctors or vulgar "medicine-men," are inspired singers, poets, musicians, diviners, priests, physicians, guardians of religion, teachers, and preservers of ancient legends. They are the inspired ("mad") intermediaries between the people and the gods or spirits. The whole intellectual life of the community rests almost wholly upon the *shaman*, who is held to possess superior and even supernatural spiritual, intellectual, and artistic gifts. It is the "*shamanic* inspiration" that may constitute the ultimate background behind the mintrelsy of the Homeric cycle, or the didactic poetry of Hesiod—behind the statement in the Hesiodic *Theogony* (27) about "fictions like the truth," a statement that can also be found in Homer, *Od.* 14.124 and 19.203. Should Cornford's attempt at linking the *shamanism* of northern Asia to certain types of Greek mythology and therefore to the beginning of

Greek philosophy prove correct—and the evidence seems to support his contention—then this monumental discovery would compel us to revise some of our most cherished notions concerning the origin of Greek speculation.

In the course of time the "philosopher" became the successor and "rival" of the seer (or the poet) and *shaman*. Pythagoras, like so many of the so-called "Wise Men of Old," according to tradition, belonged to those "divine people," that is, "divinely inspired people," who became legendary figures even during their life-time. No wonder that Pythagoras, the member of a mystical cult-society and the prophet of the mantic or Hyperborean Apollo, is called by Aristotle (frag. 191) the successor of Epimenides, Aristeas, Hermotimus, Abaris, and Pherekydes—all of them "wonder-workers." In addition, tradition records many a miracle performed by Pythagoras. Heracleitus of Ephesus, the prophet of wisdom and deep insight, in his oracular style maintained that he was no one's pupil, but had "searched himself" and learned everything from himself (Diogenes Laertius 9.1 and 9.5). For as Pindar said: "Wise is he who knows much by inborn genius; but those who have learned from others are like ravens chattering in vain against the divine bird of Zeus." "Listen not to me but to the *logos* . . . ," (frag. 1) Heracleitus exclaims like an inspired Eleusian hierophant, warning the faithful that they must understand the "words" and be pure of heart and hand. Parmenides, the visionary and inspired prohet of the νόυς, who in the metric (hieratic) language of prophecy claims that his poem is a "revelation" accorded to him by a goddess behind the gates of Night and Day (possibly the goddess of Reason), dismisses the evidence of the senses as a delusion. Like in the *shamanic* tradition, he travels through the heavens to visit the goddess who instructs him in all things. (The Siberian *shaman*, mounted on a bird, also travels to Erlik Khan, the black ruler in the realm of the dead, or to the sixteenth heaven, the abode of the highest god, to receive some revelation.) In his *Purifications*, Empedocles, who displays a great affinity with Pythagoras, Pherekydes, and Epimenides, contends that during his many reincarnations he had been "born in all manner of life: I have been a boy and a girl, a bush and a bird, and a dumb fish in the sea." But the same is claimed by the Asiatic *shaman*, by the Celtic bard, and by the Norse Othin. (Cf. *The Voyage of Bran*, the *Welsh Book of Taliesin*, or the *Edda*.)

The emancipation of the philosopher from the inspired seer or *shaman* was a revolt of the first magnitude which perforce led to a bitter quarrel between the two. The seer's business is to know and interpret the intention of the gods, and to foresee the future; the philosopher, in his sceptical attitude "scans the skies and the earth beneath" for a "scientific" or "materialistic" explanation of natural phenomena, thus endangering the status of the seer. The seer, alarmed by such developments, struck back, as the fate of Anaxagoras or Protagoras, to mention only a few, should

indicate. It was the seer Diopeithes who carried a law that authorized the indictment of those who disbelieved in "divine things" and "divine signs," or taught "naturalistic theories" about what goes on in the heavens (Plutarch, *Pericles* 32). The *Clouds* of Aristophanes, in the same vain, denounce those who study "the things in the skies and beneath the earth" (*Clouds* 365)—the traditional "travel routes" of the *shaman*. (No wonder that the apologist Xenophon, in *Memorabilia* 1. 1. 11-16, should try to absolve Socrates of all suspicion of having been interested in "the things in the skies and beneath the earth.") But I cannot agree with Cornford's statement that the main theme of the Platonic *Euthyphro* is a "collision" between the seer Euthyphro and the philosopher Socrates. In my opinion Socrates-Plato here takes issue with the Antisthenian contention that one must put "honesty" above the duties of filial piety (Diogenes Laertius 6.12). For does not Socrates, after having listened to the story of Euthyphro, retort with a "By Hercules!" (Jowett completely misses the point when he translates "By the Heavens")—an exclamation which indicates that he is contesting an Antisthenian maxim.

Like the quarrel between the seer and the philosopher, so also the clash between the philosopher and the poet—the "inspired visionary of the past"—had much to do with the development of Greek philosophy. Aside from Plato's strictures, we remember that Xenophanes rejected Homer's anthropomorphism; that Heracleitus denied that the poets alone possessed prophetic knowledge; that Parmenides insisted that poetic cosmogonies and theogonies were pure fancy; and that Leucippus, Democritus, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, Diogenes of Apollonia, and others indulged in "unpoetic abstractions." All these are, in the final analysis, instances of the clash between the "inspired poet" and the "sober philosopher." It is here that poets and philosophers part ways: the poets could not very well dispense with the Olympian personalities, while the philosophers, unconcerned with the cults or tradition of religion, rejected the mythological adventures of personalized gods.

The second part of Cornford's book discusses the possible connections that might exist between earliest Greek cosmogonies and theogonies and certain creationist myths of the East, particularly those of Mesopotamia. The present reviewer is not qualified to discuss the extremely informative and interesting theories advanced by Cornford. At the same time, he is fully aware of the dangers and difficulties inherent in all studies of "comparative literature," "comparative religion," and "comparative mythology." It might be interesting, however, to add here a bit of information which seems to have escaped Cornford. The Hittite-Hurrian *Epic of Kumarbi*, recently discovered (and made accessible by the work of Güterbock), displays strong similarities both with the Babylonian *Hymn to Marduk* and Hesiod's *Hymn to Zeus*. Undoubtedly, the *Epic of Kumarbi* is dependent on the *Hymn to Marduk*, and, conversely, the Hesiodic *Hymn to*

Zeus is most likely under the influence of the *Epic of Kumarbi*. Now it is quite possible that Minoan traders or Mycaenean travellers became acquainted with the *Epic of Kumarbi* at Ugarit, the great trading center and meeting place of the Minoan-Aegean peoples and the Hittites. From Ugarit they may have carried this *Epic* (or a version of it) to Crete (where it might have passed through a "Cretan phase"), and from there to Greece, where it could become the "model" for the Hesiodic *Hymn to Zeus*. In this fashion the work of Hesiod could be linked to the Babylonian *Hymn to Marduk*.

The last work of Cornford, like all his writings, is not merely informative, interesting, or challenging: it is brilliant, whether or not we can agree with some of his ideas and interpretations. When death took the pen out of his hand, he might possibly have stood on the threshold of certain basic discoveries which, if more fully verified, might compel us to revise radically some of our traditional views concerning the background and origin of "Western philosophy." The editor or editors, who had the courage to publish an "unfinished manuscript," ought to be highly recommended for their excellent judgment.

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BRIEF NOTICES

Neuf Leçons sur les Notions Premières de la Philosophie Morale. By Jacques Maritain. Paris: Tequi, 1952. Pp. 195.

In this volume M. Maritain studies the basic principles of moral philosophy in nine "lessons," just as he did in the field of metaphysics, in his *Sept Leçons sur L'Etre*. The author realizes the need for the moralist to make a scientific and sympathetic approach to the discoveries of Freud and other modern psychologists. He studies the various great ethical systems, with special emphasis on the general principles of classical ethics, of Kant, and of the sociological school. With this background, Maritain proceeds to a discussion of the good, value, judgments of value, the end and finality, the norm or rule of morality, duty and obligation, and sanction. Throughout it is the author's aim to present these basic questions according to the Thomistic doctrine, with a minimum of technical expression. As the eminent Thomist, Fr. J.-M. Ramirez, O.P., has noted, Maritain is not always too clear in his expositions, but one can see that he has touched upon all the major problems of moral philosophy. We shall limit ourselves to a brief discussion of some points of particular interest.

Of major importance is the author's discussion of the two main aspects of the moral good. The first is that of value, in the perspective of formal causality, signifying the intrinsically good quality of a human act; the second is the consideration of the moral good in the perspective of finality, of that to which man tends as a free agent. In the order of pure values, one is concerned with the specification of the moral act, and with a static order, while in the dynamic order of morality, of efficient causality or exercise, it is the consideration of finality that is supreme. Except for the use of the term "value," this is the classical Thomistic conception of the absolute and relative aspects of the moral act. The absolute deals with the abstract consideration of the human act in its goodness (as compared to the judgment of reason, e.g., the abstract goodness of an act of justice); the relative view concerns the moral agent, the act, and their relation to the ultimate end in the actual order. Maritain lays far greater emphasis, it seems, on the absolute, on "value," though, on the other hand, St. Thomas would appear to emphasize the aspect of finality as primary and dominant in the moral order. Involved here is the very difficult problem of what, in the last analysis, specifies the moral act. An act is absolutely good, morally speaking, when in conformity with a judgment of suitability, of "value"—thus the author analyses the notion of a "*bonum honestum morale*" in the order of specification and formal causality: "value" applies to something which of itself has the quality of evoking love for itself, and is a good in itself to which the will naturally tends. In virtue of a judg-

ment bearing on such a "value," a human act is specified as good. The problem here is—what function does finality, the consideration of the ultimate end, play in the order of specification? What function does finality play in determining what is good, and according to right reason? One may say that an act is termed morally good or evil in a relation of conformity or difformity, of adaptation or lack of adaptation to the ultimate end of man. Just how are these two aspects of the morally good act to be conceived in their mutual relations? Space does not allow us to enter into a discussion of this matter at the present time, but it may be remarked that in the Thomistic moral theory, it is necessary to consider the role of finality, not only in the order of exercise, but also in that of specification. M. Maritain has made too great a distinction between the final and the formal aspects of the morally good act, and he should have discussed the relation of the human act to man's ultimate end in his consideration of the specification of the human act.

Closely connected with this problem is that of the origin and nature of moral obligation. Basing himself on his doctrine of value, M. Maritain states unequivocally that moral obligation depends on value, in the line of intrinsic formal causality, and not on the order to the ultimate end. The proof of this position is that otherwise there would be no obligation to choose as the end of human life the true ultimate good. To establish the obligation to choose the true ultimate goal, one must have recourse to the consideration of value in the order of specification, and not to the consideration of finality. Again, this is a complex problem, and one to which various answers have been given, as one may see by reading such modern Thomistic authors as Gilson, Gillet, Lottin and Sertillanges. The first problem here is whether or not it is correct to use the vocabulary of obligation in this regard. For formally and strictly, obligation implies a duality of persons—the regulator and the regulated, and it is only by extension that man can be said to be obligated by his own nature, which tends to the true ultimate end in virtue of an immanent natural law. The second problem is to determine whether obligation properly pertains to the order of finality or to that of formality. It seems to be the commonly accepted position of Thomistic authors, as of St. Thomas, to relate obligation to finality, so that the source of obligation is the end, or the necessary connection of an act with that end. Under different aspects, it is true to say both that the ultimate end is such because it is good, and to say that it is absolutely good because it is the ultimate end: to say that a lesser end is "*honestum*" because it is good *per se*, and to say that it is good because as a means, it shares or participates in the goodness of the ultimate end.

Another related question is to be found in the proper understanding of that basic moral principle: *bonum faciendum, malum vitandum*. We may agree with M. Maritain that this is a proposition in the second mode of *per se* predication, though further explanations of this position should be

given for complete understanding. It does not, however, seem quite correct to see this principle as the first expression of "obligation." Rather, the notion of obligation is based on this principle, but since obligation is not the primary consideration of morality, neither does it seem correct to interpret this principle as dealing primarily with obligation, or even to put the idea of obligation on an equal footing with that of the good conforming to right reason which is the basic meaning of the principle. It is to be remembered that the notion of strict obligation is not coextensive with that of the moral good.

A final point to be mentioned is found in the Fifth Lesson, where M. Maritain discusses the need for the moral philosopher to have an "adequate" existential view of man and his supernatural destiny. To those acquainted with the author's works this doctrine on an "adequate" moral philosophy—*adéquatement prise*—one need not note that much controversy has been occasioned by this position. For the present reviewer it is difficult to see how M. Maritain can continue to maintain his opinion in view of the solid and balanced criticisms offered by such eminent scholars as Fathers Ramirez and Deman. There is no need to repeat here the cogent arguments advanced against the position of M. Maritain, but one may ask whether the problem raised is a real one, as the author maintains. Is moral philosophy inadequate and insufficient without taking into account the supernatural truths mentioned, relating above all to the actual ultimate end of man? On this matter, we agree with Fr. Th. Deman, O.P. that the "inadequacy" of moral philosophy does not prevent its being a true practical science.

The remarks made on this volume are not so much criticisms as indications of the complexity of the fundamental issues of moral philosophy. There is no doubt that this volume is one to be read and studied by all who are interested in the Thomistic theory of ethics.

S. Thomae Aquinatis Catena Aurea in Quattuor Evangelia. Nova editio cura P. Angelici Guarienti, O.P. Turin: Marietti, 1953. Vol. I, pp. 573. Vol. II, pp. 598 with index.

S. Thomas Aquinatis Super Epistolas S. Pauli Lectura. Ed. VIII revisa cura P. Raphaelis Cai, O.P. Turin: Marietti, 1953. Vol. I, pp. 719. Vol. II, pp. 578 with index.

In the *Catena Aurea,* written at the command of Pope Urban IV and completed in 1267, the Angelic Doctor wrote that he had selected texts from the various authors with great care in order to avoid prolixity, and even in some cases had changed word order for the sake of clarity. He admitted that the work might appear lengthy, but he had made it as

brief as possible in accord with his aim which was to expose both the literal and mystical senses. St. Thomas also noted that the translation of Chrysostom's *Homilies* is poor, and that some of the works he used were spurious. In view of this, we believe that the present edition would have been enhanced had Father Guarienti, O. P. attempted some critical work upon the citations made by St. Thomas. This, however, is a minor defect and in no way detracts from the usefulness of these volumes to theologians, exegetes and preachers.

In editing the Commentary on the Epistles of St. Paul, Father Cai continues the fine work that he has done on other work of St. Thomas in this series. He begins with an excellent critical introduction on the nature of the Commentary, its place in the works of St. Thomas, and its various editions. In the course of the work itself he has numbered the paragraphs and to these added something which we consider to be of great value, namely, a list of the parallel places in the principal works of St. Thomas. At the end of each volume he has provided a schematic division of each Epistle as given by St. Thomas in his commentary. At the end of the work he has given an index of the authors quoted by St. Thomas, and, finally, a topical index.

The Commentary itself, as we now have it, is really the fruit of the labors of previous editors. The commentary on Romans and the first seven chapters of I Corinthians is the *expositio* of St. Thomas himself when he lectured for the second time on the Epistles at Naples, 1272-1273. The remainder of the work is chiefly the *reportatio* of Reginald of Piperno, made from St. Thomas' first series of lectures on the Epistles in Italy, 1259-1268.

Father Cai has not given us a complete critical edition. Nevertheless he has done much in this regard, and he has indicated certain lines along which future investigations should proceed. It is a great service that he has rendered, both for theologians and for preachers.

The Analogy of Names. By Thomas de Vio, Cardinal Cajetan. Translated and annotated by Edward A. Bushinski, C. S. Sp. in collaboration with Henry J. Koren, C. S. Sp. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1953. Pp. 103 with index. $2.25, cloth. $1.50, paper.

The translation of Cardinal Cajetan's work on analogy is an event of major significance for the English-speaking philosophical world. All the more valuable is it because of the superb craftsmanship with which the entire project has been accomplished. The volume is the fourth in a philosophical series issued by Duquesne University Press. In technical perfection as to format and print the book is superior in every way. This precision in its mechanical aspects is but indicative of the magnificence of its textual content.

In the Foreword Father Koren explains the purpose of the work and the scholarship that went into the finished product. For the most part, the translation of the text is based on the excellent Latin Zammit edition. This also supplies guidance for many of the useful footnotes and to these Father Bushinski has made extremely valuable additions.

After the instructive Foreword there follows a life of Cardinal Cajetan which is a gem of writing and shows what can be done in this field of biography by someone with imagination in the presentation of the facts. Cajetan emerges as a real flesh and blood personality who lived an exciting life, packed with action, and still able to write profound, scholarly works. Indeed, the sketch is so excellent that one hopes a full length work in English in this fluent style might appear.

The remainder of the book is, of course, the actual translation of Cajetan's great work plus the letter he wrote to his fellow Dominican, Francis of Ferrara. In his literal translation Father Bushinski has lost none of the flavor of Cajetan nor has he fallen into a stilted style of his own. Each paragraph of the text is numbered, which provides quick and easy reference. Especially long paragraphs are neatly divided making for better reading. The book concludes with two superb indices.

Really everything about this book is magnificent. Some may take exception to a footnote here and there where the translator expresses his opinion one way or the other. For instance, there is the observation on page 10, footnote 6, that the Zammit and Hering editions are misleading in using the word species when speaking of analogy. It is feared that this might lead one to think that analogy itself is univocal. In reply it can be said that species is often taken in a broad sense simply to mean type. However, such criticism is so trivial as to be insignificant. Duquesne can be proud to have its name, its staff, and its press associated in the publication of Cajetan's *The Analogy of Names*. This is a volume that all philosophers will want to possess.

Philosophico-Scientific Problems. By P. Henry Van Laer. Translated by Henry J. Koren, C. S. SP. (Duquesne Studies, Philosophical Series 3). Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1953. Pp. 179 with index. $3.25.

After all that has been said and written about the relations of science to philosophy and the other branches of human culture, this problem still remains crucial for contemporary thought and education. The older mechanistic and materialistic interpretations of physical reality have been abandoned, but relativism and indeterminism have been widely accepted in their stead. These new theories do not offer us either a picture or an

intelligible explanation of things as they are, but rather an elaborate dialectical construction which may be beautiful in itself and even useful for new discoveries and technical applications, yet need not necessarily be true. If we cannot determine the real natures of things, then we must face the alternative that our genuine knowledge is limited to the data of sensory experience. This new positivism is a symptom of the contemporary crisis in educational theory and practice. We can hardly expect to build a solid structure of reasonable understanding of the world or any practical wisdom on the shifting sands of mere sensory experience.

Dr. Van Laer sees the way out of these difficulties along the path of a realistic insight into the nature of reality which can be attained by the right use of experience and reason. The outstanding defenders of the rights and powers of reason and experience were Aristotle and St. Thomas, and these great teachers have left us a precious common possession of fundamental principles and realistic theories. Of this ancient wisdom the Christian schools are the fortunate possessors and guardians. Its methods and principles not only forearm us against the confusions and uncertainties in contemporary theories but also enable us to give a reasonable explanation of the established laws and properties of natural things in terms of the four kinds of causes. Whatever the theoretician may say to the contrary, the physicist investigates the causes of phenomena, and for this task he will find much help in the Thomist philosophy.

The author believes that the return to Thomistic realism will be a long and difficult journey. But it is one well worth making, because Thomism is suited to the powers and needs of human nature. No one is satisfied with sense experience alone, nor with mere dialectical constructions. Man craves an intellectual insight into being and causes, and is loath to admit that intelligibility is limited to sensory data. By defending the validity of both experience and reason, Thomistic realism opens up broad possibilities of knowing things directly and of understanding them through their proper causes.

From this vantage ground we need not stand in childish awe of modern science, but can appreciate both its strength and its weaknesses. Without presupposing a profound knowledge either of science or philosophy, the author proceeds to distinguish material things from immaterial, asserting that extension is the criterion of matter. On this point he departs somewhat from Aristotle, who considered things with sensory motion or change to be most evident, and from motion proved that every mobile or material being is extended. (Phy. VI, 234 b 9) The third chapter treats of the principle of verification, and the long fourth chapter is a thorough consideration of action at a distance. There are two chapters on causality, determinism and finality, and the last chapter points out differences between physical science and mathematics.

The problems discussed in this book are genuine and timely. The careful reader will be grateful for the light which is cast on many difficult ques-

tions, and will have his appetite sharpened for more. It is a neat book, easy to read, and the treatment is for the most part simple and solid. Yet the harmony of the whole is broken in a few places by an unnatural contrast between science and the philosophy of nature, and this in spite of the fact that naturalists are presented as men interested in the natural causes of things. It is arbitrary to limit natural science to the causes of phenomena as such. If the naturalist uses his reason as well as his senses he can discover all the causes of natural things, from first to last, and in every order of causality: material, formal, efficient and final. This is the way Aristotle conceived natural science or the philosophy of nature, and he carefully distinguished it from metaphysics. (*Phys.* II, 194 a 13) A genuine philosophy of nature according to the mind of Aristotle and St. Thomas will synthesize on the basis of the ancient principles of natural science all that is certain or probable in contemporary knowledge of the world.

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